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FOREWORD
As the Obama administration took office, Russo-American
relations were generally acknowledged to be at an impasse. Arms
control issues feature prominently in that conflicted agenda.
Indeed, as of September 2008, the Bush administration was
contemplating not just a break in arms talks but actual sanctions,
and allowed the bilateral civil nuclear treaty with Russia to die
in the Senate rather than go forward for confirmation. Russian
spokesmen make clear their belief that American concessions
on key elements of arms control issues like missile defenses in
Europe are a touchstone for the relationship and a condition of
any further progress towards genuine dialogue.
This impasse poses several risks beyond the obvious one of
a breakdown in U.S.-Russian relations and the easily foreseeable
bilateral consequences thereof. But those are by no means the only
reasons for concern regarding the arms control agenda. Since the
outbreak of the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008, both sides
have further hardened positions and raised tensions apart from
the war itself and Russia’s quite evident refusal to abide by its
own cease-fire terms. Nevertheless, and for better or worse, arms
control and its agenda will remain at the heart of the bilateral
Russo-American relationship for a long time. Arms control and
disarmament issues are quintessentially political as well as military
issues that are among the most critical components of the bilateral
relationship and regional security in both Europe and Asia. For
these reasons, neither the political nor the military aspect can be
divorced from the other. And for these same reasons, we cannot
refuse to participate in the bilateral effort to resolve those issues.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this
monograph as part of the ongoing debate on Russo-American
relations.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Even before the Russian invasion of Georgia in
August 2008, U.S.-Russian relations were reaching
an impasse. Matters have only grown worse since
then as Washington has stopped all bilateral military
cooperation with Moscow, and it is difficult to imagine
either Washington or the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) entering into arms control talks
with Russia before the end of the George W. Bush
administration. Indeed, as of September 2008, the
administration is contemplating not just a break in arms
talks but actual sanctions, and has allowed the bilateral
civil nuclear treaty with Russia to die in the Senate rather
than go forward for confirmation. U.S. Ambassador
to Russia John Beyerle recently admitted that this is
not a propitious time for bilateral nuclear cooperation
and explicitly tied its resumption to Russian policy in
Georgia. Similarly, Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) and
former Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), who authored the
Comprehensive Threat Reduction Program (CTR) to
ensure the removal of unsafe nuclear materials and
weapons from Russian arsenals, have expressed their
concern that continuation of this vital program may
now be in danger due to the deterioration in RussoAmerican relations. But those are by no means the only
reasons for concern regarding the arms control agenda.
Since August 8 when the war broke out, the following
developments on both sides have further hardened
positions and raised tensions apart from the war itself
and Russia’s quite evident refusal to abide by its own
cease-fire terms.
Poland has signed an agreement with the United
States to host up to 10 missile defense interceptors and,
as a public sign of its distrust of NATO guarantees,
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demanded and obtained a mutual security guarantee
and the stationing of Patriot air defense batteries from
the United States, whose troops will defend some of
those batteries through 2012. This triggered Russian
threats to attack Poland with nuclear missiles and to
“neutralize the American missile defenses by military
means.” Ukraine, undoubtedly due to Russian threats,
has also stated its readiness to work with the West on
missile defenses. Finally, Russia has announced its
intention to equip the Baltic Fleet with nuclear weapons,
and Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt announced in
return that “According to the information to which we
have access, there are already tactical nuclear weapons
in the Kaliningrad area. They are located both at and in
the vicinity of units belonging to the Russia fleet.”
For better or worse, arms control and its agenda
remain at the heart of the bilateral Russo-American
relationship and will remain there for a long time to
come. Thus arms control and disarmament issues
are quintessentially political as well as military
issues that are among the most critical components
of the bilateral relationship and regional security in
both Europe and Asia. For these reasons, neither the
political nor the military aspect can be divorced from
the other. Furthermore, for the Russian government,
the United States is its principal partner or interlocutor
precisely because of the importance Moscow attaches
to this agenda as having not just profound impact on
the bilateral U.S.-Russian relationship, but as a major
factor of global significance and import.
Accordingly, from Moscow’s standpoint, trends
in this bilateral relationship exercise a profound
and fundamental influence upon the entire world
order. Neither is this exclusively a Russian view. For
example, Stephen Cimbala, a long-time analyst of the
bilateral strategic relationship of U.S. and Russian
viii

military policies, writes that this relationship is one
of complex interaction that relates to the strategic
agenda of NATO and to the question not just of
nuclear force structures among the superpowers, but
also of global proliferation issues. This connection
between the major nuclear powers’ self-restraint and
even downsizing of their arsenals and the viability
and durability of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
regime is clear and enshrined in both the NPT itself
and in formal documents between Russia and America.
For example, the Strategic Framework Declaration
on U.S.-Russian relations signed by both Presidents
Bush and Vladimir Putin on April 6, 2008, explicitly
states that both governments will work toward a postStrategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) agreement
on limiting strategic arms that would enable “strategic
offensive arms reductions to the lowest possible level
consistent with our national security requirements
and alliance commitments.” It also further stated
that such an agreement would “be a further step in
implementing our commitments under Article VI of the
[Nonproliferation] Treaty.” Under present conditions
of hostility due to the crisis generated by the war in
Georgia, the converse is true. If strategic arms control
accords cannot be reached, the likelihood of increased
proliferation increases accordingly, and the 2010
Review conference of the NPT will be as big a fiasco, if
not worse, than was the 2005 session.
For these reasons, even if anyone is skeptical about
many of the claims made on behalf of arms control
and deterrence, certain hard facts and outcomes
remain indisputable. Certainly for Russia, America’s
willingness to engage it seriously over these issues
means that America respects it as a power and
potential interlocutor, if not a partner. On the other
hand, numerous and constant Russian complaints
ix

are that America will not respond to its proposals or
consult with it. Although these are likely false claims,
it has long been the case that the Bush administration’s
preference is to maximize its freedom of action by
claiming that Russia and the United States were no
longer enemies. Therefore we need not go back to the
Cold War, and each side can pursue its own agenda in
security.
The current discord on arms control reflects not
only Moscow’s wounded ego and foreign policy based
to a considerable degree on feelings of resentment
and revanche, but also America’s unwillingness to
take Russia as seriously as Moscow’s inflated sense of
grandiose self-esteem demands. If Russia and America
reach a strategic impasse, the global situation as a
whole deteriorates correspondingly.
Moreover, a constant factor in the relationship
irrespective of its political temperature at any time is
that both sides’ nuclear forces remain frozen in a posture
of mutual deterrence that implies a prior adversarial
relationship that could easily deteriorate further under
any and all circumstances. The problematic nature
of the bilateral relationship is not due to deterrence.
Rather, deterrence is a manifestation of a prior
underlying and fundamental political antagonism
in which Russia has settled upon deterrence as a
policy and strategy because that strategy expresses its
foundational presupposition of conflict with America
and NATO. Thus the fundamental basis of the rivalry
with Washington is political and stems from the nature
of the Russian political system, which cannot survive
in its present structure without that presupposition
of conflict and enemies and a revisionist demand for
equality with the United States so that it is tied down
by Russian concerns and interests. From Russia’s
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standpoint, the only way it can have security vis-àvis the United States, given that presupposition of
conflict, is if America is shackled to a continuation
of the mutual hostage relationship, based on mutual
deterrence that characterized the Cold War, so that it
cannot act unilaterally. In this fashion, Russia gains a
measure of restraint or even of control over U.S. policy.
Thanks to such a mutual hostage relationship, Russian
leaders see all other states who wish to attack them, or
even to exploit internal crises like Chechnya, as being
deterred. Therefore nuclear weapons remain a critical
component in ensuring strategic stability and, as less
openly stated, in giving Russia room to act freely in
world affairs.
Indeed Moscow sees its nuclear arsenal as a kind
of all-purpose deterrent that has deterred the United
States and NATO from intervening in such conflicts
as the Chechen wars. Nevertheless, its military
and political leaders argue that threats to Russia
are multiplying. Certainly Russian officials see the
weaponization of space, the integration of space and
terrestrial capabilities, missile defenses, the Reliable
Replacement Weapons (RRW), and the U.S. global
strike strategy as apart of a systematic, comprehensive
strategy to threaten Russia. So in response Moscow
must threaten Europe.
The perpetuation of the Cold War’s mutual hostage
relationship is, of course, exactly what the United States,
at least under the George W. Bush administration, has
striven mightily to leave behind. Russian analysts and
officials believe in deterrence and the accompanying
mutual hostage condition of both sides’ nuclear forces
as the only way to stop what they see as America’s
constant efforts to find ways in which nuclear weapons
can be used for warfighting or to be free to use military
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force across the globe without being deterred by anyone.
However, U.S. current weapon plans, the development
of missile defenses, reluctance to negotiate verification
protocols for a START treaty, NATO enlargement, and
weapons in space, all suggest to Russia that there is
“a growing gap between the military capabilities of
the two countries. This gap challenges the condition
of strategic parity that Russia still believes to be the
underlying principle of its relationship with the United
States. This enduring adversarial condition reflects
a mutual failure on the part of both Washington and
Moscow.

xii

RUSSIA AND ARMS CONTROL:
ARE THERE OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION?
INTRODUCTION
Even before the Russian invasion of Georgia in
August 2008, U.S.-Russian relations were reaching an
impasse. And matters have only grown worse since
then as Washington has stopped all bilateral military
cooperation with Moscow, and it is difficult to imagine
either Washington or the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) entering into arms control talks
with Russia before the end of the George W. Bush
administration. Indeed, the administration is, as of
September 2008, contemplating not just a break in arms
talks but actual sanctions, and has allowed the bilateral
civil nuclear treaty with Russia to die in the Senate rather
than go forward for confirmation.1 U.S. Ambassador
to Russia John Beyerle recently admitted that this is
not a propitious time for bilateral nuclear cooperation
and explicitly tied its resumption to Russian policy in
Georgia.2 Similarly, Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) and
former Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), who authored the
Comprehensive Threat Reduction Program (CTR) to
ensure the removal of unsafe nuclear materials and
weapons from Russian arsenals, have expressed their
concern that continuation of this vital program may
now be in danger due to the deterioration in RussoAmerican relations.3 More recently, as a result of the
U.S. presidential election and the inability of the United
States to respond effectively to the invasion of Georgia
and truncation of its integrity, arms control negotiations
have resumed. Indeed, Moscow has repeatedly made
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clear its desire to negotiate with President Obama on
all the outstanding arms control issues.4
But despite the resumption of talks, there are still
many reasons for concern regarding the arms control
agenda. Since August 8 when the war broke out, the
following developments on both sides have further
hardened positions and raised tensions apart from the
war itself and Russia’s quite evident refusal to abide
by its own cease-fire terms.
Poland has signed an agreement with the United
States to host up to 10 missile defense interceptors and,
as a public sign of its distrust of NATO guarantees,
demanded and obtained a mutual security guarantee
and the stationing of Patriot air defense batteries from
the United States, whose troops will defend some of
those batteries through 2012. This, in turn, triggered
Russian threats to attack Poland with nuclear missiles
and to “neutralize the American missile defenses by
military means.5 Ukraine, too, undoubtedly due to
Russian threats, has also stated its readiness to work
with the West on missile defenses.6 Finally, Russia
has announced its intention to equip the Baltic Fleet
with nuclear weapons and Swedish Foreign Minister
Carl Bildt announced in return that, “According to the
information to which we have access, there are already
tactical nuclear weapons in the Kaliningrad area. They
are located both at and in the vicinity of units belonging
to the Russia fleet.”7
In other words, Bildt disclosed that Russia has long
been violating the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives agreed
to by Presidents George H. W. Bush and Boris Yeltsin
removing tactical nuclear weapons (or nonstrategic
nuclear weapons as Moscow calls them, TNW and
NSNW respectively) from on board their countries’
fleets in 1991-92. This public revelation of Russian
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cheating would, under the best of circumstances, have
raised red flags in Washington and Europe regarding
future cooperation. Today it merely confirms the
gathering and overwhelming impression that arms
control deals with Russia are inherently dangerous and
futile because Moscow will not abide by them unless
there is a rigorous inspection and verification regime.
Furthermore, General Nikolai Makarov, Russia’s
Chief of the General Staff, has recently publicly stated
that Russia will retain its TNW as long as Europe is
“packed with armaments” as a guarantee of Russian
security and that priority funding will be directed
to Russia’s nuclear arsenal.8 Beyond that, Russia is
buying new nuclear missiles whose main attribute is
their ability to evade U.S. missile defenses and, as part
of its prioritization of its nuclear forces, will buy and
deliver to the forces over 70 strategic missiles, over 30
short-range Iskander missiles, and a large number of
booster rockets and aircraft.9 Moscow will also spend
$35.3 billion on serial production of all weapons in
2009-11 (1 trillion rubles) and virtually double the
number of strategic missile launches to 13 for 2009.10
This procurement policy represents both a quantum
leap in Russian capabilities if it can be consummated
and also would constitute a major step in a new actionreaction cycle of procurements based on the old Cold
War paradigm. The key question is whether the Russian
economy, which is now reeling under the shock of
what will almost certainly be a protracted and global
economic crisis, can sustain this level of procurement
without collapsing as did its Soviet predecessor.
This testifies to the possibility that recognition of the
strain upon the economy inherent in such ambitious
procurement goals, along with the desire to enter into
a serious negotiation with the Obama administration,
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may be affecting policy considerations. ColonelGeneral Nikolai Solovtsov, Commander in Chief of
Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces, also recently stated
that, “If Americans give up plans to deploy the third
positioning region (i.e., missile defenses in Poland and
the Czech Republic—author) and other elements of the
strategic missile defense system, then certainly we will
adequately respond to it.”11
Therefore, the current arms control agenda stands
poised between a continued hardening of both
sides’ positions or else the possibility of substantive
negotiations. Likewise, for better or worse, arms control
and its agenda remain at the heart of the bilateral RussoAmerican relationship and will remain there for a long
time to come. Thus arms control and disarmament
issues are quintessentially political as well as military
issues that are among the most critical components
of the bilateral relationship and regional security in
both Europe and Asia. For these reasons, neither the
political nor the military aspect can be divorced from
the other. Furthermore, for the Russian government,
the United States is its principal partner or interlocutor
precisely because of the importance Moscow attaches
to this agenda as having not just profound impact on
the bilateral U.S.-Russian relationship, but as a major
factor of global significance and import. As Russian
Chief of Staff General Yuri Baluyevsky wrote in 2006,
“It will not be an exaggeration to say that the relations
between Russia and the United States have actually
defined and are defining the situation in the world
over the course of nearly an entire century now.”12
Accordingly, from Moscow’s standpoint, trends
in this bilateral relationship exercise a profound
and fundamental influence upon the entire world
order. Neither is this exclusively a Russian view. For
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example, Stephen Cimbala, a long-time analyst of the
bilateral strategic relationship of U.S. and Russian
military policies, writes that this relationship is one
of complex interaction that relates to the strategic
agenda of NATO and to the question not just of
nuclear force structures among the superpowers, but
also of global proliferation issues.13 This connection
between the major nuclear powers’ self-restraint and
even downsizing of their arsenals and the viability
and durability of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
regime is clear and enshrined in both the NPT itself
and in formal documents between Russia and America.
For example, the Strategic Framework Declaration
on U.S.-Russian relations signed by both Presidents
Bush and Vladimir Putin on April 6, 2008, explicitly
states that both governments will work toward a postStrategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) agreement
on limiting strategic arms that would enable “strategic
offensive arms reductions to the lowest possible level
consistent with our national security requirements
and alliance commitments.” It also further stated
that such an agreement would “be a further step in
implementing our commitments under Article VI
of the [Nonproliferation] Treaty.”14 Under present
conditions of hostility due to the crisis generated by
the war in Georgia, the converse is true. If strategic
arms control accords cannot be reached, the likelihood
of increased proliferation increases accordingly, and
the 2010 Review conference of the Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT) will be as big a fiasco, if not worse, than
was the 2005 session.
For these reasons, even if one, like this author, is
skeptical about many of the claims made on behalf of
arms control and deterrence, certain hard facts and
outcomes remain indisputable. Certainly for Russia,
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America’s willingness to engage it seriously over these
issues means that America respects it as a power and
potential interlocutor, if not a partner. On the other
hand, numerous and constant Russian complaints are
that America will not respond to its proposals, consult
with it, etc. Although these are likely false claims, it
has long been the case that the Bush administration’s
preference is to maximize its freedom of action by
claiming that (at least until now) Russia and the United
States were no longer enemies. Therefore we need not
go back to the Cold War, and each side can pursue its
own agenda in security. Furthermore, as President
Bush has consistently argued since 2001,
I am committed to achieving a credible deterrent
with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons
consistent with our national security needs, including
our obligations to our allies. My goal is to move quickly
to reduce nuclear forces. The United States will lead by
example to achieve our interests and the interests for
peace in the world.15

The current discord on arms control reflects not
only Moscow’s wounded ego and foreign policy based
to a considerable degree on feelings of resentment
and revanche, but also America’s unwillingness to
take Russia as seriously as Moscow’s inflated sense of
grandiose self-esteem demands.16 But even if Moscow’s
constant need of reassurance is invariably affronted by
governments who refuse to accept its inflated demands
for compensation and status, it is still the case that the
bilateral strategic relationship is a factor of enormous
consequence in international affairs beyond their own
bilateral relationship. If Russia and America reach
a strategic impasse, the global situation as a whole
deteriorates correspondingly.
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Moreover, a constant factor in the relationship
irrespective of its political temperature at any time is
that both sides’ nuclear forces remain frozen in a posture
of mutual deterrence that implies a prior adversarial
relationship that could easily deteriorate further under
any and all circumstances.17 This point is critical. The
problematic nature of the bilateral relationship, just as
was the case during the Cold War—albeit less intensely
today—is not due to deterrence. Rather, deterrence is
a manifestation of a prior underlying and fundamental
political antagonism in which Russia has settled upon
deterrence as a policy and strategy because that strategy
expresses its foundational presupposition of conflict
with America and NATO.18 Thus the fundamental basis
of the rivalry with Washington is political and stems
from the nature of the Russian political system which
cannot survive in its present structure without that
presupposition of conflict, enemies, and a revisionist
demand for equality with the United States so that it
is tied down by Russian concerns and interests. From
Russia’s standpoint, the only way it can have security
vis-à-vis the United States, given that presupposition
of conflict, is if America is shackled to a continuation
of the mutual hostage relationship based on mutual
deterrence that characterized the Cold War, so that it
cannot act unilaterally. In this fashion, to the degree
that both sides are shackled to this mutual hostage
relationship, Russia gains a measure of restraint
or even of control over U.S. policy. For as Patrick
Morgan has observed, this kind of classic deterrence
“cuts through the complexities” of needing to have a
full understanding of or dialogue with the other side.
Instead, it enables a state, in this case Russia, to “simplify
by dictating, the opponent’s preferences.”19 (Italics in the
original) Thanks to such a mutual hostage relationship,
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Russian leaders see all other states who wish to attack
them or even to exploit internal crises like Chechnya
as being deterred. Therefore nuclear weapons remain
a critical component in ensuring strategic stability and,
as less openly stated, in giving Russia room to act freely
in world affairs.20
Indeed Moscow sees its nuclear arsenal as a kind of
all-purpose deterrent that has deterred the United States
and NATO from intervening in such conflicts as the
Chechen wars. Nevertheless, its military and political
leaders, e.g., Colonel-General Nikolai Solovtsov,
Commander in Chief of the Strategic Missile (Rocket)
Forces, argue that threats to Russia are multiplying.
Thus Solovtsov recently argued that,
Some potential threats to the defense and security of the
Russian Federation, including large-scale ones, remain,
and in some sectors are intensifying. Moreover, the
possibility cannot be ruled out that major armed conflict
could arise near Russia’s borders, which will affect its
security interests, or that there could be a direct military
threat to our country’s security. This is graphically
illustrated by the military aggression unleashed by
Georgia overnight from 7 to 8 August against South
Ossetia.21

While such statements represent the fantasy world
of the Russian military where threats are always rising
despite the plain evidence of Western demilitarization
and omit to mention that Georgia neither attacked
Russia nor in fact started the war that was a Russian
provocation, his remarks do amply underscore the
importance of deterrence and the permanent sense
of being under threat that drives Russian policy.
Hence the need for deterrence, primarily, though not
exclusively, of the United States at the price of accepting
that Russia, too, is deterred from a nuclear strike on
8

the United States. In return for accepting that it, too,
is similarly deterred, Russia, however, postulates
as one of the fundamental corollaries of its policy
and strategy that Moscow must retain a capability to
intimidate and destroy Europe with its nuclear and
other missiles. Hence the continuing aforementioned
reliance upon TNW no matter the cost. In other
words, believing a priori that Europe is the site of a
presumptive enemy action against it, Russia demands
as a condition of its security that the rest of Europe
be insecure. Indeed, reports of Russia’s forthcoming
defense doctrine openly state that the United States
and NATO represent the main threats to Russian
security and that Washington will continue to seek
military supremacy and disregard international law
for a generation. Furthermore, unlike the United States,
Russia is engaged in a comprehensive modernization
and renewal of all of its nuclear weapons, clearly in the
belief that it needs to deter America by military means,
and maybe even fight using such weapons. Likewise,
Moscow has consistently said that the deployment of
U.S. missile defenses in Europe and Asia will disrupt
existing balances of strategic forces and undermine
global and regional stability.22 There is also conflicting
evidence as to whether or not Russia intends to tie
completion of a treaty on strategic missiles reduction
with the removal of missile defenses from Central and
Eastern Europe.23 In addition, Russia’s leaders openly
contend that one cannot discuss European security
without taking into account the missile defense issue
or the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.24
Certainly Russian officials see the weaponization of
space, the integration of space and terrestrial capabilities,
missile defenses, the Reliable Replacement Weapons
(RRW), and the U.S. global strike strategy as a part of a
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systematic, comprehensive strategy to threaten Russia.
So in response Moscow must threaten Europe. Indeed,
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently repeated
the now habitual but no less mendacious charge that
missile defenses in Europe, systems that allegedly used
to be regulated by bilateral agreements to maintain
parity, are now being introduced close to Russia’s
borders, thereby rupturing that parity in Europe and
elsewhere.25 During his recent trip to Poland, Lavrov
went even further, saying that,
For many decades, the basis for strategic stability and
security in the world was parity between Russia and
the United States in the sphere of strategic offensive
and defensive arms. However, in recent years, the U.S.
Administration chose a course towards upsetting that
parity and gaining a unilateral advantage in the strategic
domain. Essentially it’s not just about global missile
defense. We also note that the U.S. has been reluctant
to stay within the treaties on strategic offensive arms,
and that it is pursuing the Prompt Global Strike concept,
and developing projects to deploy strike weapons in
outer space. This, understandably, will not reinforce the
security of Europe or of Poland itself.26

Lavrov then went on to say that if Poland, under the
circumstances, chose a “special allied relationship”
with Washington, then it would have to bear the
responsibilities and risks involved and that Moscow, in
principle, opposed having its relations with third parties
being a function of Russian-American disputes.27
Thus Russia’s arms control posture also represents
its continuing demand for substantive, if not
quantitative, parity as well as for deterrence with a
perceived adversarial United States in order to prevent
Washington from breaking free of the Russian embrace
and following policies that Russia deems antithetical
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to its interests.28 Moreover, that parity is calculated
not just globally, but in regional balances as well so
that Russia also demands a qualitative or substantive
parity with America at various regional levels, most
prominently Europe. Russia’s demand for restoring
parity at both the global and regional levels entails not
an unreachable numerical parity, but rather a strategic
stability or equilibrium where both sides’ forces
remain mutually hostage to each other in a deterrent
relationship and where the United States cannot break
free to pursue its global or regional interests unilaterally,
or what Moscow calls unilaterally. For example, up
to December 2008, the two sides have failed to reach
agreement on a reduction of strategic weapons because
they cannot even agree as to what constitutes a strategic
weapon. Because the Bush administration wants to get
away from using nuclear weapons and has so stated
in its public rhetoric, and because the United States is
no longer producing any nuclear weapons, it insists
on confining the treaty to strategic (intercontinental
ballistic missiles [ICBMs] or sea-launched ballistic
missiles [SLBMs]) offensive nuclear weapons that are
actually deployed while retaining the possibility of
several hundred or thousand so-called “operational
reserve” weapons that are not physically deployed
and may eventually be dismantled. This would allow
the United States to conduct its strategy of having a
prompt global (conventional) strike capability and to
mount conventional ballistic or cruise missiles on board
launchers, including submarines, hitherto reserved
for nuclear launches. For Russia, such conventional
missiles with a global range are inherently strategic
weapons, and they want both those missiles (which,
after all, represent an innovation in U.S. strategy), as
well as the reserve nuclear weapons, counted in any
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strategic weapons treaty and thereby banned. Until
this issue is resolved, no treaty is likely to come out of
the current negotiating process.29 And Moscow’s stance
openly reflects its commitment to its understanding of
strategic stability under contemporary conditions, i.e.,
no innovations for the United States even as it works
on many of these selfsame projects.
Moreover, as Lavrov’s remarks imply, Russia
demands a free hand vis-à-vis European states so that
it can maximize the leverage it can bring to bear upon
its relationships with them. This leverage very clearly
includes the nuclear leverage it gains by being able to
intimidate them with either conventional or nuclear
missiles. Russia wants to relate to key countries and
regions irrespective of its relations with America so that
it can have this free hand in regard to them and thus
resents the presence of American power in Europe,
Asia, etc. Indeed, not only does it wish to shackle U.S.
power to the mutual hostage relationship of mutual
deterrence and thus mutually agreed destruction
(MAD), it also clearly believes, as Lavrov’s and dozens
of other threats to Poland and other states show, that
its security remains contingent upon its ability to
intimidate Europe with nuclear weapons and threats.
The perpetuation of the Cold War’s mutual hostage
relationship is, of course, exactly what the United States,
at least under the George W. Bush administration, has
striven mightily to leave behind. Indeed, the Russian
views outlined below confirm Ambassador Linton
Brooks’ assertion that “arms control is for adversaries,”
and typifies the Bush administration’s approach to
arms control.30 Russian analysts and officials believe
in deterrence and the accompanying mutual hostage
condition of both sides’ nuclear forces as the only way
to stop what they see as America’s constant efforts to
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find ways in which nuclear weapons can be used for
warfighting or to be free to use military force across the
globe without being deterred by anyone. Russia also
seeks thereby to ensure that it possesses a substantive
measure of control over any and all escalation processes.
Therefore any advance—low-yield nuclear weapons,
weaponization of space, the RRW, missile defenses,
use of Trident conventional missiles on a nuclear
launcher, etc.—that could give Washington ideas of
having a real chance to use such weapons or to have a
real first-strike capability that can sufficiently degrade
Russia’s nuclear capabilities to the point of inhibiting
a retaliatory strike as called for by deterrence theory
must be stopped in its tracks.31 And this is true even
though Moscow, as we shall see below, is working on
almost all of these issues itself. In addition, therefore,
the primary mission or top military priority of the
government is maintenance of its nuclear forces and
is a condition of fighting ability and readiness, i.e.,
deterrence.32
However, U.S. current weapon plans, the
development of missile defenses, reluctance to
negotiate verification protocols for a START treaty,
NATO enlargement, and weapons in space, all suggest
to Russia that there is “a growing gap between the
military capabilities of the two countries. This gap
challenges the condition of strategic parity that Russia
still believes to be the underlying principle of its
relationship with the United States.”33 This enduring
adversarial condition reflects a mutual failure on the
part of both Washington and Moscow. The extent of this
failure can be summarized in the following points:
• Even before Georgia, there were no genuine
arms control negotiations between Russia and
the United States, only “consultations,” mostly
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•
•

•

•
•

•

•
•

on antiballistic missile (ABM) problems without
real prospects for success;
The ABM treaty does not work any more, which
means that in this field there is no kind of legal
limitation on any sort of ABM activities;
The CFE treaty practically does not work;
Russia suspended its participation in this treaty
for an indefinite period of time. Moreover, after
Georgia, it probably is dead;
The START-1 Treaty will expire in December
2009, and the parties must give notice of
an intention to renew by December 5, 2008,
something that is quite unlikely in the present
atmosphere;
The START-2 Treaty did not enter into legal
force;
The Strategic Offensive Treaty Reductions
(SORT) Treaty (The Moscow Treaty of 2002) still
works, but this agreement does not provide for
any kind of verification and control measures.
And when the START treaty expires, there will
be no mechanism at all for mutual verification
and confidence;
With regard to the Intermediate Range Nuclear
Forces (INF) Treaty, the question of a possible
withdrawal of Russia as a response to the
U.S. ABM deployment in Europe is raised at
different levels of the Russian government as a
matter of course. Given the crisis growing out of
Georgia, it too could become a treaty that Russia
abandons.
The NPT regime is widely believed to be in
danger of falling apart;
The 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of
Biological and Toxin Weapons still does not

14

have a verification system because the U.S.
Government will not sign the verification
protocol, believing it to be ineffective in
preventing violations (the Soviet Union violated
this accord on a grand scale);
• The 1997 Protocol on the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons will not be implemented according to
its schedule by the United States and Russia for
financial reasons.34
And presently the official position of all the declared
nuclear states except North Korea may be systematized,
as Alexei Arbatov has done, in the following manner.
• All of them envision the use of nuclear weapons
in response to a nuclear attack;
• All, except China, plan for first use of nuclear
weapons in response to an attack with chemical
or biological weapons;
• All, except China and India, imply the first
use of nuclear weapons in response to an
overwhelming attack with conventional forces
against oneself or one’s allies;
• All, except China and India, may initiate the use
of nuclear weapons to preempt or prevent an
attack with missiles or other delivery systems of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD);
• The United States envisions the use of nuclear
weapons in various other contingencies if
necessary;
• Russia may decide to selectively initiate the
use of nuclear weapons to “deescalate an
aggression” or to “demonstrate resolve,” as
well as to respond to a conventional attack
on its nuclear forces, command, control,
communications, and intelligence (C3I) forces
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(including satellites), atomic power plants, and
other nuclear targets.35
In this context of lack of progress on arms
control, Moscow also charges that Washington will
not negotiate with it seriously because Washington
opposes any restrictions “on weapons delivery
hardware and nuclear warhead storage,” i.e., the
ability to keep weapons in reserve, and will only limit
actual deployments. Russia wants to subject the total
volume and quantity of nuclear arms on both sides
to reduction. Equally disconcerting to Moscow is the
fact that Washington will not follow former President
Putin’s logic and jointly discuss threats with it (a
procedure that would, or so Moscow hopes, give it a
restraining hand on U.S. force developments).36 At the
same time other U.S. writers charge that Russia and
China are busily modernizing their nuclear weapons
and infrastructure while America is essentially sitting
on its decaying nuclear bayonets and refraining from
such modernization. They therefore project that if
this posture continues into the future, America will
be weaker in strategic power than Russia, a condition
that will shred our alliances and extended deterrence,
giving other states freer reign abroad to threaten
American interests.37 Obviously this situation would
constitute a recipe for future political struggle that
could easily tip over in any one of the many contested
zones of world politics into actual armed conflict, an
inherently unstable condition where forces exist to
deter each other based on a mutual presupposition of
future conflict.38 Thus, beyond the impasse, we confront
the real possibility of a renewed nuclear arms race.
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UNDERSTANDING THE CURRENT IMPASSE
Russia.
In Russia’s case we can attribute the current
impasse to persisting Soviet mentalities, structure of
government, and policies carried over to the present.
Indeed, this author has argued that, from Moscow’s
side, this adversarial posture derives inherently from
the autocratic, regressive, and neo-Tsarist structure of
its government.39 But that factor is then reinforced by
its perception of American policies. As Moscow grows
more autocratic at home, aggressive in its policies,
and more truculent in its rhetoric, it is increasingly
dominated by a threat perception based on its inability
to imagine a world without the presupposition of
conflict and threat and the frank admission of its
adversarial relationship with Washington even as it
offers strategic partnership, as in its new foreign policy
concept.40
Moscow thus discerns or claims to discern dawning
threats from U.S. and/or NATO military power even
though in actual fact today it has the most benign threat
environment in its history. For example, Lieutenant
General V. A. Gusachenko wrote in the General Staff’s
Journal, Voyennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), that
Russia faces real threats to its security “in practically
all spheres of its vital activities.”41 He is not alone in
arguing this way. Solovtsov recently said that,
Some potential threats to the defense and security of the
Russian Federation, including large-scale ones, remain,
and in some sectors, are intensifying. Moreover, the
possibility cannot be ruled out that major armed conflicts
could arise near Russia’s borders which will affect its
security interests, or that there could be a direct military
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threat to our country’s security. This is graphically
illustrated by the military aggression unleashed by
Georgia overnight from 7 to 8 August against South
Ossetia.42

It is notable that Solovtsov, who in this is representative
of both the political and military elite, omits the fact
that on August 7-8, 2008, and even now, South Ossetia
was recognized by everyone, including Russia, as
Georgian territory. Hence there was never any threat
to Russia from Georgia. Apart from confirming
Russian threat perceptions and Moscow’s propensity
to manufacture wholly fabricated threats, he thus
also suggests the enduring imperial drive in Russian
thinking that contributes so much to its presupposition
of being in a state of ongoing conflict with its neighbors.
Nevertheless, Solovtsov, not surprisingly, also argues
that new military uses for nuclear weapons are coming
into being. Thus,
The radical changes that have occurred since the end of the
Cold War in international relations and the considerable
reduction of the threat that a large-scale war, even more
so a nuclear one, could be unleashed, have contributed to
the fact that in the system of views on the role of nuclear
arms both in Russia and the U.S., a political rather than
military function has begun to prevail. In relation to this,
besides the traditional forms and methods in the combat
use of the RVSN [Russian Strategic Rocket Forces], a new
notion “special actions” by the groupings of strategic
offensive arms has emerged. . . . Such actions mean
the RVSN’s containment actions, their aim to prevent
the escalation of a high-intensity non-nuclear military
conflict against the Russian Federation and its allies.43

In other words, though there is no threat or a
diminishing threat of large-scale war, a new use for

18

nuclear weapons will be their use in actions during
such a war to control intrawar escalation. It is not
surprising that Solovtsov is arguing for increasing the
forces under his command, but it also is the case that
such dialectical reasoning makes no sense unless one
postulates an a priori hostility between East and West
and grants Russia the right of deterrence that it has
unilaterally arrogated to itself over other states who
have never publicly accepted it. Indeed, the new calls
for renovating the nuclear forces and having a solution
guaranteeing nuclear deterrence in all cases has now
become policy even if America deploys its global
defense system and moves to a defense dominant
world.44
Putin’s authoritative remarks as president further
augmented and developed these trends in Russian
thinking. In his speeches since 2006, Putin repeatedly
charged that NATO enlargement, missile defenses, the
incitement of terrorism, growing American military
emplacement in Central and Eastern Europe, refusal to
submit to the United Nations (UN) on questions of using
force, calls for democracy in Russia, militarization of
space, use of conventional missiles in intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs), development of the Reliable
Replacement Warhead (RRW), the use of low-yield
nuclear weapons or of conventional missiles atop
nuclear launchers for missions hitherto described as
nuclear, other new weapons, and the militarization
of space all present threats to Russia. These reputedly
aim at coercing and marginalizing Russia by means
of threats against its vital interests and are allegedly
drawing closer to Russia’s borders.45
Reflecting that presupposition of entrenched EastWest hostility, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told an
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interviewer in February 2007 that,
Our main criterion is ensuring the Russian Federation’s
security and maintaining strategic stability as much as
possible. . . . We have started such consultations already.
I am convinced that we need a substantive discussion on
how those lethal weapons could be curbed on the basis
of mutual trust and balance of forces and interests. We
will insist particularly on this approach. We do not need
just the talk that we are no longer enemies and therefore
we should not have restrictions for each other. This is
not the right approach. It is fraught with an arms race, in
fact, because, it is very unlikely that either of us will be
ready to lag behind a lot.46

Here Lavrov signaled Russia’s unwillingness to leave
a mutually adversarial relationship with America and
its presupposition of mutual hostility as reflected in
both sides’ nuclear deployments. Similarly Alexei
Arbatov ridicules the administration’s view, stated
above by Ambassador Brooks, that because the two
sides are no longer adversaries, detailed arms control
talks are no longer necessary, as either naiveté or
outright hypocrisy.47 Nevertheless, whatever the
failures of the Bush administration are or have been,
and they are discussed below, any objective analysis
of Russian policy would concede that the Russian
elite had hardened its position on America by 2000
and that Putin’s shift to support after September 11,
2001 (9/11) reflected his personal view, which was
clearly not internalized by his subordinates.48 Thus the
overwhelming inertia of the Russian state and of its
policies is and was anti-American. And as Washington
pursued policies that increasingly seemed to confirm
the validity of that anti-American perspective, Putin
gradually moved to embrace it.
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Furthermore, the continuing failure of its
conventional forces to reform to meet the demands of
the times and of its defense industry to prepare either
enough or enough quality weapons for these forces
leaves Moscow with a defense force that is too weighted
in the direction of threats towards rapid escalation to
first-strike threats, if not use of nuclear weapons as
Solovtsov hinted above.49 Yet as we shall see below,
it cannot provide enough nuclear weapons by 2015
to obtain anything more than a state of minimum
deterrence. Indeed, its forces are already configured at
that level. Thus all of its military options, for all of the
boasting about of long-range bomber patrols, claiming
territory in the Arctic, buzzing American ships, and
now talking about bases for its long-range and nuclear
capable bombers in Cuba, as Russian analysts realize,
are, to a considerable degree, rhetoric for domestic
consumption. Under the circumstances (and until
the economic realities generated by the global crisis
that erupted in 2007-08 make themselves felt), Russia
is not only committed to an extensive conventional
rearmament, but to a thoroughgoing nuclear one as
well.50 And its recent exercises, most notably Stabilnost’
2008 (Stability 2008) reflect preparation for scenarios
entailing the actual use of nuclear weapons in a war.51
In fact, and Russia’s leaders know it well, Russia’s
defense industry cannot meet the state’s demands
for serial or quality production of high-precision
conventional weapons that alone would justify its
remaining a major conventional power, and its army,
which refuses to become truly professional, is hardly
able (except for some niche specialties) to conduct
high-tech operations and use that equipment to
optimal effect.52 Although it can overwhelm countries
in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
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like Georgia, conflicts with stronger military powers
present a rather different picture and problems for
Moscow.
And beyond that series of causes, we find that
Russia, laboring under these conditions, has long
considered the main strategic mission of its nuclear
forces to be one of guaranteeing deterrence against
aggression, a posture that has been reiterated to both
Russian defense and political elites and to NATO.53 In
addition, that deterrence posture is openly advertised
as being directed against NATO, and this too has
long been the case. As First Deputy Foreign Minister
Alexander Avdeyev wrote in 1999,
Cautiousness in the sense of understanding what the
present day NATO is, and alertness because a military
aggression occurred in Europe (the Kosovo operation
of 1999—author) [is necessary]. What are we to do in
the future? Of course, we cannot increase our military
power to equal the aggregate military power of all
NATO member states. We would not be able to bear
such an enormous burden. But the Russian military
doctrine must proceed from the fact that Russia must
adequately deter the adversary, and that it must have
armed forces at such a level that will avert attack by
any country. The same applies to politicians in NATO
who could be carried away and have military intentions
towards Russia.54

Similarly, arguing against the continuing posture of
mutual nuclear deterrence that characterizes (at least
in Moscow’s eyes) the bilateral strategic relationship,
Sergei Kortunov writes that,
The situation of mutual nuclear deterrence—even
minimal nuclear deterrence—in fact is in flagrant
contradiction both with the proclaimed idea of a
partnership and with the idea of international security.
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No matter what kind of incredible efforts would be
undertaken at the high political level in order to break
away from the boundaries of the Cold War, the situation
of mutual nuclear deterrence, which was materialized
in the military potentials, is theoretically capable of
reproducing all of the aggregate of confrontation(al)
interstate relations at any moment.55

Today Kortunov’s warnings have materialized in
reality. Indeed, in 2007 Putin virtually heralded the
return of a Cold War-type arms race in the face of
American missile defenses in Europe when he told a
press conference of G-8 country reporters that Russia
and the West were returning to the Cold War and
added that,
Of course, we will return to those times. And it is clear that
if part of the U.S. nuclear capability is situated in Europe
and that our military experts consider that they represent
a potential threat, then we will have to take appropriate
retaliatory steps. What steps? Of course, we must have
new targets in Europe. And determining precisely which
means will be used to destroy the installations that
our experts believe represent a potential threat for the
Russian Federation is a matter of technology. Ballistic or
cruise missiles or a completely new system. I repeat that
it is a matter of technology.56

No less consequential than the observation about
returning to the Cold War is the fact that Putin here
stated that he has bought the General Staff’s vision and
version of ubiquitous a priori American and Western
threats expressed in a worst-case scenario. Worse yet,
he openly conceded their power to define and formulate
those threats and on that basis formulate requirements
for defense policy and strategy. Indeed, here he openly
invited the General Staff—these military experts—to
determine Russia’s threat assessment and announced
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that the government would accept it. Not surprisingly,
that assessment of the Russian military, running true to
its traditions, is alarmist and based on inflated versions
of the worst-case scenario. Therefore, for Moscow,
not only is arms control necessary because of a priori
perception of an inherently adversarial relationship
with America, its forces are also configured in a way
according primacy to the mission of deterrence that also
presupposes a potential armed conflict with America,
making both sides’ nuclear forces reenact the mutual
hostage relationship of the Cold War.
Furthermore, Russia wants to keep things this way
because any unilateral, substantive, or qualitative
progress in American capabilities beyond the confines
of what Russia defines as strategic stability will allow
America to harvest the full benefits of the Revolution
in Military Affairs (RMA) and give it either a means
of attacking Russia’s nuclear arsenal, nullifying it
by missile defenses, bypassing it by high-precision
conventional attacks, or combining the three through
space weaponization. Such capabilities need not be
used in conflict to be successful, all they need to do
is be deployed as instruments of coercive diplomacy
as in a Kosovo-type crisis, one of the many nightmare
scenarios of the Russian leadership. And the nightmare
is, as countless Russian statements state openly, that
the parity with the United States will then no longer
exist.57
Weapons in space, the use of conventional missiles
on nuclear launchers, and missile defenses, are among
such breakout possibilities for America. As Pavel
Podvig has observed,
One of the consequences of this is that if the promises
held by the revolution in military affairs materialize,
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even incompletely, they may significantly lower the
threshold of military intervention. And this is exactly
the outcome that Russia is worried about, for it believes
that the new capabilities might open the way to a more
aggressive interventionist policy of the United States
and NATO, that may well challenge Russia’s interests
in various regions and especially in areas close to the
Russian borders.58

America.
Nonetheless, and as a result of Russia’s nuclear
bluster and overall belligerently anti-American
policy, the Pentagon has now responded with its own
determination to ensure the quality and responsiveness
of America’s nuclear deterrent.59 Indeed, even before
the war with Georgia, the Navy was considering the
possibility of deploying Aegis warship patrols in the
Baltic or Black Seas (the latter would be a violation of
the Montreux Convention of 1936 and Ankara, not to
mention Moscow, would never allow it in peacetime)
to protect missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech
Republic since they might become the first targets in a
phased enemy attack.60 Similarly, Navy spokesmen are
now writing and talking about “hedging our bets visà-vis Russia” and its drive to rearm. This also includes
possible future naval missions with regard to ensuring
energy supplies across Central Asia and the Caucasus.
In a related vein, we see concern as to what the future
Russian Navy will be, and we should remember that it
will be primarily a nuclear oriented Navy.
While current capability and intent pose no immediate
danger, we should be wise to remember that China wasted
no time in translating its conversion-to-capitalismaffluence into a navy that poses a serious challenge to
U.S. influence in the Western Pacific. Russia will not
ignore that example, and neither should we. Keeping our
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strong maritime edge will demand continued awareness
and pacing with RFN capabilities and capacity in both
maritime and cyber domains.61

And these dynamics then translate into a demand
signal for a larger and more capable maritime presence
in the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea in the
mid-to long-term.62 This is the language of arms races
and great power rivalry at its clearest.
Indeed, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates now
appears to be saying that we need missile defenses
because of the Russian strategic nuclear force, and
they will increase the significance of our nuclear
deterrent forces. Certainly this is how Russia interprets
his remarks, i.e., as a justification of its perception of
prior hostility and confirmation of it.63 This process
obviously rekindles the possibility of a nuclear arms
race, especially as Russia cannot conceive of America
as anything other than an enemy.64 Even if Russian
diplomats say that Russo-American relations are
better than what the media claims them to be, their
own actions and those of other high-ranking officials
belie this fact and point to a high degree of tension
in the relationship.65 And this remains the case even
though President Dmitri Medvedev professes a
hope for the continuation of the arms control and
missile defense dialog with the next administration.66
Certainly the recent foreign policy concept published
in June 2008 reeks with hostility to U.S. policy.67
Likewise, Medvedev’s concept for European security,
first outlined in a major speech in Berlin in June 2008
openly aims to reduce, if not extrude, U.S. influence
in Europe.68 Thus despite the self-evidently ludicrous
charges that missile defenses in Poland and the Czech
Republic represent a threat to Russia or that they are
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being emplaced because we regard Russian missiles
as a threat to America (even though these defenses
cannot intercept Russian missiles) or that bombers
in Cuba somehow respond to NATO enlargement,
clearly government pressure is forcing otherwise
quite level-headed analysts like Dmitri Trenin of the
Carnegie Endowment to adopt such arguments in
public.69 Therefore a virtual unanimity on the extent
of the American threat is being enforced upon Russian
opinion.
At the same time, such statements and trends also
demonstrate the utter failure of American efforts to
persuade Russia that it means to downgrade the role
of nuclear weapons and presume its strategic policies
towards Moscow on the basis of friendship, not hostility.
On the one hand, the Bush administration argues that
it has explicitly attempted to marginalize the use of
nuclear weapons in American military strategy in its
2002 nuclear posture review (NPR).70 Nonetheless, the
administration’s efforts to convince outside observers
that their charges concerning the Nuclear Posture
Review and subsequent policy that Washington relies
excessively on nuclear forces; that the United States
is either not reducing nuclear forces or doing so fast
enough; that the United States is building new and
more dangerous nuclear weapons; that the United
States is lowering the threshold for nuclear weapons
use by emphasizing preemption; and that these alleged
failures and the supposed failure to sign new arms
control treaties are encouraging proliferation are myths,
fail to convince either domestic or foreign audiences
that those charges have any foundation.71 Instead, as
Arbatov suggests above, for some time every existing
and potential nuclear power, including Russia and
America, has been moving to operationalize its nuclear
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weapons, assert a broader range of missions for them,
and develop credible first and second-strike capabilities
despite Russo-American reductions in strategic
nuclear weapons.72 This failure on the administration’s
part can be seen in Ambassador Brooks’ statement
above, for he was saying that we do not see Russia as
an enemy with whom long cumbersome agreements
based on mutual suspicion are necessary and pointed
to numerous instances of agreements with Russia on
issues of disarmament and proliferation.73 Yet all this
was of no avail and has failed to persuade Moscow of
the truth of the administration’s previous assertion of
an end to mutual hostility.
This failure to persuade foreign audiences
of our rectitude is directly traceable to the Bush
administration’s misguided strategic unilateralism
that has only led to further nuclearization as in North
Korea and potentially Iran, growing mistrust among
allies and rivals alike, and a diminution of America’s
effective capabilities for projecting power in defense of
its interests abroad. Obviously a new policy and a new
strategy are needed. In the strategic and arms control
areas, this failure is reflected not just in the invasion
of Iraq and the disregard for many powers’ opinions
and interests, but in the fundamental tenets of the
policy formulated and devised by President Bush and
then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in 200106. This policy clearly divorced force acquisitions
and deployments from any concept of strategic and
political realities relating to ties with major nuclear and
military powers like Russia and China. It assumed they
would go along with what seemingly is a transparent
sign of American correctness, virtue, and attestations
of friendship, but without any American reciprocity
based on heeding their interests. This is not just a
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question of Iraq, it certainly applies to missile defenses
and the withdrawal from the ABM treaty that Putin
characterized as a mistake but to which he replied by
also urging a new legal-political definition of strategic
stability, i.e., a codified American strategic-political
relationship with Russia. As Russian analyst Alexander
Savelyev writes,
It was obvious that the United States, for whatever
reasons, ignored the Russian direct references to the
importance of the strategic stability issue. The U.S.
Administration just welcomed the part of Putin’s
statement about “no threat to the national security of
the Russian Federation” and paid no attention to what
Russia understood under such a threat. To my view,
if we could speak of an American mistake, it was not
the decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, but
to completely ignore the principles which must create
the basis for strategic relations with Russia after the
Cold War; as well as the inability of the United States
to present something instead of the “strategic stability”
principle for the discussions and probable acceptance by
the two states. And it was not enough to put forward
standard ideas of “mutual interests and cooperation.”
The main problem and the task were to prove that the
“strategic stability” principle must go, together with the
Cold War and U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Since it has not
been done, “strategic stability” continued to play a role
of a “mine,” which sooner or later could deeply worsen
or even undermine U.S.-Russian strategic relations.74

Savelyev’s critique parallels that of U.S. expert
Dennis Gormley. Gormley observes that arms control
theory and practices were predicated on mutual
transparency. Neither the 2001 Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR) nor the emphasis on missile defenses
“was launched with any degree of reassuring candor
and openness in mind.” Although the NPR claimed
Russia was not a threat and did not figure in our
29

primary targeting plans, there was no awareness that
revolutionary turns to depending on strategic strikes
with conventional ABM atop nuclear launchers or
nuclear warfighting strategies would affect Russian
calculations about arms control or the proliferation of
ballistic and cruise missiles abroad. “On global missile
defenses, Russia and China were told not to fear limited
American defenses. But the opaque nature of U.S.
missile defense development—consisting of open-end
system architecture and periodic block deployments—
engenders strategic uncertainty rather than stabilizing
transparency.”75 Hence the demand for exactly such a
strategic stability dialogue based on deterrence called
for by Lavrov above.
Therefore we could build missile defenses while
remaining in a deterrent posture vis-a-vis Moscow and
Beijing, militarize space, invade Iraq unilaterally and
thus disregard the UN, enlarge NATO, and withdraw
from arms control treaties, while expecting them to
accept at face value protestations either of friendship or
just simply accept that we are the strongest power who
can do as it pleases. The uniquely anti-strategic thrust of
a defense policy divorced from any realistic calculation
of outstanding political realities is now exacting its
demand for payment as a weakened America confronts
the many bills it has incurred with fewer means of
paying them and not just in economics.
Even if one is skeptical of arms control and
deterrence as methods of preserving the peace, we
must remember that other powers are wedded to
these concepts, and their needs must be addressed.
Furthermore, even arms control, pace Colin Gray,
only succeeds if the problem for which it is invented
is overcome, i.e., political and strategic rivalry among
nuclear or major powers. Disregard or even merely
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perceived disregard for those powers’ interests and
concerns can only exacerbate the conditions that
make meaningful arms control agreements harder to
achieve.76 Arms control negotiations with Russia have
long since been proven to achieve the following goals:
reinforcement of political understanding and dialogue,
if not partnership, with Russia; greater allied cohesion
and confidence in U.S. policy; downward pressure
on proliferators as the nuclear powers are seen to be
implementing the clauses of the Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) calling for disarmament; and, most importantly,
a general lowering of the likelihood of major power
crisis or war that could escalate to the nuclear level.
Failure to move forward on arms control, therefore,
has an equal and opposite effect. And the present lack
of progress on that agenda is reflected in heightened
East-West tensions, diminished allied cohesion, as well
as growing missile if not nuclear proliferation.77
The missile defense issue reflects many of these
problems. According to F. Stephen Larrabee of the
Rand Corporation,
The Bush administration viewed the issue of missile
defenses in Europe mainly as a technological issue,
not a strategic one. Thus nobody anticipated public
reactions or those of other governments to it. The plans
for deploying a third site in Europe were drawn up
by the Pentagon with little coordination with the State
Department or National Security Council.78

Consequently, Poland and the Czech Republic were
unable to respond to critics or answer questions in a
timely manner. Not enough attention was paid either
to public opinion in these countries or their domestic
politics, and did not take into account the impact of this
issue on the question of its relationship to European
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security. Thus we left out large areas of Europe that
might need protection from Iranian missiles, e.g.,
Turkey or the NATO alliance as a whole. The technology
for these defenses has also been plagued by unresolved
questions and test failures. And this assessment does
not even take into account the Russian objections,
which apparently were not sufficiently foreseen.79
Should we persist along the lines of unthinking
unilateralism here and ingrained hostility and
suspicion in Russia, the results are already clear
and present. Indeed, the best available studies of
American nuclear policies, including modernization
of those weapons, highlight the fact that these
policies, including the introduction into practice of
new concepts like dissuasion and preemptive, if not
preventive war, could, if they have not already done
so, develop into perceived potential threats to Russia
in the near future.80 Oddly enough, though, these
potential threats are hardly ever mentioned in Russian
commentary, which suggests the domestic and other
factors that we pointed to are really the main drivers
of national security thinking. To give one example,
although the United States has upgraded its naval and
other strategic forces and is gradually shifting them
to the Pacific Ocean largely to meet potential North
Korean or Chinese contingencies, these deployments
also threaten Russian forces.81 But Moscow has said
little or nothing about these forces.
A second, equally negative possible outcome is that
American policymakers will come to perceive Russia
not just as a recalcitrant independent actor that does
not want to cooperate with America, but as a potential
or even active threat in its own right. This was already
the case well before the Georgian war and had much
to do with the progressive stifling of liberalism and
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democracy in Putin’s Russia. Thus in 2007 Senator
Joseph Biden (D-DE), long before he became Senator
Obama’s running mate, cited Russia as one of the three
biggest threats facing America, precisely for that reason
of stifling democracy.82 Subsequent developments can
only have further reinforced this perception and not only
among Democrats. As this potential inheres primarily
in Russia’s nuclear capability, the developments cited
here are already creating a climate among government
circles (even before the war with Georgia) in which
Russia can quickly come to be seen as a potential
military threat due to its political differences with
America. The Navy’s recent musings along with those
of Secretary Gates are mentioned above. In another
example, the 2006 Report of the Defense Science Board
on Nuclear Capabilities stated openly that nuclear
reductions agreed to in the Moscow treaty of 2002 and
recommended in the Nuclear Posture Review of 2001
pointed to a new and benign strategic relationship with
Russia after the end of the Cold War and the desire
to forge a new bilateral strategic relationship that no
longer was based on the principles of Mutual Assured
Destruction (MAD).
Today, the Report observes, that presumption
of a new benign strategic relationship with Russia is
increasingly open to doubt. This is because “Although
United States relations with Russia are considered
relatively benign at the moment (December 2006),
Russia retains the capacity to destroy the United
States in 30 minutes or less.” Moreover, its reliance
on nuclear weapons to compensate for a weakened
conventional military has led it to emphasize nuclear
weapons for purposes of maintaining superpower
status, deterrence, and potentially warfighting. Russia’s
regression from democracy and rivalry with America
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over Iraq, Iran, and Central Asia (other issues may well
be added since then to the mix—author) suggest that
since the assessment of 2003, nothing had changed
since 2001 to justify revising the NPR’s presumption
of a benign strategic relationship with Russia, needs
to be revised.83 Therefore the Report recommends the
creation of a permanently standing assessment Red
Team “to continuously assess the range of emerging
and plausible nuclear capabilities that can threaten the
United States and its allies and friends with potentially
catastrophic consequences.”84 This team would monitor
Russian, Chinese, and North Korean developments
because,
Despite the desire for improved relations with Russia,
the direction, scope, and pace of the evolution of U.S.
capabilities must be based on a realistic recognition that
the United States and Russia are not yet the reliable,
trusted friends needed for the United States to depart
from a commitment to a robust nuclear deterrent.
Intentions can change overnight; capabilities cannot.85

Other examples of a growing wariness about
Russian intentions can also be cited.86 Several recent
articles have argued that Russia and China are
modernizing their nuclear arsenals while ours is
decaying, and that this trend could lead to the most
portentous of strategic reversals across the globe for
the United States unless it arrests the drift and starts
to modernize its weapons as well. They postulate an
unending scenario of fundamental international rivalry
and hostility, not unlike that postulated by Russian
analysts who therefore advocate both permanent
deterrence and modernization.87 Among these authors,
Bradley Thayer and Thomas Skypek conclude that,
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However, the reality is that there are no “time-outs” in
international politics. The United States does not get to
stop the clock in the realm of competition in strategic
nuclear arms. All other nuclear countries are modernizing
while the United States is not. If the United States ignores
its lead in strategic systems, the lead will go away, and
then recapturing it will be significantly more difficult
due to the loss of infrastructure and knowledge.88

Thus there is a real danger that these perceptions
can grow on both sides into self-fulfilling threat
perceptions that will drive conventional and nuclear
defense acquisitions and foreign policy decisions as
well until they influence formal doctrinal and strategic
pronouncements. Some Russian military observers have
already openly postulated that Russia and America (or
NATO) are still enemies. For example, Colonel Anatoly
Tsyganok, a noted military commentator, speaking
about the increase in large-scale and regular Russian
military exercises, observed that apart from the need
to conduct such exercises as part of the Army’s regular
routine, they are necessary to respond to American
deployments in places like Hungary and Bulgaria.
Both sides, he says, remain enemies and these exercises
are hardly anti-terrorist ones but rather something
else (i.e., he hints at their being intended to be antiNATO).89 Certainly and similarly, the so-called “Ivanov
doctrine” of 2003 formalized in a Russian white paper
that did not name NATO was oriented nonetheless to
the primacy of a NATO/American threat.90 And, as
noted above, the new doctrine already is known to cast
the United States and NATO as enemy number one.91
Nevertheless, for such threats to be actualized, the
political climate between Moscow and Washington
would have to decline still further. Consequently, while
we should not rush to restore the Cold War, the present
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trends on both sides are disturbing and destabilizing,
not only for what they mean to each other but also
because of their impact on regional security throughout
Eurasia and how they affect the calculations of other
nuclear states or states that seek nuclear weapons like
Iran and North Korea. In other words, these tensions
cannot be confined to discussions of bilateral strategy
and politics but deeply impinge upon the problems of
regional security, global proliferation, and deterrence.
In the context of charges raised in 2006 that the
United States has been striving for and now attained
a usable first-strike nuclear capability against Russian
forces—an argument that ignited a firestorm of
polemics in Russia—such interactive Russian and
American deployments of both conventional and
nuclear forces do, in fact, raise the prospect of real
as opposed to notional threats of an arms race where
Washington seems to move for a supposed first-strike
capability in both Russian and Western strategic
analyses.92 Thus David McDonough’s analysis of U.S.
nuclear deployments in the Pacific Ocean states that,
The increased deployment of hard-target kill weapons in
the Pacific could only aggravate Russian concerns over
the survivability of its own nuclear arsenal. These silobusters would be ideal to destroy the few hundred ICBM
silos and Russia’s infamously hardened command-andcontrol facilities as well as help reduce any warning
time for Russian strategic forces, given their possible
deployment and depressed trajectory. This is critical
for a decapitation mission, due to the highly centralized
command-and-control structure of the Russian posture,
as well as to pre-empt any possible retaliation from the
most on-alert Russian strategic forces. The Pacific also
has a unique feature in that it is an area where gaps
in Russian early-warning radar and the continued
deterioration of its early-warning satellite coverage
have made it effectively blind to any attack from this
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theatre. This open-attack corridor would make any
increase in Pacific-deployed SLBMs appear especially
threatening.93

Similarly, already in 2003 when the first reports of
the Pentagon’s interest in new low-yield and bunker
busting nuclear weapons became public, Russian
analysts warned that even if such programs were
merely in a research stage they would add to the
hostile drift of Russo-American relations.94 Events since
then have only confirmed this assessment and their
warning. Meanwhile, this trend continues towards
increasing Russian reliance upon nuclear weapons
against a perceived growing American threat. This
threat perception and reliance upon nuclear weapons
takes place despite American assertions that charges
of excessive reliance on nuclear forces; that the United
States is either not reducing nuclear forces or doing
so fast enough; that the United States is building new
and more dangerous nuclear weapons; that the United
States is lowering the threshold for nuclear weapons
use by emphasizing preemption; and that these
alleged failures and the supposed failure to sign new
arms control treaties are encouraging proliferation
are myths.95 So if we may paraphrase a famous movie
line, “What we have here is a failure to communicate,”
while both sides appear to be sinking deeper into their
self-justifying perceptions.
RUSSIA’S NEWLY ANNOUNCED POSITIONS
Fortunately the advent of new presidents in both
Russia and America opens up possibilities for reversing
the apparent stalemate in bilateral arms control
despite the frigidity in relations generated by the war
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in Georgia. As candidates, Senators John McCain
and Barack Obama appeared to share the traditional
view that the centerpiece of our relations with Russia
is arms control and have both supported the idea of
negotiating a new START with Russia. This suggests
a broad consensus in the Senate and House.96 Obama,
according to his website, goes further and says that he
will:
stop the development of new nuclear weapons; work
with Russia to take U.S. and Russian ballistic missiles off
hair trigger alert; seek dramatic reductions in U.S. and
Russia stockpiles of nuclear weapons and material; and
set a goal to expand the U.S.-Russian ban on intermediate
range missiles so that the agreement is global.97

Obama also told Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk
that he supports the agreement with American missile
defenses on condition that he is certain that it is not
aimed against Russia. And Senator McCain was
briefed by Warsaw that the missile defense network
has nothing to do with Russia.98
Thus, based on their campaign rhetoric, both
candidates accepted the Russian idea, rejected by the
Bush administration, that this treaty should repeat or
even amplify the extensive verification protocols of
START 1 and 2 based on Lavrov’s statement above.
They are also close to Moscow’s posture as regards the
INF Treaty, i.e., globalizing the treaty. They do differ
on missile defenses in Central and Eastern Europe
with McCain supporting them and Obama being more
critical, as noted above.99 And this should suggest
positive opportunities for progress with both Moscow
and in the Senate which must ratify treaties.
The visible mutual hostility between the two powers
and the attendant rising suspicion of their aims all but
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necessitates such an approach rather than the fatuous
pronouncement that since we are not enemies, we can
build what we like and so can you, that characterized
the Bush administration’s approach. Unfortunately, as
the events of the past decade show, the Russian view
is more realistic about world politics although much
more backward-looking and negative. Still, despite
its shortcomings, as we have said above, it cannot
be ignored, disregarded, or simply overridden by
unilateral action on our part.
However, again, and fortunately for us, we have a
means of determining what it is that Russia wants from
the United States with regard to arms control. Russia has
just formally restated its position on all the outstanding
arms control issues in its July 2008 Concept of Foreign
Policy, and an examination of those positions allows
us to see what drives Moscow and what opportunities
there are for the next administration to advance U.S.
interests and possibly global order interests as well,
while at the same time engaging with Russia in a
serious fashion.100 Here it should also be noted that
many, though perhaps not all, of the Foreign Policy
concept’s positions have been called for in earlier
Russian statements, but those did not have the force of
formal state documents like this paper.
First of all, Russia here calls once again for a strategic
partnership with the United States. Thus the concept
states that “Russia is building relations with the U.S.
with consideration not only of their huge potential
for mutually beneficial bilateral trade-economic,
scientific-technological cooperation, but also their key
effect on the state of global strategic stability and the
international situation as a whole.”101
Therefore all of the following proposals regarding
arms control (and everything else for that matter) are
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conceived of in terms of addressing a changed global
balance. Russia, which here sees itself as a major
architect who is contributing to a new or developing
world order, has broadened the concept of strategic
stability to go beyond the erstwhile superpower
relationship to encompass new actors and new regional
balances. Those new actors are itself and China, India,
perhaps Brazil, and Iran. In other words, Russia, even
before President Medvedev claimed an undefined
sphere of influence in August 2008, was announcing its
determination to play in multiple regional balances as
an equal to the United States and to restrain its capability
for action, especially unilateral action, in areas not
contiguous to Russia or the CIS.102 This is a cardinal
point that we should not lose sight of in our overall
analysis of this concept. In this light, Russia calls for
a genuine strategic partnership based on overcoming
past barriers and confronting real threats and most of
all, a partnership based on this endless quest for equal
status with America.103 Accordingly, Russia seeks new
agreements in disarmament, arms control, to preserve
the continuity of the process, agreements on trust and
transparency regarding space and missile defenses,
and a host of other issues like safe nuclear energy,
proliferation, etc.
Asserting its probity as a consistent upholder and
fulfiller of all existing arms control and disarmament
treaties, Russia advocates the following positions
regarding that agenda.
• Russia wants to negotiate with all nuclear
powers (the United States, Britain, France,
China) a treaty reducing strategic offensive arms
(ICBMs, submarine launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs), heavy bombers, and the warheads
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•

•
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placed on them to a minimum level sufficient
for maintaining strategic stability.
Moscow (like Beijing) speaks out against allowing
the deployment of weapons in space, in favor
of a system of “collective response” to missile
threats on an equal basis, and against unilateral
actions in the fields of missile defenses.
Russia here argues that strategic stability can
no longer be a concern solely of Russia and
America. Therefore, the discussion must be
opened up to all the major powers, primarily
nuclear ones who are interested in joint action
to preserve security. Specifically Moscow is
also calling for globalizing the 1987 INF Treaty,
which is to expire in 2009.
Russia also opposed the development and
deployment of what it calls destabilizing arms:
new types of weapons, low capacity nuclear
charges (which ironically it too is working
on), ICBMs with conventional warheads, and
strategic missile defenses.
Russia professes to strengthen regional stability
in Europe by taking part in the limitation and
reduction of conventional forces, and the
application of measures to enhance military trust
on the basis of all the parties’ equal security.104

Beyond these formal appeals, according to Dmitri
Trenin of the Carnegie Endowment’s Moscow office,
Russia would also ideally like to negotiate a theater
missile defense system to protect against missile threats
to Europe from the Middle East (which is strange
since Moscow still denies that such threats exist) that
would replace the U.S. missile defenses in Poland
and the Czech Republic. Moscow also, according
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to Trenin, would “welcome U.S. ratification of the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, accession to
the Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty, and a pledge not to
weaponize outer space.”105
ANALYZING RUSSIAN PROPOSALS
The CFE Treaty.
To determine whether or not there are opportunities
for the new U.S. administration to pursue mutually beneficial arms control agreements (be they conventional, nuclear, missile defense, or space weapons) with
Russia, we must analyze what these proposals really
mean, what lies behind them, and what purposes
other than traditional propaganda gains they serve.
Dismissing them simply as the same old propaganda,
which these proposals may appear to be, gains nothing
for us. That posture only impedes the realization of
potential openings for an enhanced strategic dialogue
with Moscow and other tangible strategic gains for us
and possibly our allies. Furthermore, if we are to avoid
falling into the trap described by Savelyev above, we
need to clarify our understanding of Russia’s positions
so that we can present a meaningful reply to them that
creates an intellectual and political basis for a new and
enduring (because of its legitimacy) strategic order.
First of all, the foreign policy concept is as much a
propaganda document as it is a formal policy statement.
It represents an attempt to have others see Russia and
its foreign policy as the Kremlin wishes them to be seen.
Superficially, one might think that the concept exudes
self-confidence with its numerous referrals to Russia’s
recovery and its important place as an architect of the
developing world order.106 But while every observer has
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commented on the newfound Russian aggressiveness
and truculence of its foreign policy, in this concept, the
lady doth protest too much. Constant references to the
demand for equal security and to Russia’s return to great
power status betray instead an inner sense of weakness
and even illegitimacy. States that are respected do not
have to demand it, the demand signifying that Russia
is acutely aware that it is not respected or equal to the
United States. The reasons for this disrespect transcend
this monograph, but they are clearly rooted in Russia’s
foreign policy behavior. Danish General Michael
Clemmesen, the Commandant of the Baltic Defense
College, writes in his blog analyzing the cyber-attacks
in Estonia of April-May 2007 that,
The attitude of Russia to the world and especially to its
neighbors is presently close to that of the great power
attitudes of that earlier [pre-World War I—author]
period. It is built on a demand for “respect” for the
country because of its size. It is rooted in the geostrategic
and geopolitical attitudes tainted with Social-Darwinism
that dominated the conservative elites of all other major
European states of the period. . . . The respect demanded
from the small—and thus contemptible and ridiculous—
states on the borders is similar in type to that demanded
by a mafia “capo.” Presently the focus is in Georgia and
Estonia. (Italics in original)107

Robert Dalsjo of the Swedish Defense Research
Agency (FOI) concurs in every detail, noting that
Russia’s concept of power is that it can kick around
smaller states to intimidate them, much like gangsters
in American movies.108
One reason for this disrespect is the habitual
mendacity that was so prominent in Soviet policy and
that seems to have carried over to Russian policy in its
fallacious attacks upon U.S. policy. For example, as we
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are considering the concept’s arms control posture let
us revisit the CFE treaty issue. Here Russia professes to
strengthen regional stability in Europe by taking part
in the limitation and reduction of conventional forces
and the application of measures to enhance military
trust on the basis of all the parties’ equal security.
In this context, equal security for Russia apparently
means that it should have security equal to that of the
United States and all of Europe. The frequent calls for
equal security not only betray insecurity about Russia’s
status but are ultimately indefinable. Hence they
cannot be resolved by political means but by a form of
psychotherapy beyond the capabilities of governments
and their leaders. But this demand has a long-standing
pedigree. Many analysts inside Russia also have either
advocated or noted that Russia demands a position
equal to that of the United States at the “presidium
table” of world affairs.109 Thus Sergei Rogov, the director
of the Institute for the USA and Canada (ISKAN) and
a prominent advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
argued in 1997 that to counter NATO’s disdain for
Russia’s interests and status,
The aims of Russian diplomacy should be as follows:
First of all, Moscow should seek to preserve the special
character of Russian-American relations. Washington
should recognize the exceptional status of the Russian
Federation in the formation of a new system of
international relations, a role different from that which
Germany, Japan, China, or any other center of power
plays in the global arena.110

But these statements were made in 1997 when
Russia was going bankrupt. Now that it has recovered
economically it is hardly surprising that it should
voice these demands for a superior status even more
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insistently. What this shows, of course, is that apart
from Russian insecurity, under both the best and
worst of circumstances, Russian elites are gripped by
the mystique of being a great power. Indeed, Russian
political writings are replete with references to this
concept that Russia must either be a great power (and
at home, a centralized autocratic state) or nothing and
perhaps break up into the appendage principalities of
medieval Russia. For instance, in 1999 at a meeting of
the Academy of Military Science on future war that
Sergeyev attended (Akademiya Voyennoi Nauke
[AVN]), its director, Retired General Makhmut A.
Gareyev, one of Russia’s leading thinkers and a former
Deputy Chief of Staff, stated openly that,
One of the most important unifying factors is the idea of
Russia’s rebirth as a great power, not a regional power (it
is situated in several large regions of Eurasia) but a truly
great power on a global scale. This is determined not
by someone’s desire, not just by possession of nuclear
weapons or by size of territory, but by the historical
traditions and objective needs in the development of the
Russian society and state. Either Russia will be a strong,
independent, and unified power, uniting all peoples,
republics, krays, and oblasts in the Eurasian territory,
or it will fall apart, generating numerous conflicts,
and then the entire international community will be
unable to manage the situation on a continent with
such an abundance of weapons of mass destruction. In
the opinion of the president of the AVN (i.e., Gareyev
himself—author), there is no other alternative.111

Furthermore, in the context of the CFE negotiations,
Russia is a revisionist power. Moscow’s demand for a
free hand with regard to military deployments within
the territory covered by the CFE treaty, for example
the right to take unilateral actions short of withdrawal
and suspend its participation, something that no other
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signatory has demanded, typifies its quest for a free
hand and for unequal status and security vis-à-vis
its interlocutors.112 Thus Russia wants to freeze the
process of European integration and replace it with a
regional bipolarity. Similarly, the continuing presence
of Russian forces in Moldova and until 2007 in Georgia
has held the West back from ratifying the CFE treaty.
Moscow used this as a pretext to suspend its compliance
with that treaty and to threaten to leave it altogether.113
But Moscow will not leave Moldova, or so it says, until
a political treaty recognizing its forces’ right to stay
there comes into being. Russia also has other ulterior
objectives there. For example, it seeks a 20-year lease
on a base there to perpetuate its intervention on behalf
of a separatist and visibly criminalized Russian faction
across the Dniester River.114 By obstructing conflict
resolution here and in Georgia, Russia demonstrates
its interests in preventing the completion of a durable
European security order as well as regional integration
into NATO and the European Union (EU).
We can see the real meaning of Russia’s rhetoric in
the fact that it unilaterally suspended its observance
of the treaty, a move that has no legal status. It did so
citing a nonexistent military threat in which it itself
does not believe since otherwise it would not have left
the protection of the treaty. The suspension itself has
no legal standing or status and amounts to nothing
more than what Russia accuses America of doing. Its
refusal to negotiate unless its terms are accepted first
belies its rhetoric about equal security. In practice the
Vienna conference of June 2007 called to negotiate
Russia’s charges went nowhere. At the conference,
Russia sought, but with no success, to pressure the
West into “modernizing” the treaty in its favor mixing
together all the issues, the treaty, missile defenses in
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Europe, and Kosovo as a precedent in order to gain on
at least one issue. In this context, it advanced six points
with regard to the treaty.
• The 1999 adapted treaty must be ratified and
brought into force quickly or at least declared to
be “temporarily” valid by June 1, 2008.
• The Baltic states must sign the ratified treaty
or at least the temporarily validated treaty to
fall under its restrictions. As one commentator
noted, Moscow also insists they should “return
to the CFE Treaty which they quit in 1991,
implying that as part of the Soviet Union in
1990 they inherited and accepted the treaty at
that time, thus they do not have the right as
sovereign states not to accept it.”115
• New group limits should be negotiated on NATO
armaments and hardware to “compensate”
Russia for NATO’s acceptance of new members
and American installations in Romania and
Bulgaria. Those countries’ deployments and/or
numerical ceilings should be lowered.
• The CFE treaty’s “flank limits on Russian force
deployments in the North Caucasus and Russia’s
northwest should be removed” because Russia
“cannot and will not fulfill the provisions of the
obsolete treaty to the detriment of its security”
on this point. Since Russia has exceeded the
treaty limits in the North Caucasus for years
using a treaty escape clause with full Western
understanding, this point presumably applies
mainly to its northwest flank where there are no
security challenges at all. But it certainly shows
that Russia wants a totally free hand in and
around the CIS and at home even though all the
other signatories have renounced that goal. At
the time Moscow announced that if no agreement
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is reached on these and other Russian demands,
e.g., keeping its forces in Moldova and Gudauta,
Russia threatened to suspend compliance—
i.e., exempt itself from the treaty’s inspection
regime, information exchanges, and quantitative
force challenges—or even withdraw from the
treaty. And on July 14, 2007, it announced its
suspension of compliance with the treaty for
another 150 days even though there is no legal
provision for doing so within the treaty.116 It
also expects that other signatories would refrain
from actions that “would hamper the treaty’s
revitalization” during such a suspension even
though it arrogates to itself a legal right that
does not exist in the treaty text.117
Not surprisingly, Russia’s demands went nowhere
and in practice came down to seeking a trade-off with
NATO at Moldova’s expense. But here again Moscow
failed to achieve anything, leaving the Moldovan
situation a standoff.118 These issues have considerable
importance for both Moldova and the conflicts around
Georgia. In Moldova’s case, we must remember
that the Russian military leadership believes that
its Moldovan deployments are a factor for stability
there.119 At the same time, Kommersant correspondent
Boris Volkonsky pointed out at that time that Russia’s
demands for flexibility with regard to its troop limits
and movements on the flanks while others are turned
down reveals a key point. If they are not held down
and Russia is, that opens the way to a major shift in
the regional balance of power. So, to avert this shift,
Russia must either withdraw from Moldova and
Gudauta to get Western ratification and forsake its
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previous policies or risk the alternative spelled out by
Volkonsky. Specifically,
As Putin has repeatedly stated, recognition of the
independence of Kosovo, that is, the recognition of
the rights of a nation to self-determination over the
principle of territorial integrity, opens the way to
acknowledgement of other unrecognized states. The
CFE is a stumbling block exactly for that. Limitations
on flanking countries and the possibility of transferring
quotas among member states creates the possibility of a
radical shift in the military balance in Europe as a whole
and in its most critical spots. If Bulgaria or Romania,
which cannot even hypothetically be subject to Russian
attack, transfer their quota to Moldova or Georgia, and
Russia cannot respond by increasing its contingent
because of the treaty, the likelihood of a forcible solution
to the problems of Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South
Ossetia in favor of Tbilisi and Chisinau increases
tremendously. Moscow cannot allow that to take place. It
would undermine confidence in the country’s leadership
at home and put an end to Russia’s pretensions to rebirth
as a great power or even leadership in the former Soviet
Union. That means that Moscow is going to renounce
the CFE sooner or later. Preparations for that are being
stepped up. The day after the beginning of the Vienna
conference, the member states of the Collective Security
Treaty Organization, which includes Armenia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan, issued a statement saying that the CFE does
not meet the interests of stability in Europe, the treaty’s
viability and effectiveness have passed and its further
existence is subject to question.120

Not only did suspension of the treaty open the way
for the possible recognition of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia as has happened since the war began. Close
reading of this analysis shows how all the key motor
forces of Russian foreign policy: the drive for great
power status equal to NATO despite the realities on
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the ground, the drive for a free hand in the CIS, and the
subordination of treaty compliance to those drives also
come together in the context of the CFE treaty and these
conflicts. Nor do Russia’s potential dilemmas end here.
Since Russian forces are now leaving Georgia except
for Gudauta, Georgia can sharply increase its forces up
to the CFE treaty’s limits or substitute a third power’s
forces, e.g., America’s or some other member of NATO.
This would become a real possibility should Georgia
join NATO and become subject to its rules. Given the
Russian perception of Georgia as a state that is eager
to employ provocative and even coercive means to
recover its territories, this could, according to some
Russian analysts, threaten Russian vital interests since
Russia is a Caucasian power and the conflicts in the
North Caucasus and Transcaucasia are closely related
to each other. Therefore, for Moscow it is critical that
NATO and all other noncontiguous third powers (i.e.,
America) keep out of the Caucasus (a demand that also
means binding Georgia and NATO to the CFE treaty’s
provisions).121
The complexities of the situation do not end here
for the future of the Russian base at Gudauta, which
is nominally in Georgia but actually in Abkhazia,
also raises difficult issues in conjunction with the CFE
treaty’s provisions. Moscow claimed that only 400
military personnel remain there, half of whom are
retirees and dependents. It acknowledges the presence
of several combat and transport helicopters and some
other military vehicles and facilities there but refuses
to allow inspections under the CFE treaty as Georgia
demands. Moscow argues that it needs to support
“peacekeeping” forces in Abkhazia and the other
“frozen conflicts.” And such forces’ number is not
limited by the treaty, which also does not account for
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“unaccounted-for treaty-limited equipment” (UTLE)
possessed by separatists in Abkhazia, South Ossetia,
and Transnistria, all or most of which they got from the
Russian army. Finally, Moscow argues that it needs
flexibility to deploy forces there to deal with terrorist
insurgencies in Chechnya and the North Caucasus.
Russia made such demands at Vienna to no avail.122
Since the presence of unaccounted for weaponry
which either belongs to or could be transferred to
these separatist enclaves is a major factor for continued
instability and potential violence in these conflicts,
Moscow’s refusal to allow inspections under the treaty
shows that it remains in violation of its provisions
even as it demands that the West ratify the treaty
unconditionally.123 As a result, today there is no
movement towards resolving the differences and the
CFE treaty appears to be headed for the casualty ward
of the arms control hospital. Indeed, Russia is already
building air bases near Ukraine and is now going to
get bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.124
Even before the war with Georgia, efforts to resolve
the CFE impasse were going nowhere. Russia, during
the spring of 2008, continued to argue that there was
no legal link between the Istanbul Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) agreements
of 1999 calling for withdrawal from bases in Moldova
and Georgia and the adapted 1999 version of the CFE
treaty signed at Istanbul. NATO offered Moscow a
so-called “parallel actions package.” This calls upon
NATO members to begin the ratification process
(which can take months), while Russia resumes its
withdrawal from those bases. Once those withdrawals
were completed or Russia reached a settlement with
Georgia and Moldova, all NATO members would
strive to complete ratification of the adapted CFE
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treaty. NATO also pledged that after that it would
address the Baltic accession issue to get the Baltic States
to join the adapted treaty and take account of Russian
demands to abolish the treaty’s flank limits for it while
retaining them for its neighbors like Norway, Turkey,
and Georgia. Since the war began, Russia’s behavior
has made it quite unlikely that anyone would consider
acceding to its demands, especially as the treaty’s
original intent is to limit the conventional forces of
both sides and reduce the kind of threats generated by
this war. Meanwhile, Russia refuses to be inspected
under the CFE treaty’s terms and its overall behavior
is undermining confidence and security in Europe.125
For these reasons, it is probably not unfair to
paraphrase Zbigniew Brzezinski’s remarks about
détente being buried under the sands of the Ogaden
in 1978 with the observation that the CFE treaty is
apparently buried under the hills of South Ossetia. As
a result, there are signs on both sides of rethinking the
plausibility of conventional war scenarios in Europe.
For example, General Roger Brady, Commander of
U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE), wants to procure
more F-22 jets to patrol European skies and augment
American air power capabilities in Europe from the
decreased levels that had taken place since 1991.126
Similarly, Western ministers of defense are considering
a program to create a rapid reaction force that could
easily be deployed into nations being threatened by
Russia.127 Finally, not to be undone, Russia is spending
a record amount of money on its military in 2009 partly
to offset inflation, but also to enhance its armed forces’
capability, particularly that of the air force. It will raise
spending on procurements in 2009 by 70 billion rubles
in 2009, 40 billion rubles in 2010, and 60 billion rubles
in 2011.128
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The INF Treaty.
Although the situation is different with regard
to the nuclear arms control issues, again we must
grasp Russian motivations. For example, the threat
in the Foreign Policy Concept that if the INF treaty
is not globalized Russia will withdraw from the
treaty goes back to 2005. Much evidence suggests
that various political forces in Russia, particularly in
the military community, are urging withdrawal from
those treaties, not least because of NATO enlargement
towards the CIS and U.S. foreign and military policy
in those areas. In March 2005, Defense Minister Sergei
Ivanov raised the question of withdrawal from the
INF Treaty with the Pentagon.129 Subsequently Ivanov
stated that the INF treaty was a mistake.130 After that,
Baluyevsky followed suit, threatening to pull out
of the treaty unless Washington ceased its missile
defense plans.131 More recently, on February 13, 2008,
Russia made public a draft treaty on implementing
restrictions on intermediate and short-range groundlaunched missiles to globalize the INF treaty, claiming
to welcome suggestions from interested states. At the
UN General Assembly (UNGA) meetings of September
2007, a majority of members supported the idea of such
a globalization, and the United States backed the idea
in a joint statement with Russia on October 25, 2007,
urging interested parties to discuss global elimination
of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles whose
range goes from 500-5000Km. But Washington has not
supported the draft treaty.132
As part of this debate, General Vladimir Vasilenko
also raised the issue of withdrawal from the treaty
after Ivanov did so in 2005, though it is difficult to see
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what Russia gains from withdrawal from that treaty.
Indeed, withdrawal from the INF treaty makes no sense
unless one believes that Russia is genuinely and—
more importantly—imminently threatened by NATO,
or Iran and China, but most of all by U.S. superior
conventional military power, and cannot meet or deter
that threat except by returning to the classical Cold
War strategy of holding Europe hostage to nuclear
attack to deter Washington and NATO. Similarly, with
regard to China and Iran, absent a missile defense
the only applicable Russian strategy to counter their
nuclear and missile buildups would be to use nuclear
weapons to deter them, but this means admitting that
these supposed partners of Russia actually constitute a
growing threat to it. Consequently, Moscow dare not
admit that the enemy of America is also its enemy lest
its domestically based foreign and defense policy that
postulates partnership with China and Iran be seen to
be inherently contradictory and even dangerous.
Thus the Concept’s call for such a globalization
of the INF treaty represents precisely Russia’s efforts
to pretend that an allegedly growing but actually
declining NATO/U.S. threat should be countered by a
strategy that aims to reduce both Iran’s and even more
China’s missile and nuclear capabilities to threaten
Russia. Indeed, on several occasions President Putin
raised the idea of jettisoning the treaty if it cannot be
globalized and calling it a relic of the Cold War. But
he also was quite explicit that Russia was concerned
about countries like China, Iran, and Pakistan. Thus
in October 2007, he told Secretary of State Rice and
Secretary of Defense Gates that,
We need other international participants to assume
the same obligations which have been assumed by the
Russian Federation and the US. If we are unable to attain
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such a goal . . . it will be difficult for us to keep within
the framework of the treaty in a situation where other
countries do develop such weapons systems, and among
those are countries in our near vicinity.134

Since it is by no means clear that Russia can or should
reply to any such threat by producing Intermediate
Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs), the desire to leave
the INF treaty and reactivate missile production of
IRBMs represents only the interests of the defense and
defense industrial sectors, not necessarily Russia’s state
interest. For example, in 2005 Vasilenko, anticipating
Baluyevsky, also stated that the nature and composition
of any future U.S./NATO missile defense would
determine the nature and number of future Russian
missile forces and systems even though, admittedly,
any such missile defense systems could only defend
against a few missiles at a time. Therefore,
Russia should give priority to high-survivable mobile
ground and naval missile systems when planning the
development of the force in the near and far future. . . .
The quality of the strategic nuclear forces of Russia will
have to be significantly improved in terms of adding to
their capability of penetrating [missile defense] barriers
and increasing the survivability of combat elements and
enhancing the properties of surveillance and control
systems.135

Obviously such advocacy represents a transparent
demand for new, vast, and probably unaffordable
military programs similar to the demand for reactivating
production of IRBMs regardless of consequences. But
it also reflects the belief in the United States as enemy
and the adherence to deterrence as the only available
means of preventing an American strike on Russia
(even a conventional one). But in that case, Russia’s
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government and military are, as Nikolai Sokov
suggested, thereby postulating an inherent EastWest enmity that is only partially and incompletely
buttressed by mutual deterrence.136 That posture makes
no sense in a strategic climate where virtually every
Russian military leader repeatedly proclaimed then, as
did Baluyevsky through 2006, that no plan for war with
NATO is under consideration, and that the main threat
to Russia is terrorism, not NATO and not America.137
Yet, on the other hand, Russian calls for renouncing
the treaty and Moscow’s associated demands for
military construction harmonize perfectly with the
aforementioned presupposition of a preceding and
ongoing adversarial relationship with the West. Even
if a new doctrine is being written because of NATO’s
enlargement, Moscow cannot sustain a Cold War
type of arms race in Europe, and everybody knows
it. So, should Russia leave the treaty, its policy would
default to the option of building new IRBMs and all
three legs of its nuclear triad. At the same time, that
posture also is an open sign to Beijing and Tehran of
Russian suspicions concerning their ambitions and
capabilities. So while Russian generals do not raise
these issues unless told to do so, their demands reflect
that Russian strategic policy has again fallen into a
dead end presupposing hostility to both the West and
the East without the means to address either problem
sufficiently.
Thus it would appear, as it does to Secretary Gates,
that the real threat facing Russia is the rise of neighboring
states’ short and medium-range missile capabilities,
e.g., Iran and China.138 This is a fine irony inasmuch as
Russia was instrumental in providing the wherewithal
for these states’ military development. If Moscow
withdrew from the INF treaty, that would allow NATO
to station INF missiles in the Baltic and Poland as well
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as lead China and Iran to step up their production of
intermediate range missiles. Furthermore, because it
is by no means clear that Moscow could regenerate
production for both intermediate and intercontinental
ballistic missiles as their plant for such production
systematically misses production goals, withdrawal
from the treaty could actually further diminish Russian
security, not enhance it.139
The efforts to withdraw from the INF and CFE
treaties are also connected to Russian fears that Western
military-political pressure will be used to consolidate
post-Soviet states’ membership in NATO and/or the
EU or to compel democratizing reforms in Russia or
elsewhere in the CIS where Moscow supports the
reigning authoritarians. Since Russia cannot compete
militarily with the United States, let alone NATO, it
has also openly discussed using its strategic and/or
tactical (or so-called nonstrategic) nuclear weapons
in a first strike mode in the event of a threat by either
of those parties against it or its interests in the CIS.140
Sergei Ivanov, among others, has threatened once again
to put missiles into Kaliningrad if NATO does not take
up Russian complaints about these treaties.141 In early
August 2008, there was a flurry of reports that Russia
might even put nuclear missiles into Belarus. While
this has been denied, it does appear that the Russian
leadership is contemplating putting conventional
missiles and air bases in Belarus to strike at missile
defenses in Europe.142 This issue refuses to go away as a
possible “asymmetric response to NATO enlargement
and missile defenses.”143 But Moscow already did this
in Kaliningrad when it placed nuclear missiles there in
2001 and created a scandal thereby. Still, this recurrent
discussion indicates a continuing inclination in at least
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certain circles to conduct unilateral and even menacing
political and strategic actions using Russian nuclear
weapons.144 For instance, Moscow long ago gratuitously
extended its nuclear umbrella to the CIS, even though
none of those states publicly invited it to do so. But a
plan for such deployment of newly produced IRBMs
could only truly be taken to its logical culmination if
Moscow frees itself from these two treaties that are
pillars of arms control and security in Europe and
renounces its interest in the continuing stabilization of
European security.
The negative result of that is, of course, that this
outcome reignites an arms race in Europe that, as
Putin and Company knows, Russia cannot afford
and that is in nobody’s interest. Ironically, Russia
actually depends for its security on the restraints
imposed by those treaties upon NATO’s members,
including Washington. Moreover, it depends on them
for subsidies through the Comprehensive Threat
Reduction program to gain control over its nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons arsenals. Without
that funding, it is quite likely that the recent visible
regeneration of the Russian armed forces would have
been greatly impeded because at least some of those
funds would have had to go to maintain or destroy
decaying nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.
Russia also needs Western, and especially American,
help against terrorism emanating from Afghanistan or
Iranian and North Korean nuclearization and is still
interested as recent agreements show, in curtailing
those states or terrorists’ access to these materials.145
Furthermore, it is no less at risk from Iranian missiles
than anyone else (except possibly Israel), given the
two states’ hidden rivalry in the Caspian basin. Thus
it needs or at least should need to cooperate with
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the West on proliferation concerns too. Therefore
these efforts to withdraw from the relevant treaties
are quite misguided insofar as Russia’s real interests
are concerned, even though Moscow’s legal right to
withdraw from a treaty is incontestable.
Finally, the call to globalize the INF is quite likely
to founder on Chinese refusal to give away its trump
card vis-à-vis Taiwan, America, Japan, and Russia.
Since Beijing can undoubtedly see through Moscow’s
ploy of proposing nonstarter gambits in arms control
as a way of asserting its great power status, systemforming character, international responsibility, and
hope of running with Beijing and hunting with
America, it is unnecessary for America to reject this
proposal. Indeed, since Senators McCain and Obama
have called for it, we need to ensure that our acceptance
of this is contingent upon bringing China and Iran,
and possibly the Indian and Pakistani governments
to the table in order to get some transparency and
restraint upon China’s exploding missile and nuclear
programs, Iranian programs, and the arms race in the
Subcontinent.146 Even if it is unlikely that these Asian
states will accept the proposal, it also is important for
us to start moving to curb not only ballistic but also
cruise missiles which are breaking out across all of
Asia.147 And America benefits politically by not being
seen as a nuclear spoiler.
Given this context of likely Asian skepticism if
not refusal of this proposal and the obvious strategic
and political disadvantages to Russia of leaving the
INF treaty, we still need to understand why Moscow
is floating the proposal, apart from the benefit of
looking statesmanlike with regard to arms control
and of trying to restrain both the Atlantic Alliance and
China at the same time through one proposal. Here we
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must look at the state of Russian force development
plans. Clearly the many calls for withdrawing from the
INF system now justify such an action as a response,
however “asymmetrical,” to NATO enlargement, the
emplacement of missile defenses in Eastern Europe,
and the general advance of NATO and American
military capabilities closer to Russia. So although
Russia has, as of October 2008, not yet devised a
new defense doctrine to replace the 2000 doctrine,
all the reports emanating from Moscow claim that
the new doctrine postulates NATO and the United
States as the main enemies. Furthermore, its writing
was undertaken at least in part because, “the analysis
of the situation on the global arena points to the
increasing demand for forcible actions in the policies
conducted by the leading countries.”148 And in view
of the deficiencies of Russian defense industry and
what Putin and Company perceive as the mounting
and ever approaching set of nuclear and conventional
threats confronting Russia, Putin called once again for
a “a new strategy of building armed forces until 2020”
to strengthen national security.149
In 2004 when these issues of NATO enlargement,
missile defense, and perceived alterations in U.S.
military strategy began to heat up in Russian militarypolitical discourse, Putin and Ivanov began to announce
the development of unparalleled nuclear missiles that
could give an effective asymmetric response. It was
widely assumed that Putin, Ivanov, and Baluyevsky
had in mind the Topol-M or RS-24 land-based mobile
ICBM and/or the Bulava SLBM. But this is also when
Ivanov and some generals raised the issue of leaving
the INF treaty, touching off a major discussion among
military-political elites.150
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Despite the possibility that Russia’s wounded
defense industry cannot produce both IRBMs and
ICBMs in sufficient quantity if it left the INF treaty, it is
unlikely that the Ministry of Defense (MOD) thought
this was the case. Otherwise they would not have raised
the issue and continued doing so since 2005. Neither
would they be likely to raise the threat of leaving this
treaty, even though it would clearly provoke both
NATO and China to respond by building more missiles,
unless they believed they had the same or even greater
capability to produce them. Evidently that is the case,
or at least so the Russian military believes. So if China,
as may well be expected, or Iran, or some other power
refuses the call for such restrictions on these missiles,
Moscow may well be planning to resume production
or even crash production of them.151 These new missiles
could embrace a number of different categories of
missile. One of them, described in 2005, was the revival
of the Skorost’ IRBM originally developed after 1983
but which was cancelled after one test due to the INF
treaty. It has a 2,500Km range and is deployable in 2
minutes from a combat ready position and 9 minutes
from the traveling position. Arguably, the cost of
deploying it and the more recent Iskander-E missile (a
version of the missile for export abroad) is considerably
less then the cost of the Topol-M system.152
The Iskander missile is even more interesting a
proposition. Undoubtedly as the prospects for serial
production and deployment of the Iskander family of
missiles grows, with plans being announced to deploy
five rocket or missile brigades of Iskander-M missiles
by 2015 with the first beginning in 2007, and given its
attributes described below, it is incompatible with the
INF treaty, and the Russian military evidently prefers
to scrap the treaty rather than the production line as it
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had to do with all of Russia’s IRBMs in 1987.153 Indeed,
General Vladimir Zaritsky stated in 2007 that Russia
might deploy the Iskander in Belarus if America installs
missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic and
increase their range to 500Km, thereby violating the
INF treaty, probably antecedent to Russia’s withdrawal
from it.154
In 1999 President Yeltsin reportedly signed a decree
operationalizing the Iskander missile system with nuclear
warheads (not the export version though). Evidently it
has the following capabilities: “precision accuracy of
fire”; control throughout the flight path; broad range
of effective warheads that could be mounted on it;
availability of battle management automation and
information support systems; integration into global
satellite navigation systems; ability to engage hardened
targets; increase in the number of engaged targets
per unit of time; ability to penetrate air and missile
defenses; and capability to engage moving targets. Thus
it could challenge any missile defense system within
range, which is estimated as being between 280Km
in the export version and 500Km so that it comes in
under the INF guidelines.155 Because the Iskander can
be both a ballistic missile that can maneuver along
its trajectory and a cruise missile, a new designation
for the version of it that is a cruise missile system is
Iskander-K (Krylataya or cruise in Russian). Therefore
it can penetrate or evade ballistic missile defenses.156
Indeed, the Iskander-E and presumably other variants
seem to be designed to defeat Western ballistic missile
defense systems including theater missile defenses,
particularly the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-2/3
low to high altitude air defense system.157 According
to Nikolai Gushchin, chief and senior designer of the
Machine Building Design Office, the Iskander missile
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complex is also meant for covert preparation and
launching of effective missile strikes at particularly
important small-scale targets.158 These capabilities
make it an effective regional deterrent, so it is not
surprising that its deployment at Kaliningrad or in
Belarus and the reported sale of the Iskander-E export
version at 280Km range to Belarus are often rumored
as a riposte to the U.S. missile defenses in Europe.159
The R-500, a new cruise missile adapted for the Iskander
launcher, is reportedly designed to fly a radar-evading
trajectory with an accuracy of three meters. The missile
system is said to be able to easily overcome air and
missile defenses, while its range remains limited to 500
kilometers, still in accordance with the INF Treaty.160

In 2007 Russia test-launched the ground-launched
version cruise missile from the Iskander-M transportererector-launcher, whose range could exceed the 500Km
limit of the INF treaty.161 Reportedly, deployment
should begin in or by 2010 and by 2016 Russia intends to
equip at least five missile brigades with the Iskander–M
complex (or Iskander-K).162 If one follows Moscow’s
various Iskander missiles carefully, it becomes clear
that there are at least three missiles, the export version
(Iskander-E) which conforms to both the restrictions of
the INF Treaty and the rules of the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR); the Iskander-M, which is for
domestic Russian use and is a ballistic missile that
apparently conforms to the INF’s terms; and the newlytested nuclear-capable Iskander-K, which is a launcher
system with a Land Attack Cruise Missile (LACM), the
R-500 (NATO designation SS-26), that appears to be
intended to confound missile defenses.163
If Moscow leaves the INF, it would seem that its
leaders anticipate being able to begin serial production
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of these Iskander missiles, and possibly the Skorost’
missile, to target not only missile defense sites, but a
wide range of European targets more generally. For
this reason, those forces calling for withdrawal from
the INF treaty apparently think they can deal with what
most observers believe would be the resumption of an
arms and missile race in Europe. In other words, the
purposes of Russian IRBM missiles in Europe would be
to threaten both missile defenses and Europe, possibly
hoping again to detach it from America. Given what
we have noted of Moscow’s commitment to deterrence
and presupposition of conflict with America, this
logic suggests that important elements of the Russian
military and political elite that Russia can only have
security in Europe by ensuring Europe’s insecurity
through missile and nuclear threats. Baker Spring of
the Heritage Foundation has captured the logic of this
position by referring to the INF treaty’s provisions for
withdrawal. Spring writes that,
The treaty requires the Russians to identify what
extraordinary events related to the subject of the treaty
have jeopardized Russia’s supreme interests so as to
justify withdrawal. Both Putin and Baluyevsky have
indicated that Russia will point to the prospective
deployment of missile defense systems in Europe as
the justification. If the Russians justify withdrawal on
this basis, they will leave no doubt that Europe is the
target of the new missiles, and they will have stated
that any attempt by Europe to defend itself with nonthreatening, purely defensive systems is an inherent
threat to Russia. In short, Russia apparently feels that
its supreme interests depend on having an unfettered
means to attack Europe.164

In this connection we must also understand the
strategic political utility for Moscow of retaining
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nuclear weapons that can exercise threats or deterrence,
as the case may be, in a regional context. First, it is
already banal to suggest that Russia here, like other
states, develops nuclear weapons to offset America’s
conventional superiority and deter it. But beyond that
point we can say that,
War serves both as an instrument of policy and as a
determinant of the structure of the international system.
It is war, or the threat of war which determines whether
there is a balance of power or a particular state becomes
dominant. Therefore, adequate military power is needed
to prevent any state dominating the international system.
WMD are thus viewed as a non-conventional means
aimed at preserving both regional and global balances
of power. . . . Relevant to this argument is the idea that
WMD, especially nuclear weapons, are needed to prevent
a state from the temptation to make a clandestine dash
to sole nuclear possession or, in other words, to close off
nuclear adventurism.165

Thus WMD are also necessary for redressing
conventional, not just nuclear, imbalances in military
capabilities. This reasoning explains Russia’s
determination to force America to a position of parity
with or strategic stability with it.166 Not only do these
weapons deter American and other powers’ military
action, they enable proliferators or weaker nuclear
powers like Russia to throw off the strategic and military
constraints imposed upon them by such imbalances.
For Russia, this means a free hand in the CIS and a
status as a co-equal to America, allowing it to try and
constrain American decisionmaking. Brad Roberts’
1995 observation still holds true, namely, that,
A threat-derived assessment of the proliferation
dynamic blinds people to the simple fact that the
primary implication of proliferation is not military but
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political. The primary immediate effect of the ongoing
diffusion of the ability to make high-leverage weapons
is the creation of a technically empowered tier of states
that can, if they choose, build and use high-leverage
military instruments. . . . The emergence of a tier of
states technically capable of producing high-leverage
weapons is unprecedented in international affairs. Its
emergence is coterminous with the end of the Cold War.
The intersection of these two processes constitutes the
unique moment in world affairs today.167

Proliferators or nuclear states like China and Russia
can then deter regional or intercontinental attacks
either by denial or by threat of retaliation.168 Given
a multipolar world structure with little ideological
rivalry among major powers, it is unlikely that they
will go to war with each other. Rather, like Russia,
they will strive for exclusive hegemony in their own
“sphere of influence” and use nuclear instruments
towards that end. However, wars may well break
out between major powers and weaker “peripheral”
states or between peripheral and semiperipheral states
given their lack of domestic legitimacy, the absence
of the means of crisis prevention, the visible absence
of crisis management mechanisms, and their strategic
calculation that asymmetric wars might give them the
victory or respite they need.169 Simultaneously,
The states of periphery and semiperiphery have far
more opportunities for political maneuvering. Since
war remains a political option, these states may find it
convenient to exercise their military power as a means
for achieving political objectives. Thus international
crises may increase in number. This has two important
implications for the use of WMD. First, they may be used
deliberately to offer a decisive victory (or in Russia’s case,
to achieve “intra-war escalation control”—author170) to
the striker, or for defensive purposes when imbalances
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in military capabilities are significant; and second, crises
increase the possibilities of inadvertent or accidental
wars involving WMD.171

Obviously nuclear proliferators or states that are
expanding their nuclear arsenals like Russia can exercise
a great influence upon world politics if they chose to
defy the prevailing consensus and use their weapons
not as defensive weapons, as has been commonly
thought, but as offensive weapons to threaten other
states and deter nuclear powers. Their decision to
go either for cooperative security and strengthened
international military-political norms of action, or
for individual national “egotism” will critically affect
world politics. For, as Roberts observes,
But if they drift away from those efforts [to bring about
more cooperative security], the consequences could be
profound. At the very least, the effective functioning of
inherited mechanisms of world order, such as the special
responsibility of the “great powers” in the management
of the interstate system, especially problems of armed
aggression, under the aegis of collective security, could be
significantly impaired. Armed with the ability to defeat
an intervention, or impose substantial costs in blood or
money on an intervening force or the populaces of the
nations marshaling that force, the newly empowered
tier could bring an end to collective security operations,
undermine the credibility of alliance commitments by
the great powers, [undermine guarantees of extended
deterrence by them to threatened nations and states]
extend alliances of their own, and perhaps make wars of
aggression on their neighbors or their own people.172

However, these trends also represent the
conventionalization of nuclear weapons and nuclear
warfighting scenarios where the nuclear power in
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question visualizes nuclear weapons as being like any
other weapon and hence usable for specific military
scenarios. Certainly, this is the case for Russia. For
example, in an otherwise unremarkable interview
General Vladimir Boldyrev, Commander in Chief of
Russia’s Ground Troops, described the missions of
Russia’s tank troops as follows,
Tank troops are employed primarily on main axes to
deliver powerful splitting attacks against the enemy
to a great depth. Having great resistance to damageproducing elements of weapons of mass destruction,
high firepower, and high mobility and maneuverability,
they are capable of exploiting the results of nuclear and
fire strikes to the fullest and achieving assigned objectives
of a battle or operation in a short time.173

Indeed, from Boldyrev’s remarks, we may discern that
he, and presumably his colleagues, fully expect both
sides to use nuclear weapons as strike weapons in
combat operations. This process of conventionalizing
nuclear weapons, in and of itself, substantially lowers
the threshold for nuclear use just as Moscow did in
1999. At that time Colonel General Vladimir Yakovlev,
Commander in Chief (CINC) of Russia’s nuclear forces,
stated that: “Russia, for objective reasons, is forced to
lower the threshold for using nuclear weapons, extend
the nuclear deterrent to smaller-scale conflicts and
openly warn potential opponents about this.”174
Allowing Russia to wriggle out of the INF treaty
would open the door not just to a heightened arms race
in Europe but to intensified Russian efforts to control
the CIS, maintain forces on a reduced threshold in a
deterrent relationship with the West for possible use
in smaller-scale contingencies in and around the CIS,
stimulate an acceleration of the missile “contagion”
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already visible in Asia, strike at nonproliferation,
and end the half-century or longer drift towards the
“de-bellicization” of Europe. For all these reasons,
the Obama administration should support the idea of
globalizing the INF treaty only if China and Iran agree
to it. Otherwise, it should resolutely communicate its
intention to uphold the treaty and seek to persuade
Moscow to do so as well. Since the demand for this
treaty is due to the perception of a heightened Chinese
and Iranian threat, facilitated in no small measure
by Russian proliferation to those regimes, the U.S.
Government, consistent with the overwhelming
strategic desirability of impeding a Sino-Russian
alliance, should not carry Russia’s water for it against
China. Indeed, while a discussion of Chinese missile
programs and policies is not within the purview of this
monograph, it seems extremely difficult to imagine
that China will relinquish its trump cards in Asia for
no discernible equivalent and tangible strategic gain
simply to make life easier for Russia. On a smaller
scale, the same holds true for Iran.
But even if China and/or Iran refuse to accept this
proposal, we should still not support Russian efforts to
withdraw from it although that is Moscow’s legal right.
The immense security gains from this treaty must not
be frittered away, nor should we say to Moscow that
we welcome the extension of its deterrent relationships
based on mutual suspicion toward other rising powers
across the globe. Arguably, the road to success lies
in moving from relationships based on hostility as in
deterrence that stimulate trends for offensive buildup
or lowered thresholds of nuclear use to one based on
defenses aiming to limit damages with a secondary
role for deterrence. Were forces reduced to about
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1,000-1,500 warheads on both sides, i.e., below the 2012
notional SORT levels of 1,700-2,200, both sides would
have sufficient second strike capability to deter any
threats, and they can build defenses (which as Israel
and Japan show, work, at least against IRBMs) on a
mutually transparent basis.175 This kind of approach
would override the Russian perception of the need
to abandon the INF treaty and could also overcome
the phony crisis worked up by Moscow over missile
defenses in Europe.
Tactical Nuclear Missiles.
Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW, or in Russian
parlance, Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons [NSNW])
are another issue in the bilateral arms control agenda.
Yet Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept is silent about
them. This means that Russia is not seeking American
action on this point or to reduce its holdings unilaterally
(except where physically necessary) although it would
like to raise the issue of U.S. TNW in Europe as a
propaganda point. In other words, it perceives no threat
from residual American TNW based in Europe. Rather,
it seeks American inaction and clearly would prefer
not to discuss this issue, suggesting that Russia still or
once again harbors the intention of deploying its TNW
to counter NATO enlargement and missile defenses in
Europe. In the context of this monograph’s analysis of
Russian policy postures and recommendations for the
United States, this anomaly cries out for explanation.
TNW have been and remain a contentious issue between
the two states. One reason for this contentiousness is that
it has been all but impossible to arrive at a satisfactory
definition of what constitutes TNW, how they are
distinguished from strategic nuclear weapons, and
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then how to verify that one or both sides has destroyed
that capability.176 Following the 2001 definition by
Vladimir Ryabchenkov, Counselor of the Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we will designate TNW or
NSNW as a class of weapons designed to engage objects
in the depth of enemy deployment up to 300Km to
accomplish a tactical mission. Under certain conditions
TNW may be involved in operational and/or strategic
missions. Operational nuclear weapons are a class of
weapons designed to engage in the operational depth
of the enemy deployment a distance of up to 600Km.
Occasionally they may be used to accomplish strategic
missions, or in exceptional cases, tactical missions.177
The problems connected with TNW also include
other issues in the U.S.-Russian arms control agenda,
specifically research (which is taking place on both sides)
into low-yield nuclear weapons, something that again
alarms Moscow because it is another manifestation of
what it sees as Washington’s unending penchant for
breaking through the shackles of strategic stability and
forcing it into a technologically driven arms race that it
cannot possibly win. Thus Russia apparently envisages
TNW as a counter to the prospect of American lowyield nuclear weapons and has been conducting
research on such weapons for years.178 Furthermore,
while Russian TNW do not threaten the United
States but rather Europe, U.S. TNW based in Europe
become strategic weapons for Russia.179 And typically,
anticipating a worst-case scenario, the General Staff
and members of the government refuse to rule out
the future deployment by NATO of these weapons
and clearly would like to deploy them in Kaliningrad,
Belarus, and at sea, presumably in the Baltic Sea.180
Thus, recently Nikolai Patrushev, Head of Russia’s
Security Council, charged that NATO membership for
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Georgia and Ukraine could lead to the stationing there
by NATO of TNW that could then perform strategic
missions and carry strategic threats against Russia.181
The fact that such charges are utterly fantastic and
at variance with international treaties and Ukraine’s
constitution outlawing foreign bases on its territory is
of little consequence in this manufactured paranoia.
More recent statements suggest, however, that TNW
may not be deployed in Kaliningrad but in areas close
to Poland, including possibly the Baltic Fleet, once
U.S. air and missile defenses go up in Poland.182 This
suggests that Foreign Minister Bildt’s claims about
TNW and the Baltic Fleet may be well-grounded.183
Certainly, by their own admission, Russian officials
like to sidestep discussions of TNW, especially in areas
like Kaliningrad Oblast, by bringing up U.S. TNW in
Europe and claiming that NATO cannot answer why
they are there (in fact, NATO allies want them as a
visible symbol of the U.S. commitment to Europe).184
Meanwhile Russia is also apparently working on
low-yield nuclear weapons, ostensibly against U.S.
TNW, but also possibly for deployment on its own
TNW. For example, Viktor Mikhailov resigned as
minister of Atomic Energy in 1998 in part to oversee
development of a new generation of low-yield nuclear
weapons used not just to counter NATO enlargement,
but also to “make limited nuclear strikes during
localized conflicts possible, presumably using TNW.”185
More recently an American study observed that,
Press accounts and statements by government officials
also suggest that Russia is engaged in R&D [research
and development] on fourth-generation nuclear
weapons capabilities—for example, precision lowyield nuclear weapons (possibly with yields as low as
a few tens of tons), clean nuclear weapons (including
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earth penetrators and neutron weapons), and weapons
tailored to create special effects (such as electromagnetic
pulse). Press reports also refer to more advanced or
even exotic research into weapons based on pure fusion
and nuclear isomers. The degree of investment and
technical progress in these areas is uncertain, at least
based on open sources, although some analysts suggest
such capabilities would be highly consistent with
official Russian doctrine, which emphasizes the role of
nuclear weapons in deterring and prevailing in a broad
range of nuclear and non-nuclear contingencies. If, as
Russian doctrine proclaims, a lower nuclear threshold is
required to deter conflict even down to the local level,
then acquiring more usable nuclear weapons that could
deliver decisive effects with presumably manageable
escalation risk would be a logical development.186

Similarly, in 2004 it was reported that Baluyevsky
said that since America’s doctrine mentions the
necessity of “direct applications of nuclear lowpower nuclear warheads at the battlefield, Russia
won’t be removing TNW from its military arsenals.”
Putin has also expressed concern that the possibilities
of American use of low-yield nuclear weapons for
regional conflicts involving non-nuclear states or of
conventional missiles atop nuclear launchers could
lower the threshold for use of nuclear weapons to a
dangerous level.187 Of course, he failed to mention that
Russia’s similar research into low-yield weapons could
have the same result, a factor that makes low-yield
and TNW equally dangerous.188 Baluyevsky alluded
to what makes these low-yield weapons dangerous for
both sides in 2004 when he said that,
The United States should be the first to raise the
threshold for the use of nuclear weapons to the supermaximum level—If the nuclear weapons, which formerly
were seen only as a political instrument of deterrence
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become battlefield weapons, that will be not simply
scary but super-scary. We will be compelled to modify
the development of our own strategic nuclear forces
depending on Washington’s plans for the use of these
weapons.189

Furthermore, while Russian TNW do not threaten
the United States but rather Europe, U.S. TNW based
in Europe become strategic weapons for Russia.190
Meanwhile, Russian research into low-yield weapons
continues.191 According to Ivan Safranchuk, Putin’s
1999 statement (when he was head of Russia’s Security
Council) that President Yeltsin had endorsed a
blueprint for the development and use of nonstrategic
nuclear weapons means that Russia will develop “a
new generation of nuclear munitions with low-yield
and super low-yield delivered to the target by strategic
launchers.”192
Because it is virtually impossible to create a data
exchange and verification regime for TNW, it has
proven impossible to fully allay suspicions on both sides
concerning each other’s deployments. These weapons
today are only subject to 1991-92 Presidential Nuclear
Initiatives (PNIs), unilateral and parallel statements
by Presidents George H. W. Bush, Mikhail Gorbachev,
and Boris Yeltsin. These presidents declared their
intention to store or eliminate warheads for TNW
and NSNW, including shipborne weapons, except
for a share of air-based weapons. Thus the “regime”
for them is informal, not legally binding, and has no
transparency or verification measures. Even aggregate
numbers on both sides are unknown.193 Moscow has no
intention of changing this, preferring unilateral action
to cooperation, again raising suspicions concerning its
ulterior motives for using these weapons. For example,
in 2004 a defense official told the press that “If you want,
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take our word for it. If you don’t want to, then don’t.
But we are not going to report back to anybody with
figures in our hands about how many and what kind
of specific tactical nuclear arms we have reduced.”194
Therefore, most analysts accept these weapons’
importance for Russia. As Pavel Podvig wrote in 2001,
According to the view that almost all Russian military
and security analysts share, the only practical way of
dealing with a confrontation with the United States
is to resort to nuclear weapons. The Russian military
doctrine, adopted in April 2000, specifically reserves
the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a fullscale non-nuclear aggression with the apparent goal of
deterring it. The text of the doctrine does not say, perhaps
intentionally, what kind of nuclear capabilities Russia
might need to deter a conventional aggression, but the
common understanding of the doctrinal language is that
it means reliance on tactical nuclear weapons.195

Since then, not only have statements by people like
Retired General Vladimir Belous, Senior Analyst at
the Institute of International Relations and World
Economics (IMEMO), openly referred to the use
of TNW in deterrence mode against conventional
aggression, Russian exercises in 2004 (Soyuznaya
Bezopasnost’ [Union Security]) involved the use of
TNW against a sudden aggression of superior enemy
forces. As a result, many Russian analysts have argued
that the continued use or threat of use of TNW means
that these weapons, which are seen as warfighting
weapons much more than are ICBMs or SLBMs, will
heighten the existing deterrence relationship between
East and West and irretrievably poison their relations.196
Gunnar Arbman and Charles Thornton of the Swedish
Defense Research Agency similarly conclude that,
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If possible, Russia may have further lowered its nuclear
threshold, perhaps even compared to Soviet policy during
the Cold War. The simple doctrinal statement that Russia
will be a first user of nuclear weapons if its conventional
forces are found to be inadequate in an armed conflict of
some magnitude essentially guarantees early use of (T)
NW’s in a conflict with any sizable opponent, and all the
more so if this opponent is equipped with more modern
conventional arms than Russia.197

Unfortunately these warnings have been proven to
be true. Both sides now utter public statements revealing
their suspicions about each other’s deployments. Thus
Sergei Ivanov, as Defense Minister, claimed there was
no reason for NATO to maintain TNW in Europe.198
In 2006 Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control
Stephen Rademaker said that Russia had not fulfilled
its side of the PNI. While America still had a relatively
small number of TNW in Europe, the number had been
cut 90 percent since 1991. But Russia has not seen fit to
reciprocate. Analysts attributed this to the continuing
desire to keep these weapons (as well as the Iskander
missiles) in reserve as possible deterrents.199 In fact,
according to a Natural Resources Defense Council
Report in 2005, America stored 480 nuclear weapons
in Europe, more than twice what was believed to be
the case. If this be true, it is no surprise why Moscow
is not reciprocating even though Rademaker’s claims
about U.S. cuts represent official policy.200
Absent clarity from Moscow either in a new doctrine
or policy statement, it is unclear whether the role of
TNW is growing, though the pressure to withdraw
from the INF and to retaliate against the emplacement
of missile defenses in Europe suggests that this is the
case. The Iskander in one of its many forms could be
the centerpiece of a new generation of such weapons
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or other older versions may still be operable. While
most of them are concentrated today in the Air Force,
it appears that the Navy, as of 2003, is still lobbying
for the return of NSNW to surface ships lest they not
be able to contend with other foreign navies including
the U.S. Navy.201 Whatever decision Russia makes will
undoubtedly be affected by U.S. policy, e.g., what we
do with our missiles in Europe, missile defenses, and
NATO enlargement.202 But the utility of these weapons
as seen from the Russian armed forces’ perspective
cannot be denied, so it is quite unlikely they will give
them up without a reciprocal major arms control
concession.
The role of nonstrategic nuclear forces in Russian
military doctrine and strategy has been important and
a matter of some contention . . . Nonstrategic nuclear
weapons have been discussed in a variety of contexts by
Russian defense officials and commentators, including:
(1) their role in negating or deterring possible attacks
by opponents capable of attacking Russia with strategic
conventional weapons based on information superiority
(so-called Sixth-Generation Warfare); (2) their use for the
purpose of avoiding military defeat in a conventional
war while deescalating the conflict to Russian advantage;
(3) their role in helping to preserve combat stability, or
continuity of mission performance during enemy attacks,
as a factor of equal or greater importance to survivability
of nuclear forces.203

Accordingly, Russia sees TNW as one of the tiers
of its deterrence structure, allowing it to deter or
escalate, i.e., TNW give Russia more flexible options in
crisis situations and even the possibility of controlling
intrawar escalation.204 By 2004 it was clear to Russia,
based on the experience of exercises and due to
mounting anger about NATO enlargement, that the
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first use of TNW in a European theater conflict was
quite likely.205 Consequently, Moscow’s PNI statements
consistently say it is gradually reducing the number of
TNW by reporting percentages of implementation, not
real numbers. But at the same time, these statements
make clear that Moscow regards it as impossible to
separate discussions of TNW from those of other
armaments as Washington does.206 Therefore Russia
will only negotiate the reduction of TNW with America
if Great Britain and France (if not others) are engaged
because Russia needs TNW to contain aggression,
particularly from its south, i.e., Iran and the Middle
East. Russia claims to have withdrawn 60 percent of the
air defense forces’ TNW, 50 percent of the Air Force’s
TNW, 30 percent of the Navy’s, and 100 percent of the
Army’s TNF. “But they will be there again, if necessary,
and nobody should doubt it” according to Colonel
General Vladimir Verkhovtsev, Chief of the 12th Main
Directorate of the Ministry of Defense (responsible for
nuclear weapons). Indeed, because the United States
still has nuclear weapons in Europe, any reduction by
Russia would negatively affect its security.207
Since American officials regard Moscow’s demands
for reciprocity and for tying these systems into
larger negotiations as stalling devices, and moreover
America’s allies have made clear their desire to retain
those weapons in Europe until and unless East-West
relations improve, it is unlikely there will be progress
on this issue and that apparently suits Moscow‘s
preferences.208 If the next administration is serious
about moving toward a non-nuclear world, it might
want to revisit this issue, but it cannot do so unless
our NATO allies signal their willingness to reduce or
even dispense with TNW and until the issue of missile
defenses in Europe is resolved. If those defenses are
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further developed into a ramified network as Russia
fears, then they could conceivably negate Russia’s
TNW. But such developments would only lead to
further missile constructions and deployment as
Moscow keeps threatening to do.209
In other words, Russia intends, as part of its
deterrence policy, to keep America’s allies hostage as
shown by its threats of missile strikes against Poland,
the Czech Republic, Ukraine, and now Western Europe
for either hosting missile defenses systems or joining
NATO. Failure to resolve TNW issues, like Russian
projected deployment of missiles in Kaliningrad and
Belarus, increasingly makes no political or strategic
sense.210 Instead, the next administration should soon
try to find a way of negotiating away all TNW in Europe
and call Moscow’s bluff so that our allies are not held
hostage to the revanchism and revisionism of the new
Russian autocracy.
Indeed, sources across Central and Eastern
Europe report a sense of fear among many sectors at
being caught in the middle of an East-West struggle,
especially as Russia is apparently building up air
bases near Ukraine now that it has suspended
participation in the CFE treaty.211 Loose talk about
deploying missiles or even nuclear weapons in Belarus
or Kaliningrad, or near Poland also adds to tensions.
Russia also is now apparently threatening Bulgaria,
saying the building of a missile shield will undermine
its relations with Russia.212 Moscow has also threatened
to target Georgia for missile strikes if it joins NATO.213
It should be noted that if missile defense systems are
installed in Poland and the Czech Republic, they will
be more than 500Km away from the potential sites
for the Iskander which means that essentially Moscow
is threatening countervalue strikes on places like
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Warsaw or withdrawal from the INF treaty followed
by the building of weapons that could then target
both these countries and the missile defense sites.214
Therefore, only in the larger context of arms control
will we and Moscow be able to address the issue of
TNW. But until then, continued delay has its costs, as
it only generates more pressure within the paranoid
Russian military-political elite to develop TNW, lowyield nuclear weapons, and cruise missiles like the
Iskander-K, given their belief that only if Europe is
insecure and under threat from Russia, can Russia have
security. On that basis, the retention of older systems,
if not the construction of new TNW, appears to be a
compelling military requirement for Moscow, which
sees no reason to bargain them away for U.S. nuclear
weapons in Europe, especially as it understands that
the allies want them to stay. Until and unless there
is progress on INF and missile defenses or a formal
proposal to go to zero on both sides, this strategic
requirement will probably remain for Moscow and can
only be addressed in a larger framework of East-West
relations. Inevitably, that retention and likely further
development of Russian TNW will further poison ties
with Europe and America and further underscore
Moscow’s belief that its security is contingent upon
Europe’s insecurity and intimidation.
Space Weapons.
The Bush administration’s professed interest in
weaponizing space, and in doing so not solely in
conjunction with missile defenses, is profoundly
troubling for Russia. Russian writers and officials fear
that this program is another way in which the United
States can break free of strategic stability and threaten
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not only Russia’s nuclear weapons, but its C3I space
systems including satellites and the ground-based
infrastructure that supports them. After all, President
Bush signed an order in October 2006 “tacitly asserting
the U.S. right to space weapons and opposing the
development of treaties or other measures restricting
them.”215 Thus Russian analysts acknowledge the
rising possibility that in future conflicts space will not
only be militarized, i.e., used for military purposes,
but also weaponized, particularly in a way that allows
America to break free of the shackles Russia wants to
fashion through strategic stability.216 As Peter Rainov
observes, Russian writings fully grasp the looming
threat of space war. Thus,
Space warfare is emerging as the most significant
sphere of military operation[s] in any future major war
due to its importance in reconnaissance, electronic,
and information warfare. In the period up to 2020-30
Russian authors see it as an extension of other airspace
operations. The expected future introduction of specific
space offensive weaponry in addition to anti-satellite
weapons, according to some experts, could transform all
of space into two major theaters of strategic operations:
the near space theater and the lunar theater.217

Because terrestrial and even submarine and space
warfare are becoming increasingly integrated
operationally, space capabilities to project power to
the earth, sea, and underwater will become a decisive
factor of war as well, further challenging backward
Russia.218 Consequently, we should not have been
surprised that in September 2008 Russia announced
that it would build a space defense system.219
Indeed, for all the boasting about asymmetric
ripostes to American innovations, Russian leaders
know and admit that their air and space defenses
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cannot defend against the threats they perceive from
the United States, including not just missiles, but
also space-based systems.220 Commander in Chief
of the Air Force General Alexander Zelin publicly
stated that these particular threats to Russia are of the
greatest significance while its air and space defenses
are in critical condition. Therefore, by 2020 the entire
country will be vulnerable to foreign air and space
attack.221 So much for the numerous boasts that Russia
has the missiles that can nullify any missile defenses
or that its defenses can detect and destroy any ICBM
warheads.222 Thus Baluyevsky, for example, warned
that the planned U.S. deployment of missile defenses
in Europe threatens not only Russia’s deterrent, but
also could lead to the deployment of missile defense
space-strike systems that pose a special danger to
global stability.223 Certainly Russian officials see the
weaponization of space, the integration of space
and terrestrial capabilities, missile defenses, and the
U.S. global strike strategy as a part of a systematic,
comprehensive strategy to threaten Russia as Lavrov
suggested above.224
Russia has responded in four ways to this threat.
First, already by 2000, it was helping China to
modernize and extend the range and precision of
its ICBM and SLBM missiles and missile defense
capability to threaten the continental United States,
diversify and expand its arsenal, and counter foreign
missile attacks in the event of conflict over Taiwan or
elsewhere in Asia. This is only part of a much larger and
still ongoing Chinese comprehensive modernization of
military technologies that aims to give China the means
to fight for informational and strategic superiority
by striking the enemy’s most critical targets first,
even preemptively This strategy and target set could
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easily mandate space war and/or nuclear attacks.225
There is no reason to believe that this assistance has
been discontinued despite China’s demonstration of
an anti-satellite (ASAT) capability in 2007. Second,
along with China, Russia has tabled a draft treaty at
the UN Disarmament conference in Geneva, banning
space weapons. It has no chance of going through, as
Washington sees it for what it is, an attempt to impose
a ban on its weapons and missile defenses in Europe.
Such gambits might have some traction, since many
states are alarmed at the prospect of an arms race in
space, given China’s visible capabilities there. But it
is not likely to be anything more than a political and
propaganda gesture.226 Moscow and Beijing have been
fighting the so-called “militarization of space” since at
least 2002.227
But this draft treaty is particularly interesting. The
current regime for space dates back to the 1967 Outer
Space Treaty that forbids the deployment of WMD,
military facilities, weapon testing, or maneuvers on
the moon or other celestial bodies. But it does not
ban conventional weapons. The Russo-Chinese draft,
however, bans the deployment and testing of space
weapons but not research, development, or production.
As a recent assessment observes, even as China is
reported to be aggressively developing anti-satellite
weapons with the space and counterspace assets they
omitted to ban from their draft treaty. “This huge
lacuna runs the risk of allowing, even encouraging, the
development of a potential counter-space ‘breakout’
capability—that is, a clandestine but untested antisatellite (ASAT) system—while still remaining within
the treaty’s limits.”228
Likewise, this draft is silent about terrestrially
based systems, e.g., direct ascent, radio-frequency,
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and directed energy weapons that are the next wave of
counter-space capabilities, especially for China, which
is involved in both kinetic and nonkinetic counterspace
programs.229 There are other thorny issues related to
verification of any such treaty. But it is clear from the
foregoing that this draft is a tendentious and one-sided
effort to cripple U.S. programs.
Third, Russia has announced its intention to retaliate
if other nations deploy space weapons.230 Indeed, since
its analysts have already acknowledged the likely
further militarization of space, a process to which it
has contributed in the past, it really has no choice.231
Indeed, it already is building a new Angara space
rocket at the Plesetsk site in Arkhangelsk Oblast.232
Alternatively, if Russia cannot develop its space-based
forces sufficiently, some experts believe it can develop
its ground-based counterspace (ASATs?) potential
until it can cause the enemy unacceptable damage.
This would include missiles with short active boost
phase or maneuverable warheads.233 Unfortunately for
Moscow, its efforts to maintain even its reconnaissance
and communications satellites in space, e.g., the Global
Navigation system GLONASS, are faltering or failing
to keep up, and it is unlikely that Russia will be able
to place weapons in space worthy of being targeted.
This evidently is true even if America does weaponize
space because Russia’s experience with ASAT
capabilities has been disappointing. The benefit to
Russia is that its forces’ limited dependence upon space
assets does not make its military overly vulnerable to
attacks on those assets. Therefore, according to Pavel
Podvig, it may counter any space weaponization with
asymmetric means that should be relatively easy for it
to accomplish. For example, he noted the discussion
of emplacing missiles in Kaliningrad and Belarus and
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of the extension of the life of Multiple Independently
Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRV) systems are
rejoinders to the development of missile defenses in
Europe. Such deployments, as noted above, are quite
destabilizing for European security. But beyond that, as
Podvig notes, the small likelihood of a Russian weapons
system in space puts into question the desirability of
our doing so to deal with Russia.234 China, of course,
may be a different story. Nonetheless, the next
administration needs to take a hard look at the trends,
benefits, and costs relating to the weaponization of
space beyond existing conditions of the use of satellites
and reconnaissance systems.
It may or may not turn out to be necessary and/
or desirable to undertake such weaponization. But
it should be clear that if we do, Russia will retaliate,
either unilaterally to counter our actions and/or by
drawing closer to China. Given the fact that any such
alliance makes China the dominant partner against
Russia’s preferences, that is decidedly not in our, or for
that matter, Russia’s interest. Here it should be clear to
us that China’s capabilities threaten Russia’s interests
as much as they do ours. Second, we should consider
the consequences if Russia is not really a useful target
of future American weapons, of such an emplacement,
as it could lead to a Russo-Chinese alliance.
Consequently, the danger is that this ideologicalstrategic rivalry will harden, leading to a polarized,
bilateral, and hostile division of Asia into blocs based on
a Sino-Russian bloc confronting a U.S. alliance system
led by alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Australia.
Some Western writers have already opined that SinoRussian relations appear to be tending towards an antiAmerican alliance in both Northeast and Central Asia.235
But more recently both Asian and Western writers have
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begun to argue that such a polarization in Asia could be
taking shape. The shared interest of perceiving America
as an ideological and geopolitical threat has also united
Moscow and Beijing in a common cause.236 Already in
the 1990s, prominent analysts of world politics like
Richard Betts and Robert Jervis, and then subsequent
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) studies, postulated
that the greatest security threat to American interests
would be a Russian-Chinese alliance.237 Arguably, that
is happening now and occurs under conditions of the
energy crisis that magnifies Russia’s importance to
China beyond providing diplomatic support, cover for
China’s strategic rear, and arms sales.238
That alliance would encompass the following
points of friction with Washington: strategic resistance
to U.S. interests in Central and Northeast Asia,
resistance to antiproliferation and pressures upon the
regimes in Iran and North Korea, an energy alliance,
an ideological counteroffensive against U.S. support
for democratization abroad, and the rearming of both
Russia and China, if not their proxies and allies, with
a view towards conflict with America.239 One South
Korean columnist, Kim Yo’ng Hu’i, wrote in 2005
that,
China and Russia are reviving their past strategic
partnership to face their strongest rival, the United States.
A structure of strategic competition and confrontation
between the United States and India on the one side, and
Russia and China on the other is unfolding in the eastern
half of the Eurasian continent including the Korean
peninsula. Such a situation will definitely bring a huge
wave of shock to the Korean peninsula, directly dealing
with the strategic flexibility of U.S. forces in Korea. If
China and Russia train their military forces together in
the sea off the coast of China’s Liaodong Peninsula, it
will also have an effect on the 21st century strategic plan
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of Korea. We will now need to think of Northeast Asia
on a much broader scale. The eastern half of Eurasia,
including Central Asia, has to be included in our strategic
plan for the future.240

Since then, Lyle Goldstein and Vitaly Kozyrev have
similarly written that,
If the Kremlin favors Beijing, the resulting Sino-Russian
energy nexus—joining the world’s fastest growing
energy consumer with one of the world’s fastest
growing producers—would support China’s growing
claim to regional preeminence. From Beijing’s point
of view, this relationship would promise a relatively
secure and stable foundation for one of history’s most
extraordinary economic transformations. At stake are
energy reserves in eastern Russia that far exceed those
in the entire Caspian basin. Moreover, according to
Chinese strategists, robust Sino-Russian energy links
would decrease the vulnerability of Beijing’s sea lines of
communication to forms of “external pressure” in case
of a crisis concerning Taiwan or the South China Sea.
From the standpoint of global politics, the formation
of the Sino-Russian energy nexus would represent a
strong consolidation of an emergent bipolar structure
in East Asia, with one pole led by China (and including
Russia) and one led by the United States (and including
Japan).241

Russia’s tie to China certainly expresses a deep strategic
identity or congruence of interests on a host of issues
from Korea to Central Asia and could have significant
military implications. Those implications are not just
due to Russian arms sales to China, which are clearly
tied to an anti-American military scenario, most
probably connected with Taiwan. They also include
the possibility of joint military action in response to a
regime crisis in the DPRK.242
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MISSILE DEFENSES
As the foregoing analysis suggests, in our strategic
nuclear dialogue with Moscow (and Beijing), we cannot
lose sight of the fact that trends in force deployments
and strategy simultaneously affect strategic-political
developments in both Europe and Asia. If for no other
reason, from Russia’s perspective, U.S. technological
and military advances across the spectrum of hightech, precision-based conventional warfare, space,
and nuclear weapons all threaten to unhinge the
relationship of strategic stability, giving Washington
what Russian leaders dread, i.e., a belief that they
can use or threaten to use nuclear weapons to coerce
Russia into surrender. Thus both the alleged and
real threats posed by missile defenses, among other
potential breakout systems, are not just military issues
in nature but also political questions. The issues of the
development of missile defenses in the Czech Republic
and Poland, and around the Pacific rim, exemplify this
fact even if the consequences and circumstances of
these deployments differ in each region.
Precisely because analyses of this issue now focus
on Europe at the expense of Asia, we will reverse that
trend and deal with the impact of these defenses upon
Russia in Asia, bearing in mind that we must factor
China’s nuclear capabilities into this equation along
with the fact of North Korean proliferation. Moscow
must protect against such contingencies that could
emerge from China’s growing nuclear and military
capabilities as well as against the consequences of
North Korean proliferation. Absent missile defenses
and even sufficient conventional defenses against
China, Russia must at all costs be friendly with China
(though not necessarily an ally) even as it deters China
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with its nuclear capabilities. Consequently, Russia is
steadily building up those nuclear capabilities in both
the Pacific Fleet and its ICBMs. Likewise, in order to
avoid being marginalized in regard to the Korean
issue, it has restored a dialogue with Pyongyang and
taken part in the six-party process to denuclearize the
DPRK.
As McDonough showed above, U.S. force
deployments in the Pacific theater definitely threaten
Russian nuclear assets and infrastructure as well as its
territory and conventional forces.243 A second major
Russian concern is the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan
alliance in the twin forms of joint missile defenses and
the apparent consolidation of a tripartite or possibly
quadripartite alliance including Australia and South
Korea, if not India. In that context, both Moscow and
Beijing worry that North Korean nuclearization might
lead Japan to build nuclear weapons. But beyond that,
for both Russia and China, one of the most visible
negative consequences of the DPRK’s nuclear and
missile tests has been the strengthened impetus it
gave to U.S.-Japan cooperation on missile defense. The
issue of missile defense in Asia had been in a kind of
abeyance until the North Korean nuclear tests of 2006.
These tests, taken in defiance of Chinese warnings
against nuclearization and testing, intensified and
accelerated U.S.-Japanese collaboration on missile
defenses as the justification for them had now been
incontrovertibly demonstrated. But such programs
always entail checking China’s nuclear capabilities
and even, according to Beijing, threatening it with a
first strike. Naturally those developments greatly
annoy China.244 Therefore China continues publicly to
criticize U.S.-Japan collaboration on missile defenses.245
Perhaps this issue was on Chinese President Hu Jintao’s
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agenda in September 2007 when he called for greater
Russo-Chinese cooperation in Asia-Pacific security.246
His remarks may have prompted Russia to act
or speak out against these trends in Asia for Russia,
having hitherto been publicly reticent to comment
on this missile defense cooperation or to attack the
U.S. alliance system in Asia, reacted quite strongly.247
During Lavrov’s visit to Japan in October 2007 and
despite his strong pitch for Russo-Japanese economic
cooperation, he publicly warned that Russia fears
that this missile defense system represents an effort
to ensure American military superiority and that the
development and deployment of such systems could
spur regional and global arms races. Lavrov also noted
that Russia pays close attention to the U.S.-Japan
alliance and was worried by the strengthening of the
triangle comprising both these states and Australia.248
He observed that “a closed format for military and
political alliances” does not facilitate peace and “will not
be able to increase mutual trust in the region,” thereby
triggering reactions contrary to the expectations of
Washington, Tokyo, and Canberra.249 More recently, at
the 2008 annual Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Regional Forum (ARF) in Singapore, Lavrov again
inveighed against “narrow military alliances,” claiming
that Asian-Pacific security should be all-inclusive and
indivisible, the work of all interested parties, not blocs.
Any such activity must enhance strategic balance and
take account of everyone’s interests and be based on
international law, i.e., the Security Council where
Moscow has a veto.250
Lavrov’s complaints show what happens when
bilateral cooperation breaks down and, as a result of
proliferation, overall regional tensions increase, in
this case in Northeast Asia. Russia has responded to
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the U.S. missile defense program in both Europe and
Asia by MIRVing its existing and older ICBMs, (that is,
putting so called MIRVs [missiles] onto its missiles in
silos) leaving the START-2 treaty, creating hypersonic
missiles that allegedly can break through any American
missile defense system, introducing new Topol-Ms
mobile ICBMs that also allegedly can break those
defenses, and testing the Bulava SLBM with similar
characteristics. Still Moscow apparently thought this
was not enough, and only 6 weeks after Lavrov’s public
complaints in Japan, Vice-Premier Sergei Ivanov called
for nuclear parity with Washington, even though the
quest for such parity would undoubtedly undermine
Russia’s economy unless he meant the retention
of strategic stability, albeit at unequal numbers of
missiles. Nevertheless, the real threat for Moscow
here is the U.S. policy to build missile defenses and
an alliance excluding Russia and China, not Japanese
missile defenses. Those defenses are mainly directed
formally against North Korean missiles and in reality
the threat of Chinese missiles, not Russia.
Russian experts long ago noted that the military
balance in East Asia was unfavorable to Russia and
specifically invoked the specter of Russia losing its
nuclear naval potential there.251 That nuclear naval
potential remains precarious as Moscow recently
admitted that its submarines conducted a total of three
patrols in 2007.252 To overcome these weaknesses and
threats, and thanks to Russia’s economic resurgence
(largely energy-driven, however), then President
Vladimir Putin and Deputy Prime Minister and former
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov announced a planned
strategic upgrade for the Pacific Fleet, specifically
aiming to address this problem and make the Fleet
Russia’s primary naval strategic component.253 This
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policy reverses prior naval policy that made Russia’s
Northern Fleet the strategic bastion for anti-American
scenarios in the 1990s, testifying to an enhanced threat
perception in Asia. The recent expansion of Russian
military activity in and around the Arctic, including
calls to incorporate Arctic scenarios into Russia’s armed
forces’ training and doctrine, should be seen, at least in
part, in this context despite the recent Russian show of
force in the Arctic.254 Here we should understand that
Russia’s forces, particularly those in the North and the
Far East, may be deployed on a “swing basis” where
either the Fleet, or air forces, or even nuclear forces in
one theater move to support the analogous forces in
the other. The Northern Fleet, a nuclear armed fleet,
as a swing fleet can go to challenge enemies from the
North Pacific, presumably from bastions in the Kola
Peninsula. Similarly, the Pacific Fleet has its bastions
from which it may be tasked to conduct missions in the
Arctic.
Alternatively, the Northern Fleet and Russian Air
forces based in the high north can be used to sweep the
North Pacific of enemy air and naval assets. Russia has
carried out exercises whereby one fleet moves to the aid
of the other under such a concept.255 Likewise, Russia
has rehearsed scenarios for airlifting ground forces
from the North to the Pacific in order to overcome
the “tyranny of distance” that makes it very difficult
for Russia to sustain forces in Northeast Asia. And
the revival of regular air patrols over the oceans have
clearly involved the Pacific-based units of the nuclearcapable Long Range Aviation forces as well as some of
the air forces based in the North and Arctic who fly in
the areas around Alaska.256 Similarly, nuclear exercises
moving forces or targeting weapons from the North to
the Pacific or vice versa have also occurred.257 To the
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degree that Arctic Missions become part of the regular
repertoire of the Russian armed forces, they will also to
some degree spill over into the North Pacific.
As part of this strategy, President Medvedev
announced in September 2008 that Russia would
not only build space defenses but that a guaranteed
nuclear deterrent system for both military and
political circumstances (which are not explained or
defined) must be built by 2020. He also announced the
construction of warships, mainly nuclear submarines
armed with cruise missiles (which are unregulated
by any convention or agreement and thus able to do
whatever Moscow wants with them) and multipurpose
submarines.258 The Pacific Fleet will be the main fleet
and one of two nuclear fleets (the Northern Fleet) will be
the other, suggesting that the main mission of that fleet
is to provide a reliable second-strike deterrent while
the non-nuclear vessels will protect the “boomers”
(nuclear armed submarines) and prevent hostile forces
from coming within their range. Meanwhile, Russia’s
long-term rearmament program apparently envisions
the renewal of the submarine fleet as nuclear propelled
multirole submarines, in an effort to save money.
Three missions for them will be anti-submarine
warfare, anti-aircraft carrier missions (mainly against
U.S. carrier battle groups), and attacking surface ships
and transports. The submarines that are not equipped
with SLBMs will be armed with precision conventional
weapons to be a strategic non-nuclear deterrence
force.259 Nonetheless and even though the Far East is
very much a naval theater, Moscow’s main investments
through 2010 will evidently go not so much to the Navy
as to nuclear weapons (to redress Russia’s conventional
inferiority vis-à-vis U.S. and Chinese threats) and to
air and air defense in order to forestall a Kosovo-like
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aerial campaign.260 This emphasis on strengthening the
nuclear deterrent, especially the sea-based deterrent,
in the Asia-Pacific is clearly a response to both missile
defenses and the augmentation of America’s nuclear
and conventional long-range strike forces in an effort
to maintain deterrence and strategic stability in that
theater.
This strategy also connects to Moscow’s concerns
about the conventional equation because it cannot
stand up for a long time, especially in an austere
economy of force theater that must be self-sustaining
against large-scale conventional attacks over very
exposed and huge borders. Consequently, at some
point nuclear weapons, possibly TNW’s or Iskander’s
or the Skorost’ system, might have to be called into
play to redress that balance and restore control over
intrawar escalation. At the conventional level, apart
from ongoing reinforcement or resupply of the forces
with what is hoped to be more advanced conventional
weapons and improved training and quality of the
manpower (a very dubious assumption given the
inability and refusal to build a truly professional army),
reform also entails experiments in new force structures
and rapid reaction forces. Moscow is endeavoring to
develop a functioning mechanism of rapid response
and airlift (the idea of the swing fleet or forces also
plays here) from the North or interior of Russia to
threatened sectors of the theater.
Second, Russia, as in Central Asia, is building an
integrated, mobile, and all arms, if not combined arms,
force consisting of land, air, and sea forces capable
of dealing with failing state scenarios, insurgencies,
terrorism, scenarios involving large-scale criminal
activities, and ultimately conventional attack. Third,
if, however, the scale of the threat overwhelms or
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is too large for the conventional forces, doctrine
evidently continues to point to the use of nuclear
weapons (probably TNW or Iskander, or other NSNW)
in a first-strike or possibly even preventive mode,
as stated by Baluyevsky.261 On January 20, 2008, he
stated that “We do not intend to attack anyone, but we
consider it necessary for all our partners in the world
community to clearly understand . . . that to defend
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia
and its allies, military forces will be used, including
preventively, including with the use of nuclear
weapons.”262 Russian commentators noted that he was
speaking entirely within the parameters of established
Russian doctrine, and that he essentially conceded
the failure of conventional forces to provide adequate
defense and deterrence at the high end of the spectrum
of conflict.263 But beyond that, Baluyevsky invoked the
use of nuclear weapons in a first or preventive strike
to defend allies. By allies, he probably meant largely
the CIS states to whom Moscow has extended its
nuclear umbrella. But in the context of Russia’s AsiaPacific territories, his remarks bring us to the political
dimensions of Russia’s efforts to overcome the strategic
challenges it faces there.
Those are not only U.S. challenges. Northeast Asia’s
nuclear landscape is changing under pressure of Korean
proliferation and China’s rise. This could present Russia
with difficult choices, especially given its nuclear and
conventional deficiencies. As the pressure on China
to abandon its no first use policy grows along with its
nuclear and apparent second-strike capability, Russian
strategy must factor these new trends into account even
as it must reduce its nuclear forces.264 This downward
pressure on the Far East’s regional arsenal was already
apparent in 2004-05, and, if Baluyevsky’s remarks
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are to be taken seriously, it is likely that the Northern
Fleet’s nuclear forces and Russia’s NSNW will become
more important for consideration of deterrence or first
strike in the Asian as well as European theater. As of
2004:
Currently, about 20% of the deployed Russian strategic
nuclear forces remain in the Eastern part of Russia.
As strategic forces shrink, the pace of reductions in
the region is the fastest. In particular, three of the four
divisions of the Russian Strategic Forces that have
been disbanded since 2000 were located here. And the
reductions will continue. Most likely, the SS-18 base
at Uzhur will be closed down after 2010. The future
of the SS-25 mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) is also uncertain, as they are getting older. The
submarine base on the Kamchatka peninsula will likely
no longer host strategic submarines once the last DeltaIII nuclear submarines will be retired. Thus, perhaps, the
only place where strategic forces will remain in this part
of Russia is Ukrainka, the home of strategic bombers. As
deployment of strategic nuclear forces in the Eastern part
of Russia is curtailed, non-strategic nuclear weapons in
the region may be assigned a stronger role. According
to the author’s assessment, nearly one third of the
3,300 Russian non-strategic weapons are assigned for
deployment with general-purpose forces in the Siberian
and Far Eastern military districts. All of these weapons
are currently kept at central storage facilities of the 12th
Directorate of the Russian Armed Forces. In case of
hostilities they can be deployed with surface-to-surface,
surface-to-air, air-to-surface, anti-ship, antisubmarine
missiles, and other dual-use means of the Ground, Air,
and Naval Forces.265

However, if nuclear missions grow in importance
and likely consideration, this will inhibit North Korea’s
disposition to give up its existing nuclear weapons, not
to mention foregoing new nuclear weapons. Similarly,
Japan and South Korea will either be further tempted
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to go nuclear or cleave ever more to Washington, which
would likely increase its regional military presence
under such conditions.266 Therefore, a purely military
and preeminently nuclear strategy leads Russia into a
strategic dead end here. A political strategy is essential
and even paramount in Russia’s endeavors to defuse
potential security challenges here.
Such a strategy is even more essential because of
the problems generated by China’s overall military
and nuclear buildup. First of all, there are multiplying
signs that the no first use injunction in Chinese military
doctrine is neither as absolute a ban as China has
previously proclaimed and that it is under pressure
from younger officers there.267 Thus China is now
debating retention of its no first use posture regarding
nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons appear to be
playing a more prominent role in Chinese strategy
than was hitherto believed to be the case. For example,
China is building a hitherto undisclosed nuclear
submarine base in the Pacific and a major nuclear base
in its interior, moves that suggest consideration of a
second strike capability but can also put much pressure
on Russia’s Pacific Fleet and Russian Asia.268
Russian military analysts or planners are quite
aware of the possibility of Chinese military threats
even though they do not discuss them often unless they
are critical of the partnership with China or profess to
believe, as is apparently now the case, that they have
at least 10 years before China can be a real threat and
that China is not now a real threat to Russia.269 Even
so, at least some writers have pointed out that the rise
in China’s capabilities could go beyond a conventional
threat to Russian assets in Siberia and Russian Asia. For
example, the following 2004 analysis took into account
both the limited nuclear capability China had then and
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the possibilities that could subsequently ensue based
on those forces’ ongoing development.
Despite the significant qualitative makeup of the current
Chinese nuclear missile potential, its combat capabilities
are quite limited; it would hardly be adequate to destroy
highly protected command and control posts and could
not substantially degrade Russia’s ground and seabased strategic nuclear forces. However, this potential
would be capable of substantially degrading the Russian
Federation Armed Forces group in the Far Eastern Theater
of Military Operations and of doing major damage to the
population and economy not only in the Far Eastern and
Urals regions, but even in the Central Region of European
Russia. According to available data, so far China does not
have missile systems with MIRVed warheads, but the
upsurge in activity related to the building of antimissile
defense systems could accelerate its development of that
type of weapons system, including antimissile defense
countermeasures. It should be noted that the PRC’s
economic and technological potential is quite adequate
for a quantitative and qualitative breakthrough in the
area of its strategic offensive weapons development.270

Given these aforementioned trends, we might well see
a rethinking of Russia’s nuclear strategy in Asia.271
These trends in China’s military development fuel
Moscow’s aforementioned ambivalence about the INF
treaty. As Russian officials from Putin down have
argued, other countries to Russia’s south and east are
building such missiles but America and Russia are
debarred from doing so. In October 2007,
Mr. Putin said that Russia would leave the INF treaty
unless it was turned into a global agreement to constrain
other states, including those “located in our near vicinity.”
He did not identify any country but Iran and North
Korea are within the range covered by the treaty. Dmitri
Peskov, a Kremlin spokesman, later acknowledged that
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China, India and Pakistan had medium-range missile
capabilities. He insisted that Mr. Putin was concerned
about an imbalance of regional security rather than any
specific threat.272

But these remarks also reveal that Moscow cannot
publicly reveal or confront its true threat perceptions
and instead blames Washington for its failure to take
Russian interests into account. Thus while Moscow had
“privately told Washington it wanted medium range
missiles to counter Iranian threats, it publicly argued
that the lack of Iranian missiles meant the U.S. did not
need a defense system.”273
From here we can see that from Moscow’s standpoint, American missile defenses not only threaten it
directly, they also force it to “lean to one side,” i.e.,
become partners of China, which is regarded as a lesser threat, more predictable, and more respectful of
Russian interests. As Deputy Foreign Minister
Aleksandr Losyukov said in 2007,
We would like to see a non-circuited system. Besides,
we might make our own contribution to it, too. Then
we would have no reason to suspect this system is
targeted against us —If it is true that the system being
created is expected to ward off some threats posed by
irresponsible regimes, then it is not only Europe, the
United States or Japan that one should have to keep
in mind. When some other countries’ concerns are
kept outside such a system, they may have the feeling
threats against them are growing, too. Consequently,
the systems to be created must accommodate the
concerns of other countries concerned.274
Clearly the other countries to which he refers are
Russia and China, both of whom feel that America
99

disregards their interests and concerns. Thus it is not
surprising that Russia publicly criticized the U.S.Japan collaboration on missile defenses and the linking
of Australia to the U.S-Japanese alliance about which it
had previously been silent. Here Moscow has adopted
China’s argument, for certainly the U.S. alliance system
is not primarily targeted on Russia. Such arguing on
behalf of mainly Chinese interests suggests that as
part of the Sino-Russian partnership, we are beginning
to encounter the phenomenon that many Russian
analysts warned about, specifically that Russia ends
up following China’s line. But this may well be because
Russia perceives that Washington will not grant it the
self-inflated status that it claims for itself either in
Europe or in Asia. Interestingly enough, while China,
according to most analysts, had hitherto been seen as
desisting from challenging the U.S. missile defense
program by a vigorous program of building nuclear
weapons, Russia seems ready to do so even though the
utility of that program for its overall interests, which
normally focus on getting the West to include it as a
major international actor, is decidedly moot.275
Even if one argues or warns that Russia’s strategic
partnership with China resembles an alliance that
could fracture Asia into bipolarity, this partnership
may be based more on what both sides oppose than on
a shared positive view of world politics.276 Certainly
it still lacks a solid economic underpinning. Therefore
Beijing’s growing quest for a global role may leave
Russia behind. Certainly Beijing appears to be pressing
Moscow for more tangible signs of support like
increased energy shipments and support for its attacks
on the U.S.-Japanese alliance. Although Moscow
obliged somewhat in 2007, it is once again making
overtures to Japan, having suddenly decided that
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Japanese missile defense is not aimed against it and
failing to send China the energy it needs and wants.277
Indeed, the alliance or comity with China presents
great strategic problems for Russia because of the risk
of dependence upon China that it inevitably carries.
While Russia needs China as a partner in Asia against
American power and policy, it also covertly depends
upon America’s alliance system to maintain a balance
there, forestall a renationalization of Japanese defense
policy, and give it an opportunity to remind Beijing
that because of its independence it can undertake a
rapprochement with Japan. Moscow has played off
Beijing and Tokyo regarding the destination of energy
pipelines to the Asia-Pacific, and in 1997 Defense
Minister Igor Rodionov praised the U.S. alliance
system in a not so subtle reminder by both Tokyo and
Moscow to China that Russia had a Japanese option if
it cared to exercise it. Such divide and rule tactics are
basic to Russian foreign policy.278 Since Moscow now
proclaims that its foreign policy will consist of purely
tactical alliances with interested parties, it may yet turn
out that Russia outsmarts itself and will not be fully
trusted by any major interlocutor in Asia. 279 Absent a
vision of the regional order other than its returning as
a great power, Russia might yet find itself isolated and
distrusted.
Yet weighing all the alternatives in the balance,
Russia has made up its mind to react.280 It perceives U.S.
nuclear policy and strategy as part of an overarching
strategy to isolate and threaten it and is responding
accordingly, asymmetrically as promised. Thus its
response is partnership, if not alliance with China,
pressure on Japan to desist from targeting Russia with
its missile defenses coupled with alternating offers of
economic incentives for partnership in the region, and
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the nuclearization of the Pacific Fleet to ensure robust
deterrence and a second-strike capability.
The issue of missile defenses in Europe raises
different problems for Russia. Despite all the ink and
hysteria it has spilled and displayed on this issue,
Moscow’s claims that these systems are targeted
against its nuclear weapons, threaten its basic interests,
and that Washington is not being forthcoming about
the details or negotiations are utterly mendacious.
Even anti-American military writers and analysts
acknowledge this. For instance, writing in 2001, we find
a group of leading military men and civilian analysts
headed by retired General Makhmut A. Gareyev, the
doyen of Russian military thinking and President of
the Academy of Military Sciences, writing together
that,
We are conscious of the fact that even if the U.S.A. starts
creating an antimissile defense system, it will hardly
present a threat to our nuclear potential for years and
years to come. The point rather is this: a collapse of the
ABM Treaty is likely to strike a blow to all disarmament
agreements as it may to the non-proliferation and
strategic stability regimes in general. And this is what
may represent a serious challenge to the security of both
Russia and, incidentally the U.S.A. (something we are
telling the U.S. side).281 (Italics in the original)

From the Russian point of view stated earlier in
this monograph, it is the threat to strategic stability as
Moscow understands it that is the real threat which
Washington should take seriously. But it has been
lost in a flurry of mendacious charges about phantom
military threats and charges. Russia got 10 detailed
technical briefings on the subject before 2007 so it is
hardly uninformed as to the capacities of these systems.
Ten radars and interceptors in Poland and the Czech
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Republic cannot threaten Moscow’s nuclear forces in
any way or fashion, especially as their trajectories do
not intersect with those of Russian missiles. Neither
are the repeated claims from Putin on down that Iran
is not building an atom bomb or that it has no IRBM
capability and will not have one for years truthful as
Moscow itself knows.282
In fact both Deputy Prime Minister and former
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov and former Chief of
Staff General Yuri N. Baluyevsky have acknowledged
Iran’s threats.283 Commenting on Iran’s launch in early
2007 of a suborbital weather rocket, Lieutenant General
Leonid Sazhin stated that “Iran’s launch of a weather
rocket shows that Tehran has not given up efforts to
achieve two goals—create its own carrier rocket to
take spacecraft to orbit and real medium-range combat
missiles capable of hitting targets 3,000-5,000 miles
away.”284
Although he argued that this capability would not
fully materialize for 3-5 years, it would also take at
least that long to test and deploy the American missile
defenses that are at issue. Equally significantly, MajorGeneral Vitaly Dubrovin, a Russian space defense
expert, said flatly “now Tehran has a medium-range
ballistic missile capable of carrying a warhead.”285
Naturally both men decried the fact that Iran appears
intent on validating American threat assessments.286
Since they wrote in February 2007, Iran has announced
that it has developed the Ashura IRBM with a 2,000Km
range.287 Indeed Putin’s 2007 proposal for joint use
of the Gabala air and missile defense installation in
Azerbaijan implicitly acknowledged the validity of the
U.S. threat perception concerning Iran. As one Iranian
newspaper wrote in September 2007,
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Meanwhile, the change of stance by Russia regarding
the anti-missile defense shield, from criticizing it and
rejecting it to proposing the use of an alternative site
for that system, could be regarded as a remarkable
development that indicates the serious threats posed
by that project. In the case of the implementation of
a “joint missile defense system” and the installation
of intercepting radar systems in our neighboring
countries—the Republic of Azerbaijan, Turkey, Iraq, or
Kuwait—would include the intensification of American
threats against our country.288

To understand Moscow’s alarm and anxiety about
these missile defenses, we must look at the scenarios
advanced by Russian spokesmen as to why these
defenses allegedly threaten Russia.
• As Dmitri Trenin has suggested, Moscow
believes (though with no basis in fact—author)
that the building of missile defenses represents
an American perception of threats from Russian
nuclear missiles. Therefore, these defenses
aim to neutralize them in potential conflict.289
Either Russian missiles would be attacked by a
conventional air and space first strike, possibly
involving these networks in Europe, or else these
missile defenses would frustrate a retaliatory
second strike, leaving Russia defenseless.290
• While these missile defenses in and of themselves
are no threat, they represent the first stage of a
planned or potential U.S. buildup of a missile
network in Europe that could then neutralize
Russia’s first and/or second strike capabilities
as cited above and shift the burden of war to
Russia and Europe.291
• If missile defenses were stationed at these bases,
that would be a pretext for then stationing
offensive missiles there, which would force
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Moscow to assume the worst case scenario.
In turn, that could cause Russia to attempt to
shoot them down, leading to a conflict with
America.292
• As suggested above, these defenses and
whatever may follow them rupture the fabric
of strategic stability where neither side has the
freedom of action or margin of superiority that
might encourage it to think it could employ
coercive diplomacy or military force with
impunity. That strategic stability equation is of
critical importance to Russia because it believes
that otherwise Washington might be tempted
to think it has a margin within which it could
strike at Russia with relative impunity.
• Finally there is a fifth, and always unstated but
critical aspect here. These defenses entrench the
United States in Europe’s military defense and
foreclose any prospect of Moscow’s being able
to intimidate or reestablish its hegemony over
Eastern and Central Europe, and even possibly
the CIS. If missile defenses exist in Europe,
threats like TNW and the Iskander are greatly
diminished, if not negated. Because empire and
the creation of a fearsome domestic enemy are
the justifications for and inextricable corollary
of autocracy at home, the end of empire impels
the decline of Russia as a great power, or so it is
imagined, and generates tremendous pressure
for domestic reform. As Lilia Shevtsova writes,
Maintaining Russia’s superpower ambitions and
the domination of the former Soviet space are now
crucial to the reproduction of the political system
and the self-perpetuation of power. In short,
Russia’s foreign policy has become an important
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tool for achieving the Kremlin’s domestic
objectives. And a key foreign policy objective
is to create the image of a hostile international
environment and demonstrate a strong reaction
to which it can legitimize the hyper-centralization
of Kremlin power, top-down governance, and its
crackdown on political pluralism.293

Missile defenses contribute greatly to shattering
the tie between autocracy and empire, and, if Moscow
cannot dominate the CIS as it hopes to do, its domestic
form of government no longer has any legitimate or
even pseudo-legitimate justification since its avowed
purpose is to restore Russia as a great power. Moreover,
autocracy cannot survive in a democratic Europe.
Arguably, this is the real threat, not the highly unlikely
threat of a war in Europe.
Therefore we see Russia’s constant and habitual
resort to intimidation of any and all states who may
be tempted to join NATO or host these systems. Those
tactics of intimidation are clearly Mafia-like tactics,
and evoke the classic signs of a protection racket. It is
not for nothing that many European diplomats and
intelligence officials characterize Russia in just this
way, i.e., as a Mafia state.294 In other words, it appears
to be a key belief of the Russian elite that because of its
presupposition of conflict with the West, it must retain
a formidable capability for holding Europe hostage
militarily as well as through energy and conventional
military power. ICBMs and SLBMs can do this but
they also have to deter Washington. Where threats to
Europe are concerned TNW, including systems like
the Iskander and Skorost’ ballistic missiles and possibly
the cruise missile version of the Iskander (Iskander-K),
are intended for that purpose as well as for purposes of
a nuclear first strike with which to restore control over
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the intrawar escalation process. Even a rudimentary
American military presence in Europe is anathema to
Russian plans as it entrenches the U.S. overall military
presence and extended deterrence in Europe and creates
stronger European solidarity. Since two clear themes
in Russian discourse about Europe are, first, that the
American presence is unnatural and that by placing
missile defense there, Washington is embroiling Europe
in unnecessary and unwanted conflicts; and, second,
that European solidarity is “silly” and a complicating
factor for Russia, missile defense undermines many
of Russia’s political objectives for European security
as well as their cognitive basis.295 And no government
welcomes such developments.
Russian Replies to Missile Defenses.
True to the spirit of a policy based on deterrence
and the presupposition of mutual hostility with
Washington, Russia is either unable or unwilling to
follow Washington’s move from deterrence vis-à-vis
Russia towards a defense-dominant world with lower
numbers of nuclear weapons, especially offensive
ones. Instead, Russia is building up or attempting to
build up more capable and newer offensive missiles
with professed capabilities to evade any and all
manner of defenses. Medvedev’s recent demands for
a comprehensive deterrent against all contingencies by
2020 when missile defenses are supposed to be fully
in place only reaffirm that hostile posture.296 Such
action-reaction processes betray the fact that Russia
and its generals have regressed back to a period before
Gorbachev’s reforms in their thinking and cannot or
will not seem to understand, as do civilian analysts,
that remaining in this posture and demanding strategic
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stability and some notion of parity with America is not
only a bankrupt economic policy, but also a bankrupt
strategy that only replicates mutual hostility.297 Indeed,
Baluyevsky admitted in 2005 that, “The nuclear
potential of the armed forces of the Russian Federation
is currently formed up to the agreed level of minimum
sufficiency.”298 These remarks show how hard, even
ruinous, a task it is for Russia to sustain multiple
missile programs.
According to Russian sources, in the last 7 years
Moscow has undertaken the following moves in
response to the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty
and move to construct defenses on its Pacific coast and
now in Europe. In 2007 Ivanov unveiled plans to build
by that date: 50 new Topol-M ICBM missile complexes
on mobile launchers; 34 new silo-based Topol-M
missiles and control units; 50 new bombers; and 31
ships and to fully rearm 40 tank, 97 infantry, and 50
parachute battalions. Forty Topol-M silo-based missiles
have already been deployed. In 2007 alone, the military
would get 17 new ballistic missiles, rather than four a
year as has recently been the case, and four spacecraft
and booster rockets. It would overhaul a long-range
aviation squadron, six helicopter and combat aviation
squadrons, seven tank and 13 motor rifle battalions. In
2007 alone, $11 billion will be spent on new weapons.
Thirty-one new ships will be commissioned, including
eight SSBN’s carrying ICBMs (presumably the
forthcoming Bulava missile). And in 2009-10, Russia
will decide whether or not to build a new shipyard for
the construction of aircraft carriers. Over this period,
50 Tu-160 Blackjack and Tu-95 Bear strategic bombers
would operate as well. Doctrinally, Russia will also
retain its right of launching preemptive strikes.299 The
increase of the original military budget for 2009 by
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27 percent, the extensive nuclear building plans and
demands for more nuclear submarines (both in terms
of engine propulsion and weapons) suggest a reversion
to the kind of thinking that preceded Gorbachev.300
In this connection, it is clear and admitted by
Solovtsov that in 2002, once America exited the ABM
treaty, Russia altered the development plan for its
strategic nuclear forces to emphasize the creation of
fundamentally new and effective means of penetrating
any missile system. Apart from the Topol-M (SS-27)
mobile ICBM, which will be, if it has not already been,
MIRVed, there is the new land-based ICBM, the RS24, that was tested in 2007. This ICBM is fitted with
a multiple reentry vehicle so it is capable of being
MIRVed up to apparently 10 missiles and will replace
the aging SS-19 and SS-20. The Iskander family of
missiles has already been discussed above, but it, too,
is part of this process, especially the cruise missile
version. Medvedev’s recent call for these nuclear
submarines to be armed with (presumably) nuclear
cruise missiles suggests as well a demand for or the
expected existence of a submarine launched version
of the Iskander-K discussed above. Moscow is also
maintaining existing missile complexes as long as it
can through the parameters of the State Armaments
Program through 2015.301 And since Medvedev is now
calling for building through 2020 for the navy and the
nuclear forces, we can expect that this program will
continue through that date as well. The naval nuclear
forces have built two new missiles, the Sineva and the
Bulava, and has launched new submarine programs
e.g., the Delta IV class SSBN from which the Sineva was
tested (specifically the Tula) in 2007 and the Borey-Class
submarine, e.g., the Yuri Dolgoruki, for the Bulava. But
despite introduction of these weapons, the Bulava has
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failed its recent tests and has not yet been introduced.
Meanwhile the Topol-M will only be introduced at the
rate of six or seven a year, which evidently is the limit
of Russian capabilities.302 Even so, all of these new
weapons have as their aim the evasion or penetration
of U.S. missile defenses.303
But Russian ambitions do not end here. Russian
writers previously talked about hypersonic missiles. It
is not clear if any of the new ones listed here include
such capabilities. But there is no doubt that the intention
to build such missiles is probably still there, and that
work on them is moving forward. Second, Russia has
announced tests of a precision guided 2,000Km cruise
missile and is having its strategic bombers test cruise
missile launches. Finally, Russia is also developing
a low-trajectory ICBM (this may refer to the RS24 which is supposed to be able to penetrate enemy
missile defenses).304 Such programs underscore the fact
that inasmuch as the U.S. missile defenses in Europe
will not be up until 2011 or 2013, there is no threat to
Russian missiles.
Nevertheless, as noted above, at present Moscow
cannot defend against an air-space attack, some parts of
its country not yet being capable of affording coverage
by air defenses, and Putin has opposed investment in
missile defenses saying in 2004 that it is premature to
invest large sums in that program.305 Likewise, there is
mounting doubt about the credibility of Russia’s naval
nuclear forces.306 While this doubt seems misplaced, at
least for the next decade, if the Borey-class submarines
and accompanying missiles are built, it is noteworthy
that Stephen Cimbala’s analysis of this issue also
suggests movement towards cruise missiles and
cites Russian reports of a new missile that surpasses
the Topol-M and that should be operational by 2017.
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Perhaps this missile could be used for both land-based
and sea-based deterrents.307 Medvedev’s call for a new
nuclear naval program may reflect that disquiet among
Russian elites about this leg of the triad.308
Meanwhile, at present, in fact, Russia actually has
no adequate response to American missile defenses
as former commander of the radio-technical troops
of Russian Air Defense Lieutenant General Grigory
Dubrov has admitted.309 Worse yet, major military
figures, e.g., Gareyev, are pressing for the forthcoming
defense doctrine to emphasize that Russia developed
its defense posture on the assumption that the “nuclear
weapons of practically all major states are ultimately
intended against Russia.”310 Even worse news for
Russia is the reduction of the nuclear component
under Putin. Boris Yeltsin bequeathed to Putin land,
sea, and air based warheads totaling 5,842. As of 2007,
according to the National Strategy Institute, Russia
has 3,344 warheads. Thus it has lost 405 platforms
and 2,498 warheads. The situation in conventional
weapons is no better. Under conditions where Russia’s
defense industry cannot make up this gap and can only
produce 6-7 ICBMs a year, the gap between U.S. and
Russian forces both quantitatively and qualitatively
will inevitably widen.311 And these considerations do
not take into account the rise in Chinese conventional
and nuclear power that Russia must also find a way to
deter.
START AND RUSSIA’S STRATEGIC
CHALLENGES
In this strategic environment and especially given
the Russian official position of adhering to deterrence
as a strategy and to the principle of strategic stability
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with Washington as a way of restraining it, Russia is
facing ever more difficult strategic dilemmas despite
its newfound wealth and status. Even if we left aside
the Chinese factor, U.S. policy presents Russia with
enormous, if not insuperable, challenges because
America simply refuses to stay deterred and, as noted
above, Russia evidently finds it increasingly difficult
to deter the United States across both the conventional
and nuclear spectrum. The dominant motif of U.S.
defense policy, to some extent under President Clinton,
but strongly articulated in the Bush administration is
the refusal of the United States to accept any kind of
deterrence upon its capabilities for global strike. This
trend is unlikely to abate under the next administration.
Apart from America’s unchallenged capability for
conventional power projection and global strike using
long-range missiles and integrated land, sea, air, space,
and cyber capabilities, it has undertaken the following
initiatives with respect to nuclear weapons, all of which
are seen from Moscow as either lowering the threshold
for actual nuclear use on the battlefield or freeing itself
from the constraints of arms control treaties, mutual
transparency, and strategic stability.
• America has abandoned the ABM treaty and
is building strategic defenses in lands Russia
considers to be its sphere of influence. Given
the opaque nature of U.S. missile defense
development—consisting of an open-end system
architecture and periodic block deployments—
this process engenders strategic uncertainty
rather than stabilizing transparency. This alarms
Moscow into believing that these programs
will not end with what is currently planned for
construction in Poland and the Czech Republic.
Thus as Dmitri Trenin writes,
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Moscow’s core problem with the U.S.BMD
[ballistic missile defense] position area in Central
Europe is that Russia regards it as part of the
global network in an environment where it is not
fully clear as to what Washington’s long-term
politico-military strategy toward Russia will
be. The United States’ de facto refusal to join
Russia in building a joint Theater Missile Defense
(TMD) system to protect Europe has been seen
as a worrying sign; alleged U.S. backtracking
on confidence-building measures for the Polish
and Czech sites is another. The story planted in
the Russian media in July 2008 about Moscow
considering the use of Cuba by its strategic
bombers, now again on global patrolling missions,
is obviously sending a message to Washington
that Russia sees the missile defense deployments,
which it cannot reliably monitor, as a strategic
challenge.312

• American military doctrine expressly calls for
the use of nuclear weapons (which kind are not
specified) in its global strike strategy even in a
preemptive mode, and at the same time assigns
potential missions of destroying an adversary’s
nuclear or C3I capability to advanced
conventional weapons.313 These doctrinal or
mission assignments not only openly call for
use of nuclear weapons in a first-strike mode on
the battlefield, or as preemptive and preventive
strike weapons, the use of conventional missiles
atop nuclear missile launchers to accomplish
nuclear missions could easily lead adversaries
into assuming an incoming nuclear strike,
especially if they, like Moscow, operate upon a
launch on warning (LOW) basis.
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• Despite all the rhetoric to the contrary and the
talk of Russia being a partner and enemy and
not the target of American nuclear weapons,
in fact, close examination of the size and
structure of that arsenal suggests that an attack
on Russian missiles, i.e., a countervalue attack,
is the canonical mission for which those forces
are structured, a fact that makes the preceding
points all the more dangerous.
• Whereas Russia is destroying or cannot replace
nuclear weapons equal to the enhancement
of U.S. conventional and nuclear capabilities,
America, by walking out of the ABM treaty and
refusing any kind of verification or constraint
upon its ability to upload or replenish weapons,
has a huge strategic nuclear reserve that can be
quickly mobilized for military purposes.
• Despite the Bush administration’s professions
of faith that its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)
pointed to a movement away from reliance
upon nuclear weapons, its presenter, Assistant
Secretary of defense J. D. Crouch stated in 2002
that the United States would retain its triad,
albeit at smaller quantitative levels, retain an
“operationally deployed force” that could be
augmented if the security environment changed,
retain dismantled warheads so that the process
of reductions could be reversed at any time if
necessary, and still retain a capacity to “hold
at risk a wide range of target types.” Indeed,
Crouch observed that while we regarded Russia
as a nonthreatening power,
Russia’s nuclear forces and programs,
nevertheless, remain a concern. Russia faces
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many strategic problems around its periphery
and its future course cannot be charted with
certainty. U.S. planning must take this into
account. In the event that U.S. relations with
Russia significantly worsen in the future,
the U.S. may need to revise its nuclear force
levels and postures.314

		

We should take into account the fact that the
unreformed defense establishment and the
political leadership share an ingrained neoSoviet reflex that the United States is and was the
main enemy seeking to threaten Russia. Thus,
as a forthcoming paper by Mikhail Tsypkin of
the Naval Postgraduate School says,
The Russians have probably interpreted all
of this as implicitly directed against Russia
as well as likely other targets. The fact that
the NPR was only partially declassified
must have unshackled the imagination of
GRU analysts, who could add their own
projections to the information made available
by the U.S. They also would not have missed
the reference to future “defensive systems
with multiple layers” in the leaked excerpts
of the NPR.315 The emphasis on precision
strikes combined with enhanced intelligence
against mobile targets must have left the
Russians wondering about the survivability
of Russia’s mobile SS-25 and SS-27 (Topol-M)
ICBMs, while the requirement to increase
hard target-kill capability would make
them think about the survivability of their
country’s silo-based ICBMs and command
and control facilities.316

• Tsypkin also observes that reliable channels of
communication, e.g., the Consultative Group
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for Strategic Stability (the original group of
2+2 of foreign and defense ministers and the
working groups under it) were moribund from
the moment of their creation in 2002. Moreover,
U.S. plans were briefed to Moscow by assistant
secretaries, a rank that in Russia does not connote
high status or influence. This protocol gaffe
may have added to Russians’ sense that Putin
was being deliberately snubbed. As a result,
while there were American briefings on missile
defense, there were apparently no senior-level
consultations until the middle of 2007, another
sign to Moscow of a deliberate disregard for its
status and interests.317
• As a result of all the foregoing points, it would
appear to Russia that America is moving towards
a first-strike capability against Russia’s nuclear
missile sites integrating conventional, nuclear
and, as suggested below space capabilities.
• Washington is also experimenting with or trying
to build low-yield nuclear weapons that are socalled bunker busters that can again lower the
threshold of nuclear use according to Russia and
which can threaten deeply buried missile sites
and C3I centers, e.g., Yammantau Mountain.
• Finally, Washington is also discussing, if not
implementing, the emplacement of weapons in
space, not just satellites or weapons that traverse
rather than are based in space.318 As we have
seen, all of these moves, whether singly or as
part of an integrated defense strategy, combine
to provoke Russia into charging that the United
States is threatening other states with nuclear
weapons, undermining strategic stability,
destroying deterrence and transparency,
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stimulating proliferation among threatened
states, and forcing Russia (and for that matter
China too) to develop their own nuclear and
asymmetric capabilities to either hold Europe or
Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea hostage and to
cling ever more to a strategy of deterrence whose
fundamental premise is the irreducible mutual
hostility of the adversaries. Furthermore, albeit
in different language and style, these Russian
critiques are substantively very much the same
as those mounted by such domestic critics of
the Bush administration as Jonathan Schell,
Hans Kristensen, David McDonough, Ivan
Oelrich, Christopher Chyba, George Bunn, and
others.319 And these critics all base themselves
on a close reading of the administration’s own
statements and official documents. If one looks
at the results of the administration’s strategy,
the rise in proliferation, China’s 25 percent
increase in nuclear weapons since 2006, Russia’s
continuing adherence to a nuclear answer to its
strategic problems vis-à-vis America, mounting
hostility towards it, and the general decline of
U.S. standing and power in the world, it should
become clear that these criticisms have much
merit.320
Similarly, under the circumstances, it should be clear
why Russia wants to multilateralize not only the INF
treaty but also a START treaty, and has been calling for
that for the last 8 years.321 Failing to understand this and
failure to restore transparency and mutual confidence
can only lead to an escalation of tensions and mutual
suspicion, a reinforcement of the antidemocratic and
neo-imperial trends in Russian foreign policy because
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the need to hold Europe hostage to Russian military
and especially nuclear capability will grow as does
the gap between Washington and Moscow. Worse yet,
this failure will also enhance the likelihood of further
nuclear proliferation as the two nuclear rivals and
China compete across the globe for support.
As Cimbala has written, “The reassurance of a stable
nuclear deterrence relationship between the U.S. and
Russia, and at lower levels than hitherto, is a necessary
condition for a viable nonproliferation regime and
for crisis stability in a multipolar nuclear world.”322 A
stable and secure bilateral relationship between these
two states, founded on the kind of relationship deriving
from nuclear reductions, is a necessary anchor for an
international order in which proliferation is curtailed.323
Absent such reassurance and such an anchor, we will
all be sailing on very stormy seas without a rudder and
with a corpse in the cargo.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION
It will be noted here that the author is not
recommending any particular force size or mixture for
either Washington or Moscow. Instead, we and Russia
need to consider fundamental strategic issues if we
are to get back on track in curbing both the tendency
to think of nuclear weapons as oversized and more
effective conventional weapons and to restore the
bilateral confidence and reassurance necessary for
stabilizing unquiet regions and curbing proliferation.
First, it is clear that the Bush administration’s strategic
unilateralism and willingness to entertain the use of
nuclear weapons as warfighting weapons for theater
scenarios against potential proliferators and in roles
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hitherto reserved for conventional ordnance has failed
to achieve either security or U.S. interests. Predictably,
it has instead achieved the reverse outcome: more
nuclear weapons; a flight towards cruise missiles
throughout Eurasia, including nuclear capable missiles
like the Iskander; and a hardening of relations on these
issues with Russia and China. Second, the rhetoric
of partnership with Russia is not and has not been
matched by changes in force structures even when
such a partnership seemed feasible as in late 200103. As a result, the institutionalized logic of having
nuclear missiles on both sides deployed against each
other prevailed over arms control and those forces in
both governments who cannot get out of the Cold War,
particularly Moscow, where the elite is entrenched
in its anti-Americanism and institutionally disposed
to a paranoid view of enemies everywhere by virtue
of its previous socialization in the Soviet KGB were
able to prevail. The connection between the steady
drift of the Putin regime towards domestic autocracy
and its ingrained hostility to the West based on the
aforementioned presupposition of conflict is quite
strong.
Therefore, President Obama must approach issues
of nuclear force structure, arms control, and Russia in
a strategic manner in order to advance U.S. interests
more efficaciously than has been the case during the
Bush administration. Based on what both campaigns
have said, they seem to want a new START treaty with
major reductions and are willing to return to a robust
but as yet unspecified verification regime. And they also
support globalization of the INF treaty. To help them
realize these goals, President Obama must undertake
the following steps. First, he must quickly commission
not just a negotiating team for these treaties whose time
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is running out, but also a full-fledged nuclear policy
review. However, that review cannot be left solely to
the Pentagon but must be controlled by him, or at least
his direct agent, and involve other players, including
civilian experts, so that the institutional pressure for
maintaining an excessively large number of weapons
and missions for them is countered by arguments
that force credible answers in reply. This review must
proceed concurrently with the START and INF treaty
negotiations because of the deadlines attached to both
treaties, which could expire in 2009.
This review or reviews should address the following
questions: low-yield nuclear weapons as bunker
buster weapons; the use of nuclear weapons in a firststrike, preventive, or even preemptive capability; the
use of conventional missiles atop nuclear launchers
to carry out missions hitherto of a nuclear nature; the
development and deployment of the so called Reliable
Replacement Weapon (RRW); the weaponization
of space (that is, the placement of strike weapons as
opposed to reconnaissance and C3I complexes in space
that has long since happened), and the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). In other words, the nature of
our nuclear strategy and future force structure should
be comprehensively rethought, with a view to taking
into account broader strategic benefits and costs from
adopting any or all of those policies pursued by the Bush
administration. We make no a priori recommendations
as to what the outcome or the recommendations of these
reviews should be. But we do need to address whether
or not we gain from pursuing these policies when the
current strategic environment in all its dimensions
and the interests of other major interlocutors are taken
into account. The thoroughgoing unilateralism and
ideological zeal of the Bush administration has led
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us, in regard to those issues, into a blind alley and
united potential enemies against us, while diminishing
our effective ability to advance our interests. These
reviews should be conducted with cold analysis, not
theological adherence to the belief that treaties either
are a panacea or useless, that missile defense is a matter
of theology either for good or bad, that unilateralism is
always bad or alternatively always desirable, etc. The
only criterion should be a coldly impartial look as to
what degree adoption of any or all of these programs
serve U.S. interests and to what degree and at what
cost. We already see that these policies have intensified
Russian (and Chinese) suspicions about our goals
and objectives, leading them to greater collusion and
obstruction of our overall foreign and defense policies.
Surely, we can find an alternative to that self-defeating
course of action and help move the debate from the
frozen posture of deterrence with its inherent postulate
of mutual hostility to a different defense-dominant and
more inherently stabilizing discourse and policy.
Second, the Obama administration should support,
as the presidential campaigns have, a reduction of
strategic nuclear weapons—land, air, and sea-based—
from the limits of the SORT treaty of 1,700-2,200 by 2012
to figures in the neighborhood of 1,000-1,200. We make
no recommendations as to the size of each particular
leg of the triad. Modeling of forces on both sides
shows that they could ride out a first-strike at those
numbers and still have sufficient retaliatory capability
for a second-strike.324 Third, as part of that treaty the
new administration should support the restoration
of the START I verification regime and also a ban on
MIRVs, which the United States has long argued are
destabilizing weapons. Certainly in the context of a
new treaty and reductions, these weapons would be
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destabilizing. Fourth, the United States should support
the Russian idea of multilateralizing these talks and
the INF negotiations as well.
The reasons for supporting the multilateralization of
these negotiations are quite obvious. It is long since time
that China is acknowledged as a major nuclear power,
with the attendant responsibilities thereof, i.e., fully
participating in global arms control regimes. Hitherto
China has been exempt from all these talks and treaties
and has therefore been able to act without any external
constraints in developing its nuclear forces. It also has
thus been a free rider on the regimes crafted by these
accords.325 Consequently, it is necessary to persuade
China to accept its new status and the responsibilities
that go with its power and, equally importantly, to
subject its nuclear program to legitimate international
regulation. Persuading China to join both the INF and
START processes would reduce the threat of nuclear
and other wars around Taiwan and more generally
throughout the Asia-Pacific region. The regulation
and possible capping of China’s nuclear forces would
also reduce the pressure for missile defenses and
the endless modernization of U.S. strategic forces in
regions where Russia is particularly vulnerable. At the
same time, recent articles claiming that the dispatch
of the Borey-Class SSBN submarine with the Bulava
missile to the Pacific Fleet where Russia is particularly
vulnerable represents a riposte to missile defenses in
Europe, showing the interactive dynamic at work in
the question of missile defenses in both Europe and
Asia.326
While it is doubtful that China will soon accede
to these talks because they weaken or could even
remove its trump card vis-à-vis the United States in a
Taiwan or other scenario, China, not the United States,
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should bear the burden of refusing to move forward
on nuclear disarmament. If China spurns these
invitations, it also reveals that it wants a capability to
hold both Russia and America hostage, a fact whose
implications will not be lost on Russian policymakers
and may slow the tendency to bandwagon with China,
another development that would be entirely in the U.S.
interest. On the other hand, were China to accede to
participation in these two treaty regimes, we would
finally be able to develop an independent and objective
method for verifying Chinese nuclear deployments
and developments, increase mutual confidence in Asia
among at least the three major nuclear powers there,
(America, Russia, and China), and reduce military
threats throughout Asia and the Pacific. A third benefit
of Chinese participation in these regimes would be the
follow-on momentum that this would have vis-à-vis
India and Pakistan. That momentum could slow the
momentum of their arms race in regard to nuclear
weapons, since Indian developments (which Pakistan
follows) are to a considerable degree pegged to Chinese
moves.327
There would be added benefits to globalizing the
INF treaty, or at least supporting it. This globalization
puts enormous pressure on Iran to stop its quest
for nuclear weapons, for it would then lead to great
pressure upon Iran to curtail its IRBM programs for
the Shahab-3, a missile of 1,300Km range, the Ashura,
a 2,000Km range, and the projected Shahab-4 and
Shahab-5, with ranges approaching intercontinental
scope. If the INF process breaks down or cannot be
globalized, then the way is open to revitalizing Putin’s
2007 proposal for joint operation of missile defenses in
Gabala and for a joint Russian-NATO Theater Missile
Defense (TMD). Rather than have Russia walk out of
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the INF, which is its legal right, and thereby provoke
a massive arms race in Europe and Asia, we should
use this opportunity to move to a defense-dominant
relationship in Eurasia consonant with broader
strategic objectives sketched out below. Under those
circumstances, the missile defenses currently being
built in Poland and the Czech Republic would cease
to be a problem for Russia. Instead they become a
defense against Iran and the range of threats Iran could
conceivably mount against Russia. This would be a
much cheaper and more strategically effective way
for Russia to deal with IRBM threats from Iran, and
it would also have a restraining impact upon Chinese
developments.
The prospect of meaningful strategic cooperation
with Russia also weakens those in the Kremlin who base
all policies on the initial premise of unending American
hostility and readiness for war so that they can demand
ever more resources from the Russian people for their
own personal and institutional benefit. At the same time,
such accords strengthen those who want to see more
great power cooperation. Furthermore, moves that
reorient the bilateral relationship from one of mutual
deterrence that postulates an ingrained hostility with
force structures to match that presumption towards a
defense-dominant regime also weaken the intellectual
and cognitive base of those who believe in inherent
conflict, while strengthening forces wanting to work
for more genuine partnership. At the same time, if
a new INF treaty is achieved, the Russians will then
have to choose between it and the United States on
the one hand, and support for Iran on the other. New
arms control treaties have proven in general to exercise
great pressure globally to desist from proliferation, so
a new INF treaty would likely not be an exception to
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this rule. A renewed INF treaty should then place Iran
under considerable pressure to renounce its IRBMs,
and without those programs, its quest for nuclear
weapons becomes quite senseless.
At the same time, a new START treaty would also
have similar effects globally, especially if China is
part of it. A new START treaty would also certainly
strengthen the prospects for a successful round of
the next Preparatory Committee meetings of the
Nonproliferation Treaty in 2010 as well as pressure
on would-be proliferators. It would show both
Beijing and Moscow that we take their concerns and
status seriously, and that we can restore a significant
measure of mutual confidence in our relations through
a process of negotiations and of adherence to strict
verification regimes. As part of that START process,
we should also encourage the big five nuclear powers
and members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) to
move away from the hostility-inducing posture of
mutual deterrence to a defense–dominant paradigm
buttressed by treaties, inspection regimes, and robust
but reduced second-strike capabilities that would be
sufficient for retaliatory purposes and missions. As the
United States is the strongest, most capable, and most
advanced conventional military power in the world, it
is entirely to its interests that it find a way to reduce as
far as possible the possibility that nuclear weapons will
be used as warfighting weapons, as they negate our
comparative advantage. All these moves in regard to
strategic weapons would also take away ammunition
from Russia’s hawks who still hanker after a Soviettype military and nuclear force, complete with a Soviet
threat assessment that does not answer the real threats
to Russian security and bankrupts the country while
lining the pockets of its despots and their retainers.
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If we can regenerate this virtuous circle of
successfully concluded INF and START treaties, we
can then address the issue of the missile defenses
in the Czech Republic and Poland. Our analysis has
shown that irrespective of the Bush administration’s
strategies, which induced much anxiety in Moscow,
Russia, as part of its strategy, insists on being able
to intimidate Europe through the Iskander, especially
its cruise missile variant and its TNW or NSNW. The
threats of missile strikes and targeting that Moscow
has made against virtually every state from the Baltic
states to Georgia demonstrate the need for both
missile defenses and, frankly, for NATO’s continuing
robustness, if not enlargement to states who want to
join it on its terms, e.g., Ukraine and Georgia. As part
of the next admininstration’s arms control and Russian
strategy, it should be made crystal clear to Russia that,
as a matter of principle, it cannot claim partnership with
Europe while threatening it and trying to intimidate
it. Furthermore, that if it persists in doing so, we and
our allies will take the necessary steps, even within a
defense-dominant nuclear framework, to deter and
rebuff those threats so that Russia pays the price of its
misconceived and aggressive policies.
Accordingly, in regard to the nuclear agenda, the
next administration, as part of its aforementioned
moves towards a new INF and START treaty, should also
make every effort to devise a workable verification regime for TNW or NSNW (this regime would also include
the definitional issues that are crucial here in defining
just what kind of weapons are being discussed) with a
view towards eliminating not only these weapons on
both sides, but also banning the use of cruise missiles
like the Iskander-K in Europe. In other words, the
administration should move beyond Russia’s proposal,
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which may not be wholly serious (i.e., regarding the
INF), to demand a Europe freed from the weapons
covered by the INF. A mutually devised verification
regime, along with defenses like the proposed joint
U.S.-Russian defenses, would then ensure stability for
both sides and eliminate any nuclear or missile threats
against European governments. However, for this to
work, Russia has to come back to the CFE treaty. So the
U.S. Government in 2009 should hold to the CFE treaty
and induce a Russian signature of the treaty contingent
upon Russian withdrawals from Georgia and Moldova,
which could then be the trigger for a general European
ratification of that treaty that would restore its strict
and confidence-building verification regime.
If consummated, these arms control measures
would ratify the debellicization of Europe, which is
the outstanding achievement of the last generation. If
Russia refuses to go along with them, it will simply
demonstrate conclusively that its quest for “sovereign
democracy” is nothing more than a quest for empire in
Eurasia, whose corollary is the intimidation of Europe
and the bifurcation of Eurasia into blocs that are
intrinsically hostile to each other. While this renewed
regional bipolarity is not in Russia’s or our interest,
it is a threat that is well within our, NATO’s, and the
EU’s capability to deter and even defeat. Here again,
the idea is to take serious account of Russia’s security
concerns, but to use them to advance American and
Western interests, while also inducing Russia to move
from a hostile-based deterrence paradigm to a defensedominant one that is not based on the presupposition of
conflict. Then it would be clear that if there are threats
to European security, they emanate from Moscow, not
Washington. Essentially Russia will be given a choice
of alternatives so that its demands for partnership
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and security, along with a “system-forming role,” are
taken account of but, from the U.S. view, harnessed
to broader aims of peace, stability, and even progress
towards democratization in both Europe and Asia.
Finally, our efforts to forge with Russia a viable,
enduring, and mutually beneficial arms control
regime as part of a new international order must be
part of a broader comprehensive strategy toward
Russia that addresses regional security, democracy,
and energy, as well as arms control. All these policies
must move together towards persuading Russia by
force of circumstances (not circumstances of force) to
rethink its fundamental postulates concerning both its
domestic political order and the international political
order within which it takes part. In engaging Russian
proposals for arms control seriously, we must demand
an equivalent serious engagement with our agenda
that comprises the issues listed above. I have elsewhere
described what that agenda should look like and what
its prerequisites for success are, so there is no need to
repeat all of them again here.328
However, it must be stressed that while U.S. policy
will change out of necessity in 2009, though we cannot
forecast at present the direction or scope of those
changes, Russian policy must change too. And for
that change to occur, we have to create appropriate
external circumstances and pressures. While reassuring
Russia that its security is not presently at risk, we
must nevertheless appraise Russia of the risks from
continuing to try and intimidate Europe and restore an
empire in violation of the 1989-91 status quo solemnized
by several treaties, including those on arms control.
As long as it is not a democracy and is an international
law-breaker, Russia cannot expect to be acknowledged
as a true member of the G-8, or any democratic club,
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nor as a great power, certainly not a great European
power. Neither can it be exempted from what is now
the common practice whereby all governments’ internal
policies are subjected to constant foreign scrutiny.
And Russia, based on its record, certainly cannot be
entrusted with an exclusive sphere of interest around
its peripheries based on “security zones” when it is a
prime fomenter of regional instability. Indeed, such
policies only ensure the ultimate crash of the present
Russian status quo.
Therefore, simultaneously, robust engagement on
arms control and pressure for democratization and
respect for its neighbors’ sovereignty, integrity, and
independence must not only continue, but should grow
and be regularly invoked by U.S. leaders precisely
because Russia and other Eurasian governments have
signed all these treaties, going back to the Helsinki
treaty of 1975. The cornerstone of our demand for
this kind of policy is the basic building block of world
order, namely the doctrine of Pacta Sunt Servanda
(treaties must be obeyed). And the conditions that gave
rise to those treaties with regard to democratization
in Europe have not been fully overcome, as Russian
and Belarusian policy illustrate. Like it or not, Russia
or its potential satellites cannot pretend successfully
that they are being confronted with double standards
or talk about Russia being a sovereign democracy as
it now does. The treaties now in effect clearly outline
a diminution of unbridled sovereignty and arguably
any recognized international treaty does so too. That
argument should be the cornerstone of our demands to
treaty signatories, coupled with meaningful sanctions,
not just economic, for failure to uphold these treaties.
Of course, there are also equally good security or
strategic reasons for upholding democratization at
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every turn even as we seek avenues for negotiation.
It is not just because we believe, with considerable
justification, that states who reach democracy are
ultimately stronger, even if they have to cross through
dangerous waters to get there, it is also that, as noted
above, Russia shows no sign of accepting responsibility
for its actions and their consequences, e.g., in the frozen
conflicts in Moldova, Georgia, or in Ukraine, let alone
in its support for the repressive regimes of Central Asia
or its arms sales abroad. To the extent that violence,
crime, and authoritarian rule flourish in these states,
they are all at risk of upheaval, even sudden upheaval
as we have seen in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine
and in the repeated manifestations of internal violence
that shook Uzbekistan in 2004-05 and could easily do
so again. Such violence and instability could easily
spread to Russia, as the example of Chechnya and the
North Caucasus suggests.
Not pushing for reform even as we seek these
states’ security from attack by terrorists or from their
incorporation in a Russian sphere of influence avails
us little. For, as Tesmur Basilia, special assistant for
economic issues to former Georgian President Edvard
Shevarnadze, wrote, in many CIS countries, e.g.,
Georgia and Ukraine, “the acute issue of choosing
between alignment with Russia and the West is
associated with the choice between two models of
329
social development.” Indeed, even some Russian
analysts acknowledge the accuracy of this insight. Thus
Dmitry Furman writes that, “The Russia-West struggle
in the CIS is a struggle between two irreconcilable
330
systems.” Furman even accepts the repressiveness of
the current regime, saying that “Managed democracies
331
are actually a soft variant of the Soviet system.”
The aptness of these observations transcends
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Georgia and Ukraine to embrace the entire postSoviet region, since it is clear that Moscow opposes
“exporting democracy” to it. Indeed, it regards the
idea with contempt and thus attracts the local dictators
who cleave to it for support against Western pressures
332
for democratization. Basilia also pointed to the local
perception of Russia as security threat.
Nowadays there are many in the West who believe
that Russia has changed and, having reformed, seeks
to interact with neighboring countries in conformity
with international norms. Some Eurasian countries
would disagree with this opinion, and believe instead
that the Russian mentality has not changed much, and
that Russia continues to deem the “near abroad” as its
sphere of social influence. After the second war with
Chechnya, many think that Russia regards violence as
its major tool for resolving social and political problems,
especially with regard to non-Russian peoples from the
former empire. Thus integration into the international
community should be viewed as a guarantee for security
and further development.333

The current silence or relative silence on democratic
issues facilitates the exportation of Russia’s sphere
of influence and style of rule throughout the CIS,
while strengthening Georgian, Ukrainian, and other
democracies not only forestalls chances for internal
upheaval in those states, it also rebuffs Russian
imperialism and thus helps strengthen domestic
Russian calls for reform. More urgently, it reduces
Russia’s chances to engineer long-standing reversals of
both Westernization and democratization in Ukraine
and elsewhere, outcomes that only reduce security
throughout the CIS.
The logic is the same as George Kennan’s even if
containment is not the policy choice here. By standing
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on the basis of international law and the democratic
choice of those states’ peoples, not our own unilateral
and hegemonic power, and by working intensively
with those states who wish the benefits of association
with the West, we can create examples of progress that
will resonate in Russia and elsewhere while checking
the spread of deformations of governance that only add
to Russia’s and our own insecurity. NATO was and is
correct in observing that its and the EU’s expansions
enlarge the domain of security in Europe and Eurasia
to the benefit of Russia, if not that of its elite, which can
only survive by imperialism and predation.
Ultimately, then, the tenacious, insistent, and
unceasing proclamation of deviations by Russia
from its own promised course of action are legally
and strategically strongly founded and mutually
invigorating. A strategy that engages not only
Russia on its vital issues and agenda, but also the
CIS and Eastern Europe on an equal basis with
Russia and does so while unceasingly proclaiming
that democratic values enshrined in treaties must be
upheld, benefits everyone except Russia’s rulers. But it
certainly redounds to the benefit of the long-suffering
334
Russian people. Neither does it represent an effort
to overthrow Russia unless one wants to accept at
face value the self-serving pronunciamentos of the
ruling group. What must be understood as a guiding
strategic principle here is that Russian autocracy and
its corollary, Russian imperialism, are the gravest
security threat facing Eurasia (including Europe and
Russia itself) and are ultimately incompatible with any
progress of the Russian people, or Eurasia to security,
liberty, and prosperity.
A recent article by Danish scholar Sten Rynning
insightfully cites the work of Lassa Oppenheim,
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the founder of the school of positive law, on these
points. As Rynning writes, Oppenheim argued that,
“International law can operate only under certain
conditions, the two most important of which are a
balance of power and a shared conception of politics.”335
(Italics in the original.) Rynning further argues that
the supply of WMD will be the focal point where these
two conditions are met because “a shared conception
of power within a working balance of power makes for
satisfied or conservative great powers.” These powers
are uniquely empowered because of their size and reach
to control the flow of the resources needed for WMD in
the international system. And during the Cold War, the
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) came into being exactly
when they both became fully conscious of their mutual
interest in controlling nuclear weapons.336 The ensuing
regime was supposed to bolster mutual deterrence, but
it also enhanced bilateral communication and restricted
nuclear weapons diffusion to other members of their
alliance systems that helped counter the outbreak of
new threats.337
However, today’s world is rather different. Even if
America has lost ground under the Bush administration,
it still remains by far the greatest power and master
of the strongest global alliance system. Thus a
fundamental asymmetry or imbalance of power exists.
Yet Washington cannot simply insist upon its demands
and get its way, as current proliferation crises show
us. Under the circumstances, we can either follow the
logic of imbalance or strive to uphold the old balance
in unfamiliar environments. As Rynning observes,
If none of Oppenheim’s conditions are met, if power
is asymmetrically distributed and ideological conflict
predominates, we encounter cases of revisionist demand;
revisionists demand nuclear weapons as deliberate
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instruments of expansion, because they wish to check
hegemonic power and enhance the scope for their
own values and desires. What happens when an order
designed to control supply and counter misguided
demand—by nature a generalized, universal order—
encounters cases of revisionist demand? Gerry Simpson
is in no doubt: legalized hegemony and anti-pluralism
will move to the forefront of the international debate.
Legalized hegemony denotes the hegemon’s attempt
to secure for itself special privileges justified on the
grounds that it is policing the order; anti-pluralism
denoted the political effort to delineate the ideas and
ambitions that will earn some states the title of “outlaw”
and cause their exclusion from the society of nations.
The implication is that status quo powers cannot merely
uphold the old order. They can either seek to reshape the
old order to make it relevant and sustainable or they can
more simply, but also dramatically seek to replace it with
something new.338 (Italics in the original)

Washington, in this case the hegemon, has sought
by unilateral and multilateral actions (UN resolution
1540 and the Proliferation Security Initiative) to
reshape that nuclear order. The multilateral moves
have succeeded and are now part of international
practice and law, whereas the unilateral moves to
replace the old order, preemptive invasion of Iraq and
a unilateral nuclear policy, have failed conspicuously
to advance U.S. interests and nuclear security.339 The
U.S. nuclear weapons policy and overall nuclear
unilateralism have stimulated Sino-Russian fears of
U.S. intentions and capabilities as well as considerable
criticism abroad of Washington’s supposedly cavalier
attitude towards arms control treaties.340 Indeed, not
only are North Korea and Iran examples of revisionist
demand, so too is Russia, given its strong opposition
to U.S. nuclear weapons policies, missile defenses,
and nonproliferation policy. There is good reason
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to see in Russian policy for the last several years a
move towards the revisionist demand posture that
“demands nuclear weapons as deliberate instruments
of expansion, because it wishes to check hegemonic
power and enhance the scope for its own values and
desires.”341
This conjuncture of all these nuclear issues is not
accidental. As Stephen Cimbala writes,
The possible emergence of a nuclear armed Iran shows
how the issue of cooperative security in Europe and
the Middle East is directly linked to the U.S.-Russian
problem of post-Cold War nuclear stability. Russian
political support is necessary inside and outside of
the UN Security Council in order to contain Iranian
nuclear ambitions. To obtain this cooperation, the U.S.
must reassure Russia that it has no interest in nuclear
superiority with the intent of coercing Russia or using
NATO as a vehicle for undermining the Russian regime.
Missile defense, if deployed cannot have their Cold War
flavor of competition for nuclear superiority, but must
emerge from an environment of U.S.-Russian security
cooperation.342

However, we are far away from that environment.
Precisely because a state constituted as Russia now
represents a standing invitation to uncontrolled
military adventurism—of which there has been much
in Russia’s brief history and not least due to the absence
of democratic control over the power ministries—it
has to be checked.343 There is no contradiction between
engaging Russia on the great issues of proliferation
and arms control and cooperating with it against the
common enemy of terrorism, and at the same time
insisting on its behaving according to European norms
that it has accepted in the treaties it has signed, all with
a view to integrating it with its European neighbors.
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While this is certainly difficult in practice, it is hardly
less difficult than the policy we now are conducting,
which has left us attacked by unending crises with few
if any governments willing to help us.
In fact, a policy that bases itself on treaties and
laws rather than upon unilateral assertions of power
is actually more effective than that alternative, even if
it means narrowing the scope of freedom of action for
344
unilateral American ventures. As Robert Wright’s
recent argument for reforming U.S. foreign policy in
general towards what he calls progressive realism
contends,
There is principle here that goes beyond arms control:
the national interest can be served by constraints on
American behavior when they constrain other nations
as well. This logic covers the spectrum of international
governance, from global warming, (we’ll cut carbon
dioxide emissions if you will) to war (we’ll refrain from
it if you will).345

Indeed, democratization is essential, first of all in
regard to Russia’s power agencies. The armed forces
still regard NATO and the United States as their main
enemies, and their exercises confirm it even to the point
of often involving missile and nuclear strikes or largescale conventional exercises against alleged terrorists.
Second, although Putin, Medvedev, and Ivanov have
endeavored to restructure at least some of the armed
forces to fight primarily against terrorist attacks, which
are the current main threat to Russian security, this use of
the military in a counterterrorist or counterintelligence
force can have the most serious negative domestic
outcomes, as we have seen in Chechnya. Moreover,
these forces could also easily be used as Gorbachev and
Yeltsin had sought to use them, i.e., against democratic
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reform at home.346 The more recent military buildup
and emphasis on nuclear and anti-American scenarios
within a framework of the presupposition of conflict
will inevitably recreate pressures akin to those of the
Cold War for military buildup because deterrence,
while possibly restraining both sides from war, freezes
them in a posture of global hostility across the global
security agenda and stabilizes the rule of autocrats and
great power chauvinists in Russia.
Third, the tendency to adventurism that led
Moscow into its so-called peacemaking operations in
the Caucasus and Moldova have now embroiled it in
situations where the threat of war, particularly with
Georgia, is constant and where Russian policy seems
mainly to consist of provocations of Tbilisi to get it
to launch a violent conflict or of responses to Tbilisi’s
own penchant for provocative acts.347 So dangerous
a policy inevitably has unforeseen consequences.
The recent signs of military adventurism, buzzing
Scotland, flights to Guam and the resumption of longrange air patrols, submarine races to plant the flag of
sovereignty in the Arctic, and exercises with Venezuela
in the Caribbean only serve the armed forces’ myopic
interest of “walking tall.” They do nothing to enhance
Russian security. And, finally, the lack of democratic
control over the armed forces has been a constant and
lethal aspect of Russian policy toward Chechnya which
has resulted in frightful violations of human rights and
which has generated in response a running series of
low-intensity conflicts across the North Caucasus for
which Moscow has no solution.
While democracy is not a panacea, it is safe to say
that a democratically controlled military would have
behaved differently as would its masters also have
done. Indeed, it is arguable that what Russia’s military
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fears most about NATO expansion is that it generates
an external pressure that is supported by domestic
reformers to democratize the entire range of Russian
national security policy and subject it to civilian and
democratic accountability under law, something that
is anathema to that military-political elite.348 Thus,
ultimately there are compelling geostrategic reasons
why the vigorous and ongoing insistence on reforms
as signed in international treaties is an essential and
indispensable part of any sound Western policy toward
Russia.
While the next administration should take
account of Russia’s (and China’s) interests, it cannot
be bound and shackled by them. Those interests and
the proposals emanating now from Moscow offer
the next administration the opportunity to forge a
strategy based upon cooperative engagement in arms
control and to move forward to effect a mutually
beneficial reshaping of the current status quo. At the
same time, those arms control proposals that we are
recommending for the next administration should
be seen and included as part of a comprehensive
strategy towards Russia that strives to reduce Russian
opportunities for intimidating its neighbors and
breaking free of international restraints even as we
assume them upon ourselves. These proposals and
the larger strategy within which it is embedded offer
opportunities for both Russian security partnerships
and a decline of tension throughout Eurasia that is a
necessary prerequisite for further progress towards
both peace and democratization.
If Moscow prefers conflict and the fantasy of neoimperial revanche based upon deterrence and enduring
great power hostility, we are not strong enough to
reshape Eurasia unilaterally and simply exclude it as
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we move forward. That strategy was tried and failed,
leaving us with a renewed entrapment in the mire
of deterrence. We can maintain peace and possibly
make limited advances towards our objectives in this
fashion. But we do so at the cost of permanent tension,
and Russia does so at the cost of setting the stage for
what will likely be another political upheaval in its
long history of aborted chances for peace and reform.
Despite the current seeming impasse in bilateral
relations, there are opportunities for us in Russia’s new
arms control proposals, whatever their underlying
intentions may be. We can either ignore them and move
along the same unsatisfying lines that we have taken in
the last 8 years, or we can exploit this opportunity and
devise proposals that move us, Russia, and other key
players farther in the direction of mutual security and
peace than ever before. That outcome would be the
most beneficial for all concerned. But Russia, too, has
a choice; it can saddle itself with the continuation of
the status quo because it is governed by suspicion, an
egotism borne of the dizziness from success induced
by oil and gas revenues and the neo-imperial dynamic
inherent in autocracy. Or else Russia can choose to
recover its professed European vocation and begin
to deliver on the promise of prosperity, peace, and
freedom for its citizens. Ultimately arms control issues
are inseparable from the nature of the domestic regime
in each country. Our regime will of necessity change
in January 2009. And as the strongest player in the
game and a truly “system-forming” power, it is up to
us to take a leadership role in moving toward a new
nuclear and overall order. But can Russia do so? Does
it want to do so? Its formal proposals, no matter how
they were intended, offer the next administration the
opportunity not only to fulfill America’s responsibilities
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both for and to the world, but also to help Russia begin
to unchain itself from the fantasies and nightmares of
the past. We can only hope that both Washington and
Moscow seize those opportunities that now beckon to
them.
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